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THE USE OF DURESS IN DEFENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
The following snapshots of seemingly diverse prosecutions illustrate
the potential breadth of duress as a defense for battered women:
* In Alabama, a judge sentenced Judith Neelley to death after a jury
convicted her of the capital murder and kidnapping of a thirteen year old
girl that Neelley admittedly lured from a shopping mall. Neelley contended
that she had killed the girl at the direction and under the control of her
husband, who had brainwashed Neelley, through physical and sexual
torture, to carry out his criminal deeds. 1
* In Chicago, Marcia Bohach pled guilty to charges that she engaged
in a two-year conspiracy to possess and distribute 500 pounds of
marijuana. Bohach, who had suffered more than 25 years of previous
sexual, physical, and emotional abuse, claimed that she was terrified of
her abusive co-conspirator and, notwithstanding his residence in Arizona,
believed that she must do anything he told her.2
e In Hawaii, Barbara Lee Sebresos entered a conditional guilty plea
to charges stemming from a four-year scheme to embezzle over $130,000
from a union. Sebresos argued that the primary beneficiary of all
embezzled funds was her husband who controlled her conduct through
years ofphysical and mental abuse.3
* In West Virginia, a jury convicted Debra Lambert of welfare fraud.
At trial, Lambert presented evidence of prior physical abuse from her
husband, including evidence that on several occasions he had beaten and
threatened her after she had informed him of her desire to inform the
welfare department of his employment. 4
1 Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 670-71, 677 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd,
494 So. 2d 697 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1987), denial of post
conviction relief aft'd, 642 So. 2d 494 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), writ quashed as
improvidently granted, 642 So. 2d 510, (Ala. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316
(1995); see also infra notes 155 and 289.
2 Charles J. Aron, In Defense of Battered Women-Is Justice Blind?, 20 HuM.
RTs. Q. 14, 15 (Fall 1993) (citing United States v. Marsha Bohach, 91 C.R. 63 (N.D.
11I.)); Mary Wisniewski, Is "Battered Syndrome" a Defense to Drug Charges?, 137
Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 3, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter "Wisniewski, Battered
Syndrome"]; Mary Wisniewski, Defense Request for Expert on Abuse Rejected, 137
Cm. DAILYL. BULL., Dec. 17, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter "Wisniewski, Defense"].
3 United States v. Sebresos, No. 91-10193, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17757 (9th
Cir. 1992).
4 State v. Lambert, 312 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1984).
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* In California, a jury convicted Debra Romero of one count of
second degree robbery and four counts of attempted robbery. Romero
established that she had been battered daily by her live-in boyfriend, who
would beat her if she did not get money to support his drug addiction or if
she refused to do what he wanted.5
* In Ohio, Edna Engle pled no contest to murder in connection with
the scalding death of her four-year old son. At trial, Engle sought to
establish that her husband, who was convicted in the son's death, beat
and threatened her to keep her quiet.6
Though the seriousness and circumstances of their respective crimes
differ widely, each of these women shared a common defense strategy:
each asserted that she had been the victim of severe physical, sexual,
and/or psychological abuse and that she had committed her offense at the
compulsion of her male batterer, i.e., under duress. Similar accounts of
battered women who allegedly commit criminal offenses at their abusers'
insistence increasingly fill pages of newspapers and legal reporters. Some
of these women admit to participating in violent offenses such as murder, 7
5 People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), vacated on other
grounds, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994).
6 Jim Woods, Edna Engle Enters Plea of No Contest in Death of Son, 4,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 9, 1992, at IA.
7 Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 670-71 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (murder of
13-year old girl), aft'd, 494 So. 2d 697 (Ala. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 926
(1987), denial of post conviction relief affid, 642 So. 2d 494 (1993), writ quashed as
improvidently granted, 642 So. 2d 510, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995); People
v. Smith, 608 N.E.2d 1259 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (mother convicted of force-feeding
acid to her infant); State v. Dunn, 758 P.2d 718 (Kan. 1988) (two counts felony
murder), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Dunn v. Roberts, 758 F. Supp. 1442 (D.
Kan. 1991), aft'd, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992); McDonald v. State, 674 P.2d 1154
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (life sentence plus 20 years for first degree murder and
assault and battery with intent to kill); State v. Bockorny, 863 P.2d 1296 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993) (life without parole for aggravated murder committed with husband),
review denied, 870 P.2d 220 (Or. 1994); McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (R.L
1992) (first degree murder); see also Rorie Sherman, Acceptance of Defense Is Up for
Battered Women, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 3 (reporting on clemency granted to
battered woman on death row for being an accessory with her abuser in killing spree
that left eight dead); Kathryn Kahler, Women on Death Row: Chilling Sign of the
flmes, PLAIN DEALER, May 26, 1993, at 1A, 10A (reporting on youngest woman on
death row in 1990 who murdered a Florida man while her boyfriend videotaped the
killing).
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kidnapping, 8 robbery, 9 burglary,10 and child abuse.11 Many commit drug
offenses 12 that often carry stiff mandatory penalties. 13 Still others admit to
property crimes like fraud, 14 embezzlement, 15 and shoplifting.16
8 Dunn, 963 F.2d at 310; Neelley, 494 So. 2d at 671.
9 United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1992) (aiding and abetting
armed bank robbery); Dunn, 963 F.2d at 310 (aggravated robbery); Romero, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 333 (robbery, attempted robbery).
10 Kessler v. State, 850 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (burglary of a
habitation).
11 Commonwealth v. Ely, 578 A.2d 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (endangering
welfare of child, incest, corruption of minor); see also John Ellement, Battered
Woman Defense OK'd in Abuse Case, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1994 at 30;
Dan McGrath, Abused Mom Still Must Protect Kids, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 18,
1994, at A2; Angela Phillips, The Abuse that Paralyzes; Angela Phillips on the
Battered Wife IWho Must Pay Twice Over for Her Daughter's Death, THE GUARDIAN,
Jan. 28, 1992, at 13; Woods, supra note 6.
12 United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 1994) (carrying a firearm during
commission of drug trafficking crime), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2585 (1995); United
States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1992) (defendants were low-level operatives
in large drug operation); United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1991) (seven
counts cocaine-related criminal activity), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985 (1991); United
States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 1991) (possession
with intent to distribute), reh'g denied, 952 F.2d 413 (11th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (intentional possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute); Sloan v. State, No. CA CR 88-35, 1988 WL 70743 (Ark. Ct.
App. July 6, 1988) (delivery of controlled substance; possession with intent to
deliver); State v. Vanzant, No. 64010, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5220 (Ohio Ct. App.
Oct. 28, 1993) (drug trafficking; possession of criminal tool); State v. Baker, No.
13-91-46, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3745 (Ohio Ct. App. July 16, 1992) (aggravated
drug trafficking); State v. Sisson, No. 9-88-36, 1990 WL 121493 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
22, 1990) (drug trafficking).
13 For a discussion of the obstacles that battered offenders face at sentencing, see
infra part V.D.
14 United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1992) (federal wire fraud and
conspiracy in connection with false affidavit); United States v. Gregory, No. 88 CR
295, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10060 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1988) (scheme to defraud
United States in connection with false tax returns and refunds); State v. Torres, 657
P.2d 1194 (N.M. 1983) (obtaining merchandise by fraud); State v. Lambert, 312
S.E.2d 31, 32 (W. Va. 1984) (welfare fraud).
15 United States v. Sebresos, No. 91-10193, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17757, at *1
(9th Cir. July 22, 1992) (15 counts of embezzlement).
16 Barbara Fitzsimmons, A Hostage Is Freed; Battered Wife Released from Jail,
Cleared of Check-Kiting, Theft Charges, SAN DmoO UNION Tam., June 28, 1992, at
D1.
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Unlike "standard" duress cases, the batterer-coercer is often either
absent or not immediately threatening the woman at the time she commits
these crimes.17 Frequently, battered women assert duress to multiple
crimes occurring over an extended period of time.18 Indeed, the batterer
may not explicitly demand that the woman commit the specific crime with
which she is charged. The woman, instead, may act at the batterer's
"uncoerced" suggestion that she engage in illegal activity or out of some
generalized, albeit well-founded, fear of future abuse unless she obtains
money to support her family or placate her abuser.19 Because a battered
woman often does not have the proverbial "gun to her head" during
commission of her crime, she may not satisfy many of the restrictions
traditionally imposed on the defense of coercion.20 Not surprisingly, courts
in these cases struggle to define the appropriate role that this alleged duress
17 See, e.g., Homick, 964 F.2d at 906 (ex-husband out of town at time he
allegedly requested that defendant falsify affidavit); Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669,
693 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (woman armed and traveling in separate vehicle during
much of couple's criminal exploits), aff'd, 494 So. 2d 6978 (Ala. 1986), cert denied,
480 U.S. 926 (1987), denial ofpost conviction relief aff'd, 642 So. 2d 494 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1993), writ quashed as improvidently granted, 642 So. 2d 510 (Ala. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995); State v. Vanzant, No. 64010, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
5220, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. October 28, 1993) (battered woman sold drugs to bail
abuser out of jail); State v. Baker, No. 13-91-46, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3745, at *15
(Ohio Ct. App. July 16, 1992) (threat from jailed boyfriend); McDonald v. State, 674
P.2d 1154, 1155 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (woman held gun while husband
bludgeoned victims); see also Wisniewski, Defense, supra note 2, at 3 (Bohach's
abuser in Arizona during drug conspiracy and would only visit defendant in Illinois
once a month).
18 See, e.g., Sebresos, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17757, at *1 (embezzlement
scheme over four-year period); United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 253 (3d Cir.
1991) (distribution of cocaine on six occasions over period of almost one year);
Gregory, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10060, at *3 (34 month scheme to defraud); People
v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 334-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (five
robberies/attempted robberies over one-month period of time), vacated on other
grounds, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994); State v. Dunn, 758 P.2d 718, 722 (Kan. 1988)
(two and one-half week crime spree), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Dunn v.
Roberts, 758 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1991), aft'd, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992).
19 See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 489 So. 2d 402, 403 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(defendant's drug addicted husband forced her to cash worthless checks to support his
habit).
20 While some courts treat "coercion" as a defense technically distinct from
"duress," see infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text, many courts and legislatures
view the two terms as synonymous. Unless indicated otherwise, this Article uses the
terms "coercion" and "duress" interchangeably.
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should play in defense of "battered offenders."21
In this Article, I explore whether the "battered woman defense," 22 as
currently formulated in the self-defense context, comports with the present
parameters and underlying rationale of duress itself. I conclude that
excusing battered offenders in non-traditional cases of alleged coercion
would require either an explicit or implicit downward adjustment in the
ordinarily stringent requirements of classic duress. Such a modification
would further require that the principles of criminal responsibility
themselves be altered to speak in a more caring and individualistic voice
attuned to the plight of a much broader class of defendants than battered
women alone. Absent such adjustments, consideration of the coercion
undoubtedly experienced by many battered offenders must be relegated to
sentencing, where duress and the battered woman syndrome should play a
prominent role in mitigation of punishment.
The Article begins, in Part ]I, by considering the potential
21 The term "battered offenders" will herein specifically refer to battered women
allegedly coerced into crime by their abusers.
Some courts view battered offenders as having a psychological weapon trained on
them throughout the course of their criminal conduct. These courts readily permit
battered women to submit even "non-traditional" claims of duress to the fact-finder
and to support this defense with both lay and expert testimony concerning the abuse
and its psychological effects. Often, these courts analogize to the numerous cases
holding similar testimony relevant to the self-defense claims of battered women who
kill their abusers, often in apparently non-confrontational situations. See infra part
V.B.
Most courts, however, refuse to stretch the traditional confines of duress to
encompass battered offenders. These courts reserve duress for the truly
"extraordinary" case presenting an immediate, clear, and unavoidable choice between
the commission of a crime or serious physical harm to the defendant or another.
Individual psychological incapacity caused by subtle and ongoing physical or
psychological abuse, however coercive, will not excuse battered offenders. Instead,
these courts consider such abuse and coercion as relevant, if at all, solely to mitigate
punishment at sentencing. See infra part IV.B.
22 Most courts recognize that the battered woman syndrome does not constitute a
separate legal defense that gives battered women some unique right to kill or
otherwise engage in illegal activity. See Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337 n.8; People
v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 761 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d
801, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982); State v.
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988). Instead, and as used herein, the term
"battered woman defense" refers to the evidentiary use of expert and lay testimony
concerning domestic violence in order to bolster a battered woman's credibility or to
support the substantive elements of her defense.
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ramifications of expanding duress to excuse battered offenders. 23 Given the
prevalence of domestic violence, as well as the dramatic increase in the
arrest and imprisonment rates for women, duress constitutes a much
broader and more legally significant defense for battered women than
self-defense, on which virtually all legal commentary currently focuses. 24
Notwithstanding its potentially greater significance, however, the
duress asserted by battered offenders relies heavily upon the psychological
and legal theories utilized in battered women's self-defense work. To
provide necessary foundation, then, Part I briefly examines the nature of
the battered woman syndrome25 and the role it currently plays in
circumventing the obstacles that battered women often encounter under
traditional self-defense doctrine.26
Parts IV and V then explore recent attempts to extend the battered
woman defense, by analogy, beyond self-defense to cases of alleged duress.
Part IV examines the traditional elements of duress and the roadblocks
currently confronting battered offenders under that classic formulation. 27
Part V explores possible means of circumventing those obstacles, whether
through the explicit or implicit modification of duress itself, or via
23 See infra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
24 While a voluminous amount of scholarship concerns battered women's
self-defense work, see infra note 52, scholars have paid relatively little attention to the
potentially broader use of the battered woman syndrome to support a defense of
duress. The limited literature on this point is reflected in the following works: Susan
D. Appel, Note, Beyond Self-Defense: The Use of Battered Woman Syndrome in
Duress Defenses, U. ILL. L. REv. 955 (1994); Aron, supra note 2 at 14-17; Charles I.
Aron, Women Battered By Life and Law Lose Twice, 15 NAT'L L.., July 19, 1993 at
13; Meredith Blake, Coerced Into Crime: The Application of Battered Woman
Syndrome to the Defense of Duress, 9 WIs. WOMEN's L.J. 67 (1994); Beth LZ.
Boland, Battered Women Who Act Under Duress, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 603 (1994);
Juanita Brooks, Creative Defenses and Desperate Defenses, LITIGATION, Winter 1992,
at 22; Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1994); Monique
Gousie, From Sel-Defense to Coercion: McMaugh v. State-Use of Battered Woman's
Syndrome to Defend Wife's Involvement in Third-Party Murder, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV.
453 (1993); Eilis S. Magner, Case and Comment on Runjanjic/Kontinnen, 15 CRIM. L.
J. 445 (Australia) (1991).
25 The term "battered woman syndrome" refers to the behavioral and
psychological reactions of women subjected to severe, long-term physical and
psychological domestic abuse. See LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (1984). For a detailed discussion of the battered woman syndrome, see
infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 68-115 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 116-209 and accompanying text (part IV).
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increasing sentencing discretion. 28
Parts VI and VII conclude by examining which, if any, of those options
comport with the underlying nature of duress, 29 as well as principles of
criminal responsibility. 30 Given the objective nature of duress, as well as
the principles of personal accountability and free choice that underlie our
criminal justice system, the battered woman defense, as employed in
practice today, cannot fit within the narrow confines of duress as an
exception to the general rule of culpability for crimes knowingly and
voluntarily committed. Instead, the subjective coercion presently embodied
in the battered woman defense seems most appropriately accounted for
through increased sentencing discretion.
II. BATTERED OFFENDERS
No one knows precisely how many women in this country are
"coerced" 31 into crime by abusive male intimates. While I have located no
formal study on the issue, statistics concerning domestic violence, in
conjunction with those concerning female crime, indicate that many female
offenders are battered women who commit their offenses under fear,
domination, or coercion of an abusive partner.
Domestic abuse constitutes the leading cause of injury to women in this
country.3 2 Although statistical descriptions of the magnitude of the problem
vary widely, most would agree that "woman abuse" 33 is a pervasive social
28 See infra notes 210-89 and accompanying text (part V).
29 See infra notes 290-368 and accompanying text (part VI).
30 See infra notes 369-419 and accompanying text (part VII).
31 Of course, some of the difficulty in determining this statistic flows from the
difficulty of defining "coercion" itself. I use the term loosely in this section to include
physical or emotional compulsion that might fall short of the requirements of the legal
excuse of duress.
32 Battering causes more injuries to women than rapes, muggings, and automobile
accidents combined. Cynthia L. Pike, The Use of Medical Protocols in Identifying
Battered Women, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1941, 1941 n.3 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on
Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 523 & nn.11-14 (1992).
33 Although some courts and commentators refer to domestic violence as "spousal
abuse," men perpetrate almost ninety percent of intra-family abuse and principally
women suffer serious injuries from battery. See Robert Geffner & Alan Rosenbaum,
Characteristics and Treatment of Batterers, 8 BEHAv. SCi. & L. 131, 131 (1990); see
also Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1191, 1194 n.9
(1993); Schneider, supra note 32, at 540 & n.80.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
problem in the United States, affecting anywhere between 1.5 to 6 million
women annually3 4 and transcending all economic, racial, ethnic, religious,
and educational boundaries.35 Although demographically distinct, then, a
significant number of women in this country can legitimately be termed
"battered women." 36
Women also commit crimes, including "traditionally female" crimes
like prostitution, larceny-theft, fraud and forgery; 37  drug-related
34 Lack of reporting, as well as the inherent play in all statistics, make the
magnitude of domestic violence difficult to quantify. These factors, along with
differing definitions of battering itself, probably account for the wide statistical
variance in the number of women battered annually. See Shelley A. Bannister,
Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers: Their Courtroom Battles, in IT's A CRIME-
WOMEN AND JUSTICE 316, 317 (Roslyn Muraskin & Ted Alleman eds., 1993) (more
than 1.5 million battered women); Coughlin, supra note 24, at 6 & n.13 (between 2
and 4 million women); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1574 n.1 (1993) [hereinafter "Developments"]
(1.6 to 4 million); Geffner & Rosenbaum, supra note 33, at 131 (more than 2 million
women); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 McIH. L. REv. 1, 11 & n.42 (1991) (1.5 million to 3.4 million
women); Victoria Mikesell Mather, A Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman
Syndrome, Self Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv. 545, 545-46 &
nn.2-5 (1988) (between 2 and 6 million women). Numerous other statistical
descriptions seek to capture the vast dimensions of domestic abuse. See, e.g., Dutton,
supra note 33, at 1210 ("physical aggression occurs in one-fourth to one-third of all
marital couples"); Geffner & Rosenbaum, supra note 33, at 131 (20-25% of families
experience one or more incidents of domestic violence); Mahoney, supra, at 10-11 &
nn. 39-41 (women are physically abused in 12% of all marriages; 50% or more of
women will be battered at some time in their life); Mather, supra, at 545-56 & nn.2-5
(one-half to two-thirds of marriages experience at least one battering incident during
relationship); Schneider, supra note 32, at 523 & nn.11-14 (woman beaten every 18
seconds).
35 See Julie Blackman, Emerging Images of Severely Battered Women and the
Criminal Justice System, 8 BEHAV. SC. & L. 121, 122 (1990) (reporting on case
histories that demonstrate the real demographic and psychological diversity that exists
among battered women); Mather, supra note 34, at 548 & n.25 (noting that "battering
cuts across all social, economic, religious, racial, and ethnic lines"). While domestic
violence appears to transcend class and racial lines, Elizabeth Schneider cautions that
a "significant gap exists in the discourse and literature about battering in communities
of color." Schneider, supra note 32, at 532 n.45.
36 That is not to say that all women who are battered suffer from the "battered
woman syndrome," which generally requires repetitive instances of severe, long-term
abuse. See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
3 7 See RONALD BARRI FLOWERS, DEMOGRAPHICS AND CRIMINALrrY: THE
CHARACrERISTICS OF CRIME IN AMERICA 77 (1989); Phyllis Chesler, A Woman's Right
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offenses; 38 and crimes of violence, including homicide.39 Although women
comprise only a small fraction of the United States prison population, 40 the
percentage of women incarcerated in state and federal correctional facilities
has dramatically increased over the last decade, at a rate far outpacing that
of male offenders. 41
Myrna Raeder, who has studied the impact of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines upon female offenders, asserts that the victimization of women
to Self-Defense: The Case of Aileen Carol Wuornos, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 933, 937
& nn.ll-13 (1993); Imogene L. Moyer, Women's Prisons: Issues and Controversies,
in IT'S A CRIME-WOMEN AND JUSTICE 193, 198-99 (Roslyn Muraskin & Ted
Alleman eds., 1993); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms,
Battered Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 905, 912 n.21 (1993).
38 See FLOWERS, supra note 37, at 80 (37% of increase in female arrests from
1978 to 1987 due to drug abuse violations); Chesler, supra note 37, at 937 & n.13
(increased drug use and tough drug penalties responsible for increased female prison
population); Moyer, supra note 37, at 199 (researchers report drug abuse related to
offenses for which women incarcerated); Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The
Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices,
and the Sentencing of Females Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J.
CRim. L. & CRnMINOLOGY 181, 216 (1994) (more females sentenced in federal system
for drug offenses than for any other type of offense); Raeder, supra note 37, at 912
(drug offenders now account for significant portion of female federal criminals);
James L. Tyson, Mandatory Sentences Lead to Surge of Women in Prison, CHRIST.
Sc. MON., Nov. 29, 1993, at 1, 18 (one out of three women prisoners serving time
for drug related offenses in 1989).
39 See Mather, supra note 34, at 562 & nn.123-25; Moyer, supra note 37, at
199, 205.
40 Women comprise less than six percent of the United States prison population.
See Chesler, supra note 37, at 937; Moyer, supra note 37, at 193, 205.
41 See FLOWERS, supra note 37, at 80 (comparing a 33% increase in total female
arrests from 1978 through 1987 with a 23% increase in male arrests during same
period); Chesler, supra note 37, at 937 n.13 (noting that the number of female
prisoners tripled in the 1980s, compared to doubling for men); Raeder, supra note 37,
at 922, 925 (stating that the percentage of female federal inmates grew at a faster rate
than men from 1984 through 1990); Tyson, supra note 38, at 1 (noting that in twelve
years following 1980, the number of women in state and federal prisons increased by
275%, compared to 160% increase for male inmates). Experts advance varied reasons
for this increase in the female prison population. Some attribute the increase to less
paternalistic attitudes of law enforcement and a greater willingness to incarcerate
women. See Moyer, supra note 37, at 206. Others cite the "get-tough" societal
attitude toward crime. See Raeder, supra note 37, at 923 & n.79. Most also credit
stringent mandatory minimum drug penalties. See Chesler, supra note 37, at 937;
Raeder, supra note 37, at 923 & n.79; Tyson, supra note 38, at 1, 18.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
often fosters their involvement in criminal activity. 42 Although their
surrounding circumstances may not constitute legal duress, many offenses
committed by women arise out of "efforts to accommodate . . . male
intimates" 43 who dominate the female offenders. 44
For a battered woman, a male intimate may exert more than mere
domination. Studies indicate that nationwide as many as one-half of all
female inmates are victims of battering.45 Experts on domestic violence
posit that many battered women are currently incarcerated for crimes that
they committed under the coercion of an abusive male. For example, Dr.
Lenore Walker, a clinical psychologist who has extensively treated and
studied battered women, estimates that up to one-half of the women
currently in prison in this country committed their offenses to avoid further
beating: 46
Forging checks to pay his bills, stealing food or other items he denied the
children, selling drugs to keep his supply filled, hurting someone else so
he didn't hurt her were all acts committed under the control of the
batterer's threat of, or actual, violence. Some women struck back, most
often with great force and usually in self-defense. Few of these women
received an appropriate defense for their acts. Most listened to their
attorneys' suggestions to avoid trial and plead guilty, often to a lesser
negotiated plea rather than pursue a duress or diminished-capacity
42 Raeder, supra note 37, at 977.
43 Id. at 988.
44 Id. at 973 & n.412.
45 Mather, supra note 34, at 562 & n.129; Tyson, supra note 38, at 18. While
battering cuts across all socio-economic groups, see supra note 35, research strongly
suggests that the female prison population disproportionately draws from poor and
uneducated segments of society, as well as racial and ethnic minorities. See Moyer,
supra note 37, at 197; Raeder, supra note 37, at 910-11; Tyson, supra note 38, at 18.
46 WALKER, supra note 25, at 142. Dr. Walker, who coined the term "battered
woman syndrome," has authored numerous other books and articles concerning
battered women and their treatment by the legal system. See, e.g., LENORE E.
WALKER, TERRIFYNm LovE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY
RESPONDS (1989) [hereinafter "WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE"]; LENORE E. WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter "WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN"]; Lenore
E. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PuB. POL'Y 321 (1992) [hereinafter "Walker, Self-Defense"]. In addition, since
1977, she has testified as an expert witness on behalf of battered women in more than
150 murder trials throughout the United States. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOvE, supra at
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defense. 47
Other advocates of battered women describe similar accounts of women
who steal to support their families and their abusers, 48 or who commit
violent offenses in the company or in fear of their batterers. 49
Public awareness concerning domestic violence continues to increase.
Courts and legislatures increasingly recognize the relevance of the battered
woman syndrome in cases of self-defense. 50 Abused offenders increasingly
appear to draw understanding, sympathy, and, indeed, acquittals from
juries across the country. 51 Given the epidemic proportions of domestic
47 WALKER, supra note 25, at 142.
48 See Fitzsimmons, supra note 16 (director of Family Violence Project compares
battered women to "hostages" who "do whatever their abusers demand, all the while
fearing another beating or death").
49 See Kahler, supra note 7 (clinical psychologist/professor explains power and
control exerted by batterers in cases of "particularly heinous crimes against
non-family members," in which batterers "seem to have an unusual hold over
[battered women]").
50 See Robert Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and
the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1 U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 59 (1994)
(stating that "courts and commentators have accepted [battered woman] syndrome
testimony as well-established"). See also infra notes 263-70 and accompanying text
(discussing legislative recognition of the battered woman syndrome).
51 Walker, Self-Defense, supra note 46, at 334. Commentators, legal and
otherwise, have begun to write extensively about the perceived acceptance of what
some have derogatorily designated the "abuse excuse" in criminal defense work. See,
e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER CoP-OUTS, SOB
STORIEs AND EvASIONs OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994); James H. Andrews, I May Be a
Murderer, But It's Not My Fault, CHRIST. SCL MON., Sept. 19, 1994, at 13; Gail
Diane Cox, Abuse Excuse: Success Grows, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1994; at Al, A26; Jan
Crawford, Stretching the Abuse Defense; Bobbitt, Menendez Trials Push Limits, AIZ.
REP., Jan. 23, 1994, at Al; Michael Fumento, From Battered Wives to Battered
Justice Syndrome, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at B3; Stephanie Goldberg, Faultines,
ABA J., June 1994, at 40; Julie Irwin & Susan Kuczka: A Defense That Could'Be
Abused: Battered Woman Syndrome Isn't an Open-Shut Case, CHi. TRUB., May 14,
1994, at Al; Wendy Kaminer, Can Someone Be a Victim and Still Be Guilty?, S. F.
EXAM., Jan. 23, 1994, at Dl; Niko Price, The "Abuse Excuse": Threat to Justice?;
More and More Lawyers Using Traunas as Defense to Crimes, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
May 31, 1994 at 3.
Other commentators, however, believe the excessive media attention paid to
acquittals in high-profile cases skews public perception and obscures the fact that only
a very small percentage of battered women actually win acquittals through use of the
battered woman syndrome. Instead, such testimony more likely results in conviction
for a lesser offense. See infra note 97.
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violence in this country, the escalating arrest and imprisonment rates for
women, and the growing recognition that many female offenders are
themselves victims who committed their crimes under the domination, if
not coercion, of a male intimate, an increasing number of battered
offenders will likely attempt to fit their criminal conduct into the legal
excuse of duress. The remaining sections of this Article explore the
propriety and ramifications of this anticipated defense strategy.
I. THE "BATTERED WOMAN DEFENSE" AND SELF DEFENSE
Expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome centers
prominently in a battered woman's claim of duress. To appreciate the
relevance of such testimony in cases of duress, however, one must
understand the purpose it has previously served (and still serves) in
buttressing claims of self-defense. Indeed, because most of the cases and
scholarship in this area concern battered women's self-defense claims, 52
52 See, e.g., CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE As LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987); Bannister, supra note
34; Blackman, supra note 35; Hugh Breyer, The Battered Woman Syndrome and the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 28 CRIM. L. BuLL. 99 (1992); Chesler, supra note
37; Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in
Self-Defense, 8 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 121 (1985); Developments, supra note 34;
Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered Woman's Defense": Towards
a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567 (1992); Pamela Jenkins & Barbara
Davidson, Battered Women in the Criminal Justice System: An Analysis of Gender
Stereotypes, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 161 (1990); Ailene Kristal, You've Come a Long
Way, Baby: The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. ScH. 1. HuM. RTs.
111 (1991); Laurence S. Lustberg & John V. Jacobi, The Battered Woman as
Reasonable Person: A Critique of the Appellate Division Decision in State v. McClain,
22 SETON HALL L. REv. 365 (1992); Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and
Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PENN.
L. REv. 379 (1991); Mahoney, supra note 34; Mather, supra note 34; Susan Murphy,
Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victimization: Expert Psychological Testimony on
Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome, 25 COLUM. I.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 277 (1992); Cathryn J. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 11
(1986); Richard Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their
Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 371 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on
Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986) [hereinafter "Schneider, Describing"];
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980) [hereinafter "Schneider, Equal
Rights"]; Schopp, supra note 50; Roberta K. Thyfault, Self-Defense: Battered Woman
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battered offenders who assert duress draw heavily upon the acceptance and
use of the battered woman defense in this other context. After describing
the syndrome, then, this section will briefly examine the role it currently
plays in cases of self-defense.
A. Battered Woman Syndrome Defined
The battered woman syndrome, a term originated by Dr. Lenore
Walker,53  describes a pattern of behavioral and psychological
characteristics commonly (although not universally) 54 exhibited by battered
women who have suffered severe physical and psychological domestic
abuse over an extended period of time.55 According to Walker, a three-
Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W. L. REv. 485 (1984).
53 While widely perceived as a leading expert on domestic violence, Walker and
her psychological theories are not without their critics. See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note
24, at 70-87 (criticizing Walker's studies as biased); David L. Faigman, The Battered
Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv.
619, 630-43 (1986) (viewing Walker's cycle theory as suffering from significant
"methodological and interpretive flaws" and her application of learned helplessness
inadequate to account "for the actual behavior of many women who remain in
battering relationships"); Schopp, supra note 50, at 53-64 (critiquing both Walker's
conclusions and her underlying research and concluding that "[nleither Walker's data
nor [other relevant] later studies sufficiently support the battered woman syndrome as
a pattern regularly produced by battering relationships"); Stephen I. Schulhofer, The
Gender Question in Criminal Law, in CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY, 106, 117,
120-22 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al., eds., 1990) (criticizing Walker's definition of
"battered woman" as overly broad and her theories concerning the cycle of violence
and learned helplessness as empirically shaky).
54 Dr. Walker acknowledges that not all women in abusive relationships suffer
from the battered woman syndrome. See Walker, Self-Defense, supra note 46, at 330.
As recognized by the court in McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992), "the
existence of this list of traits does not mean that all battered women look and act the
same. Although some battered women may have some of or all of these
characteristics, it is entirely possible for a battered woman not to evidence any of
these characteristics." Id. at 731.
55 United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1992); People v.
Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), vacated on other grounds,
883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. 1984); McMaugh,
612 A.2d at 731. Walker herself defines the battered woman syndrome as "the
measurable psychological changes that occur after exposure to repeated abuse."
Walker, Self-Defense, supra note 46, at 326; cf. Mary Ann Douglas, The Battered
Woman Syndrome, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 39-40 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987) (defining
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phased "cycle of violence" generally characterizes battering
relationships.5 6 The first phase, which Walker terms the "tension-building
phase," consists of relatively minor incidents of abuse, after which the
woman attempts to calm the batterer in order to prevent an increase or
repetition of the violence.5 7 The woman's attempts to placate the abuser
eventually become less and less effective, the tension continues to mount,
and the psychological and physical abuse intensifies.58 Phase two of this
cycle occurs when the violence ultimately explodes in an "acute battering
incident," distinguished from the abuse in phase one by its intensity and
brutality.5 9 A period that Walker describes as "tranquil, loving (or at least
nonviolent)" generally follows the acute battering incident. 60 In this phase
of "loving contrition" and relative calm, the batterer will often profess his
love for the woman and seek her forgiveness by promising to change his
abusive ways.61 Though phase three may persist for some period of time,
the cycle of violence will eventually begin anew. 62
"battered woman syndrome" as a "collection of specific characteristics and effects of
abuse on the battered woman" and a "battered woman" as "any woman who has been
the victim of physical, sexual, and/or psychological abuse by her partner").
Other experts on domestic violence criticize these current definitions of the
battered woman syndrome. Mary Ann Dutton, for example, seeks to re-define the
syndrome because the experiences of battered women encompass "more than their
psychological reactions to domestic violence," and because "the psychological profiles
of battered women are not limited to one particular profile." Dutton, supra note 33, at
1195-96. According to Dutton,
[a]ll women exposed to violence and abuse in their intimate relationships do
not respond similarly, contradicting the mistaken assumption that there exists
a singular "battered woman profile." Like other trauma victims, battered
women differ in the type and severity of their psychological reactions to
violence and abuse as well as in their strategies for responding to violence
and abuse.
Id. at 1232.
56 WALKER, TERRIFYNG LovE, supra note 46, at 42; Walker, Self-Defense, supra
note 46, at 330. But see Dutton, supra note 33, at 1208 (contending that not all
domestic violence follows a cycle).
57 WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE, supra note 46, at 42-43.
5 8 Id. at43.
59 Id. at 43-44.
60 Id. at 42.
61 Id. at 44-45.
62 See id. at 46.
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As the cycle of violence repeats itself over and over again, 63 the
woman finds herself reduced to a state of "learned helplessness." 64 To the
battered woman, her abuser's violence appears random, unpredictable, and
most importantly, uncontrollable. 65 As the woman "learns" that she is
"helpless" to prevent the cycle from recurring or to predict the
consequences of her own actions, she becomes "psychologically trapped"
and unable to leave the violent battering relationship. 66 As Walker
explains: "[b]attered women don't attempt to leave the battering situation
even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they
cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone
else does will alter their terrible circumstances. "67
B. Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense
The battered woman syndrome, particularly its three-phase cycle of
violence and the condition of learned helplessness, plays a significant role
in the self-defense strategies of many battered women who kill their
abusive partners. Indeed, testimony concerning the syndrome often
assumes critical importance in overcoming the obstacles that battered
63 Under Walker's theory, a woman must undergo the cycle of violence at least
twice to qualify as a "battered woman." WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 46,
at xv ("Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman."). The only way to end the cycle of violence, according to Walker, is to "end
the relationship altogether." WALKER, TERRFYmG LOVE, supra note 46, at 42.
64 WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 46, at 50-51.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 50. Walker derived her theory of learned helplessness from electric
shock experiments conducted on dogs by psychologist Martin Seligman. Seligman
randomly administered electric shocks to caged dogs. Eventually, the dogs learned
that there was nothing that they could do to prevent the shocks and, instead of further
attempting escape, developed coping strategies. Walker asserts that battered women
likewise develop coping or survival skills at the expense of their ability to escape. Id.
at 49-51; WALKER, supra note 25, at 33, 86-87. See also United States v. Johnson,
956 F.2d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1992) (viewing "learned helplessness" as a "survival
skill," rather than as a "sign of passivity or weakness"); Lustberg & Jacobi, supra
note 52, at 380 & n.76 (characterizing battered woman syndrome as a "survival
mechanism" instead of a personal pathology). But see Schopp, supra note 50, at 64
(contending that existing data "provides neither any clear conception of learned
helplessness nor any good reason to believe that it regularly occurs in battered
women").
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women encounter in asserting self-defense.
1. The Law of Self-Defense in a Nutshell
Self-defense generally consists of both subjective and objective
components. 68 To assert self-defense in a homicide prosecution, a
defendant must produce evidence 69 that she honestly (i.e., subjectively)
believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to avert imminent death
or serious bodily injury.70 An actual belief, however, while necessary to
self-defense, 71 usually will not alone suffice; a defendant's belief in the
necessity of deadly force must also be objectively reasonable.72 The
68 A number of jurisdictions in this country have, in large part, codified the
common law delineation of self-defense. For a comprehensive discussion of
self-defense, both under the common law, and as modified by the Model Penal Code,
see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, 191-213 (1987).
69 While jurisdictions may differ in allocating the ultimate burden of persuasion
on self-defense, the defendant generally bears the burden of production. That is, an
accused must produce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of
self-defense in order to merit presentation of that defense to the jury. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (1985) (prosecutor need not disprove affirmative defense
"unless and until there is evidence supporting such defense").
70 WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, § 5.7(d), at 458
(2d ed. 1986).
71 Even jurisdictions that dispense with the objective "reasonableness"
requirement of self-defense retain this prerequisite of subjective belief in the need for
self-defense. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985) ("[T]he use of force upon
or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself .... .") (emphasis added).
In contrast, some scholars like Professor Paul Robinson regard an actor's subjective
intent as irrelevant to justifications like self-defense when the objective criteria of such
defenses are satisfied. For Robinson, justifications focus on the act, rather than the
actor, and thus "should remain available in every situation for which no resulting
harm can be demonstrated, regardless of any actor-oriented considerations such as
prior fault, motive, belief, or knowledge." Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of
Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 266, 291 (1975). But see George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed For the Wrong
Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 293, 321 (1975) (advocating
that self-defense be treated "as a case in which a meritorious intent should be
required").
72 This traditional formulation contrasts with that in the minority of jurisdictions
adopting the Model Penal Code definition of self-defense. Under the Model Penal
Code, if an accused honestly believes that it is necessary to use deadly force, she can
assert self-defense, even if her belief is unreasonable. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04
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satisfaction of both the subjective and objective elements of traditional
self-defense73 will completely exonerate a defendant of all criminal liability
for a homicide. 74
2. Self-Defense Obstacles
Reported cases in which battered women contend that they killed their
batterers in self-defense typically involve one of two recurring fact
situations: the battered woman kills her abuser either (1) in the course of
his violent attack;75 or (2) during a pause in the violence when he is
sleeping or otherwise non-threatening. 76 Today, little controversy
surrounds the admission of expert testimony concerning the battered
woman syndrome in the first category of cases. 77 Because these traditional
(1985). At most, she can be convicted of negligent or reckless homicide. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.09 (1985).
73 In virtually all jurisdictions, a defendant will lose the benefit of self-defense if
found to be the "aggressor" in the deadly confrontation. This additional prerequisite,
dubbed the "forfeiture rule," demands that "a person claiming self-defense be free
from fault in bringing on the difficulty." Given that most jurisdictions do not require
retreat, see infra note 91, this forfeiture rule "serves primarily to impose a duty of
desistance and retreat on the person who initiates the fight." MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.04(2)(b)(i) cmt. 4(b), at 49-52 (1985). To some, the forfeiture rule rests on an
"innocents preferred" principle that entitles "the non-aggressor in the encounter...
to violate the 'killing is bad' principle." David McCord & Sandra K. Lyons, Moral
Reasoning and the Crinminal Law: The Example of Self-Defense, 30 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 97, 130-31 (1992). This "innocents preferred" principle aids in evaluating the
conflicting moral claims invoked when battered offenders assert duress. See infra
notes 352-68 and accompanying text.
74 In a further minority of jurisdictions, an honest, but unreasonable belief in the
need to use deadly force will mitigate an offense from murder to manslaughter.
DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 199.
75 See, e.g., State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985); State v. Kelly, 478
A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
76 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
Even rarer are those "non-traditional" cases in which a battered woman requests a
third person to kill her abuser on her behalf. See, e.g., People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d
758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 590 N.E.2d 681 (Mass.
1992); State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), denial of habeas
corpus aff'd sub nom. Anderson v. Gorke, 44 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 1995); State v.
Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
77 At one time, courts and commentators disputed whether the theories underlying
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confrontation cases fit easily into the self-defense mold, courts readily
admit lay testimony concerning prior battering, as well as expert testimony
regarding the psychological and behavioral effects of that abuse.78 In the
latter category of non-confrontational cases, in contrast, courts and
commentators widely disagree concerning whether the facts even justify a
jury instruction on self-defense. 79 The criteria of imminence, necessity, and
objective reasonableness make these apparently non-confrontational cases
difficult to fit within traditional self-defense doctrine.
the battered woman syndrome had achieved sufficient acceptance in the appropriate
scientific community to constitute admissible expert testimony. See Breyer, supra note
52, at 103-13; Lustberg & Jacobi, supra note 52, at 381-87; Mather, supra note 34,
at 574-87; Murphy, supra note 52, at 283-87. Today, courts uniformly regard the
battered woman syndrome as generally accepted scientific evidence, and, subject to
case-specific relevance and expert qualifications, admissible in support of self-defense.
See State v. Rogers, 616 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), approved in part
and quashed in part on other grounds, 630 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993) ('[E]xpert
testimony relating to the [battered woman] syndrome is henceforth admissible ...
[without any necessity for] a case-by-case determination that the scientific knowledge
regarding the syndrome is sufficiently developed to permit a reasonable opinion to be
given by an expert."). For citation of cases and commentary reflecting the trend in
admitting such evidence, see United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 900 (9th Cir.
1992); People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 337 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992),
vacated on other grounds, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994); Rogers, 616 So. 2d at 1099-
1100 nn.2-4.
78 See, e.g., Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372. This uncritical admission of expert
syndrome testimony is perplexing even in traditional cases of self-defense, given the
law's traditional reluctance to import an accused's psychological characteristics into
the objective "reasonableness standard." See infra note 200.
79 A considerable percentage of the legal scholarship in this area concerns the use
of self-defense in these non-confrontational cases. Professor Holly Maguigan,
however, criticizes as inaccurate the assumption that most battered women kill in non-
confrontational situations. See Maguigan, supra note 52, at 384-85, 397 nn.68-77.
Based on her "systematic survey" of existing appellate decisions concerning battered
women, Professor Maguigan concludes that over three-quarters of the studied cases
involve confrontations "where battered women who kill do so when faced with either
an ongoing attack or the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury .... " Id.
Maguigan attributes most homicide convictions of battered women to procedural rules
that preclude such defendants from getting their self-defense claims to the jury, rather
than to factual contexts that place those cases outside the traditional framework of self-
defense. Id. at 458-59.
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a. Imminence
One of the principal impediments preventing a battered woman from
successfully claiming self-defense in a non-confrontational killing is the
requirement that the abuser pose an "imminent" threat of death or serious
bodily harm to the defendant at the time of his death.80 "Imminent"
traditionally means "immediate" 81 or "such as must be instantly met." 82
The lethal threat must occur contemporaneously with the killing83 and the
defendant must be faced "with an instantaneous choice" between killing or
being killed or seriously injured. 84 Traditional self-defense contemplates a
one-time encounter that focuses exclusively on the circumstances at or
immediately preceding the killing.85 Future threats of death or grave injury
do not present an "imminent" danger, 86 and preemptive strikes based on
the decedent's violent reputation, a history of prior abuse, or a prediction
of future violence, are strictly prohibited. 87 "Imminence" can thus pose
significant obstacles to battered women who kill their batterers in
non-confrontational situations. 88
80 A majority of jurisdictions in this country retain this requirement of temporal
proximity. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 2(c), at 40 & nn.15-16 (1985); cf.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) (requiring that deadly force be "immediately
necessary").
81 DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 198.
82 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (citing BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 676 (5th ed. 1979)).
83 People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 760 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Stewart,
763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988).84 Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
85 Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 52, at 634-35; Schulhofer, supra note 53,
at 127.86 DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 198.
87 Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 15 (rejecting the court of appeals relaxed definition of
'imminent' threat as resting "upon purely subjective speculation that the decedent
probably would present a threat to life at a future time and that the defendant would
not be able to avoid the predicted threat").
88 Many courts refuse to even instruct the jury on self-defense in such cases. See,
e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (no self-defense
instruction because battered woman did not face immediate threat from sleeping
husband); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 574 (Kan. 1988) (trial court erred in
instructing jury on self-defense in case where battered woman killed sleeping
husband); Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (improper to instruct a jury on perfect or
imperfect self-defense when battered woman killed sleeping husband); Commonwealth
v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 372 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 517 A.2d 810 (Pa.
1987) (battered woman not entitled to self-defense instruction because no immediate
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b. Necessity
"Imminence" closely relates to the separate prerequisite "necessity." 8 9
A defendant can use deadly force only if she reasonably believes that such
force is "necessary" to avoid imminent unlawful lethal harm.90 If she has a
reasonable opportunity to safely avoid killing, the homicide is not justified
because it is "unnecessary." 91 To many courts, the lack of an "imminent"
threat in non-confrontational cases gives a battered woman "ample time
and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing further abuse by her
husband." 92 Even in more traditional confrontation cases, a fact-finder
might find a killing unnecessary under the assumption that the battered
woman could earlier have left the abusive relationship or sought the
assistance of police or a women's shelter. 93
threat from her sleeping husband). But see State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819
(N.D. 1983) (self-defense allowed where battered woman stabbed sleeping husband);
State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1273 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting self-defense
claim of battered woman who killed abuser while he lay on his bed); State v. Allery,
682 P.2d 312, 315 (Wash. 1984) (permitting battered woman who killed abuser while
he lay on couch exhibiting no immediate violence to assert self-defense).
89 See 2 PAuL H. RoBINsON, CR~iMNAL LAW DEFENSES, "§ 131(b)(3), at 76-77
(1984 & Supp. 1995) (viewing imminence as "more properly a modification of the
necessity requirement"). Some courts view any relaxation of the imminence
requirement as threatening the "requirement of real or apparent necessity to justify
homicide." State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. 1989).
90 A defendant who utilizes deadly force to avoid a non-deadly threat generally
cannot assert self-defense. This "proportionality component" of self-defense, see
DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 191-92, may present difficulties to a battered woman
who kills her abuser with a deadly weapon in response to his physical assault with
hands or fists. See, e.g., Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 15 (finding "no evidence that
[sleeping] husband had ever inflicted life threatening injury").
91 See DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 191-92. Courts do not so strictly construe the
necessity requirement, however, as to require that a non-aggressor retreat in the face
of an imminent deadly threat. The majority of jurisdictions in this country permit a
defendant to use deadly force to avert such a threat, even if she knows that she can
retreat in complete safety. Id. at 196-97; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(ii) (1985)
(imposing limited duty of withdrawal if defendant is aware that he can avoid using
deadly force "with complete safety by retreating").
92 Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
93 Indeed, both the "necessity" and "imminence" requirements encourage appeal
for outside assistance by limiting self-defense to situations where "absolutely no other
alternatives" exist and "there is no time to seek outside help." C.J. Rosen, supra note
52, at 53.
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c. Objective Reasonableness
A defendant's honest belief in the imminence of danger and the
necessity of deadly force must also be "reasonable." In most jurisdictions,
the jury assesses whether a reasonable person, in the "situation" of the
defendant, would have similarly perceived an imminent deadly threat and
the need to combat it using deadly force. 94
Jurors in self-defense cases involving battered women often find it
difficult to put themselves in the "situation" of the accused. Studies
indicate that most jurors adhere to various "myths," "misconceptions," and
"stereotypes" concerning domestic violence and women who remain in
abusive relationships. 95 The prosecution will typically exploit these
misconceptions to attack the defendant's credibility, as well as to question
the reasonableness of her perception of imminence and necessity. 96 Unless
disabused of these misconceptions, jurors will likely find the battered
woman's conduct "unreasonable" and dismiss her self-defense claim. 97
94 See Crocker, supra note 52, at 125; Developments, supra note 34, at 1580;
Maguigan, supra note 52, at 409 & nn.105-06; Schneider, Describing, supra note 52,
at 219; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.20(d) (1985) (evaluating conduct of "reasonable
person" from the vantage of "the actor's situation").
95 As recognized by one court: "Some popular misconceptions about battered
women include the beliefs that they are masochistic and actually enjoy their beatings,
that they purposely provoke their husbands into violent behavior, and, most
critically,... that women who remain in battering relationships are free to leave their
abusers at any time." State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (N.J. 1984).
Scholars disagree concerning the prevalence of these misconceptions. Compare
Jenkins & Davidson, supra note 52, at 161 (finding that "[m]yths and stereotypes
about women and battered women play a prominent role in the courtroom presentation
of both defense and prosecution cases") with Developments, supra note 34, at 1584
n.66 (questioning inconclusive empirical studies concerning whether jurors
overwhelmingly endorse myths and misconceptions regarding domestic violence).
96 See People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992),
vacated on other grounds, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377-78.
97 The impact of the battered woman defense in women's self-defense work is as
yet unclear. Developments, supra note 34, at 1588. The conviction rate for battered
women, however, appears much higher in cases in which courts exclude testimony
concerning the battered woman syndrome, than in those where this evidence reaches
the jury. See Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342 (differing conviction rates make
exclusion of expert testimony prejudicial). Compare EWING, supra note 52, at 96
(indicating that even when expert testimony is admitted, "battered women homicide
defendants are still convicted of murder or manslaughter") with Walker, Self-Defense,
supra note 46, at 322 (contending that battered woman defense results in "many not
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3. Circumventing the Obstacles
The battered woman defense assists battered women in overcoming the
foregoing obstacles presented by traditional self-defense doctrine. It aims,
in particular, at establishing both the subjective and the objective
components of that defense. 98
a. Credibility/Subjective Belief
On the most basic level, expert testimony concerning domestic abuse
and its behavioral and psychological effects bolsters the credibility of a
battered woman's claim that she believed it necessary to use lethal force to
combat an imminent deadly threat. 99 While lay testimony concerning a
batterer's violent reputation and prior abuse assists in establishing this
subjective belief, expert testimony further explains how that long-term,
severe abuse can psychologically impact a battered woman's
perceptions. 100 The battered woman defense, in other words, helps to
guilty jury verdicts or convictions of a lesser crime than first degree murder").
98 See, e.g., Kelly, 478 A.2d at 375-77 (expert testimony concerning the battered
woman syndrome relevant to defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness of her
"belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious injury").
99 See id. at 375 (battered woman's credibility "critical" to her self-defense
claim); see also Murphy, supra note 52, at 293, 298, 312; Walker, Self-Defense,
supra note 46, at 323-24. Generally, this expert testimony will focus on the cyclical
nature of a battering relationship, the specific psychological phenomenon of learned
helplessness, the social and economic impediments that prevent the battered woman
from leaving a relationship, and the very real physical dangers women face in
separating from abusive relationships. As explained by the New Jersey Supreme
Court: "Only by understanding these unique pressures that force battered women to
remain with their mates, despite their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe
bodily harm and the isolation that being a battered woman creates, can a battered
woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly understood." Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
100 Prior abuse, according to experts, makes battered women "hyper-vigilant" to
cues of increasing violence and thus able to predict the onset of an impending deadly
attack earlier and more accurately than one who has not suffered similar violence.
Walker, Self-Defense, supra note 46, at 324; see also ROBINsoN, supra note 89, at
§ 184(e)(3), at 412 n.48 (noting that battered "women's knowledge of their 'captors'
make them best able to assess the severity of the threat"). But see Schopp, supra note
50, at 73 (attributing battered woman's hyper-acuity to "ordinary process of inductive
inference from past behavior in similar circumstances," rather than to any special
capacity generated by battered woman syndrome).
[Vol. 56:665
THE USE OF DURESS IN DEFENSE
establish that a battered woman honestly believed that a preemptive, fatal
strike was the only way to finally and effectively thwart her abuser's
certain, impending attack. 10 1
b. Objective Reasonableness-Modification of Traditional Elements
The battered woman defense also aids in establishing that a reasonable
person in the defendant's situation would likewise have perceived an
imminent and inescapable deadly threat posed by an apparently
non-threatening batterer.
i. Expanding Imminence and Necessity
At a minimum, syndrome evidence persuades many courts to expand
"imminence" beyond immediacy in order to capture "the build-up of terror
and fear .'. . systematically created over a long period of time" in battering
relationships.10 2 The battered woman defense might also persuade a court
to stretch "imminence" beyond its inherent temporal borders. Experts in
101 See Walker, Self-Defense, supra note 46, at 324 (battered women "may make
a preemptive strike before the abuser has actually inflicted much physical damage,
anticipating his next moves from what they know from previous experience").
102 State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985). A jurisdiction's definition
of "imminence" often impacts the admissibility of battered woman syndrome
testimony, as well as the submission of a self-defense instruction. See People v.
Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Maguigan, supra note 52, at 415.
Unless courts broaden "imminence" to mean "impending," "likely to occur," or
"about to happen," a jury will likely focus exclusively on the circumstances
immediately preceding the killing and ignore the facts and circumstances known to the
battered woman substantially before the killing. See Blackman, supra note 35, at 128
(narrow reading of "imminence" contrary to elaborate knowledge held by the
defendant of what is likely to happen); Maguigan, supra note 52, at 449-50 (jury
instruction on "imminence" should not restrict jury's attention to "'immediate'
circumstances of the killing," but instead "should specifically direct the jury to
consider the history between the defendant and the decedent, the decedent's history of
other violence, and expert testimony introduced on the effects of the history of
abuse"); Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 52, at 634-35 ("When the imminent
danger rule is interpreted to preclude admission of evidence of the prior relationship
and the abuse a woman has suffered, the jury is unable to understand why the woman
believed herself to be in danger."); Walker, Self-Defense, supra note 46, at 324
(whether "imminence" is defined as meaning "on the brink of or about to happen" as
opposed to "immediate" makes a "critical" difference in cases of battered woman's
self-defense).
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these cases, for instance, frequently testify that the learned helplessness
experienced by the battered woman, as well as the dangers facing her if she
attempts to escape the relationship, make her a virtual prisoner of her
controlling batterer. 103 Like the hostage or prisoner of war, the battered
woman is said to experience a "single and continuing" "state of siege" 1°4
103 Courts and commentators frequently analogize the plight of battered women
to that of hostages or prisoners of war. Professor Martha Mahoney, for example,
draws heavily on this captivity analogy in formulating her theory of "separation
assault" to "bridge the difference" between confrontational and non-confrontational
cases of self-defense. See Mahoney, supra note 34, at 87-88. To Mahoney, the
battering relationship constitutes a continuing assault on a battered woman's autonomy
and her capacity to separate from the abusive relationship. Id. at 61-71. The batterer's
violent attempts, over time, to control the battered woman and prevent her from
leaving, as well as the other "difficulties of exit" confronting a battered woman, make
her a virtual captive of the battering relationship. Id. at 61-66, 81-82, 87-88; see also
United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1992) (psychological
effects of the battered woman syndrome are similar to effects on hostages or POWs
living under "threatening shadow of... complete domination"); Hundley, 693 P.2d at
479 (battered women are "psychologically similar" to "hostages, brainwashed victims,
and POWs"); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 17-18 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, I.,
dissenting) (comparing battered woman to POW of some years, who has been
deprived of her humanity and is held hostage by fear); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572,
584 (Kan. 1988) (Herd, J., dissenting) ("[P]icture a hostage situation where the armed
guard inadvertently drops off to sleep and the hostage grabs his gun and shoots
him."); EwING, supra note 52, at 83-85 (drawing analogy between battered women
and other victims of terrorism and/or war); Blackman, supra note 35, at 127
(describing battered women as living like "hostages" trapped by physical abuse and
psychological change wrought by that abuse); Coughlin, supra note 24, at 112
(anatomy of battered woman defense compares battered woman to "distorted mental
state of POWs and hostages"); Dowd, supra note 52, at 580 (dealing with
"imminence" by analogy to hostage told she will be killed the next day); Joan S.
Meier, Notes From the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295,
1319-20 (1993) (emphasizing usefulness of "entrapment" construct).
Others are not persuaded by this analogy between hostages and battered women.
Professor Stephen Morse, for example, finds it "a grave moral error implicitly to
equate such people-who are being held physically captive and who are fully entitled
to kill according to standard self-defense doctrines-to -people in psychologically
abusing relationships that they entered voluntarily and could leave but for some form
of psychological abnormality." Stephen 1. Morse, The Misbegotten Marriage of Soft
Psychology and Bad Law, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 595, 599 (1990)
10 4 Dutton, supra note 33, at 1208-09. Mary Ann Dutton describes this "state of
siege" as follows:
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characterized'by "constant" or "ever present" terror of death or serious
bodily injury.105 As viewed by one court, the battered woman experiences
"no let-up of tension or fear, no moment . . . [of] release[ ] from
impending serious harm, even while the decedent [sleeps]... [F]rom the
perspective of the battered woman, danger is constantly 'immediate.'" 106
ii. Subjectifying "Reasonableness"
In theory, the battered woman syndrome "substantiates the
reasonableness" of a battered woman's self-defense claim107  by
transforming her into an "every woman"108-a rational person normally
responding to an abnormal situation. 1° 9 In practice, however, courts and
defense attorneys have created a "paradigmatic" 110 battered woman who
suffers from a psychological aberration that impairs her capacity to
rationally assess or competently respond to an abusive situation.111 Instead
[IThe pattern of violence and abuse can be viewed as a single and continuing
entity, one whose character may change over time, but that nevertheless forever
changes the nature of the relationship. The battered woman's fear, vigilance, or
perception that she has few options may persist, even when long periods of time
elapse between physically or sexually violent episodes, and even when the abusive
partner appears to be peaceful and calm.
Id.
105 Mather, supra note 34, at 566-68.
106 Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 18 (Martin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also
Appel, supra note 24, at 975 (criticizing courts for failing to "recognize that the threat
of serious injury is always inwmnent to a battered woman") (emphasis added).
Professor Richard Rosen, who views "imminence" as a "translator" for necessity,
criticizes such attempts to jettison the temporal meaning of "imminence." R. Rosen,
supra note 52, at 375-76, 380, 392, 405-06.
107 See Crocker, supra note 52, at 143-44; Schneider, Describing, supra note 52,
at 201-02. Theoretically, by educating the jury about domestic violence, the battered
woman syndrome challenges the common misconceptions that may prevent a jury
from finding a battered woman's conduct reasonable. See id. at 215. It further seeks to
characterize the battered woman's psychological and behavioral reactions as coping
and survival mechanisms. See supra note 67.
108 See Dowd, supra note 52, at 574-78.
109 See Blackman, supra note 35, at 121; Chesler, supra note 37, at 974-75;
Dowd, supra note 52, at 574-78; Lustberg & Jacobi, supra note 52, at 367; Mahoney,
supra note 34, at 81.110 Developments, supra note 34, at 1593.
111 The Kansas Supreme Court in Hundley voiced this characterization:
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of focusing on the external social and economic factors that properly
inform the battered defendant's "situation," the battered woman defense
currently centers on internal incapacities that render battered women
dysfunctional victims, instead of rational survivors.112 Indeed, the very
notion of a "syndrome" connotes "damaged" mental states and
psychological deviancy more closely akin to insanity than
reasonableness. 113
[Blattered women are terror-stricken people whose mental state is distorted and
bears a marked resemblance to that of a hostage or a prisoner of war. The
horrible beatings they are subjected to brainwash them into believing there is
nothing they can do. They live in constant fear of another eruption of violence.
They become disturbed persons fom the torture.
State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985) (emphasis added). At least one
commentator argues that because battered women, due to a psychological syndrome,
assess situations in a manner different from the average person, their self-defense
claims should be reclassified as an excuse, rather than as a justification. See C.J.
Rosen, supra note 52, at 43-44; see also McCord & Lyons, supra note 73, at 157-58
(discussing the reclassification of self-defense in non-confrontation cases); Schopp,
supra note 50, at 107 (advocating statutory scheme that separates justification defenses
based on actual necessity from excuses based on the unreasonable, but nonculpable
mistakes produced by the battered woman syndrome).
112 Feminist scholars are by no means oblivious to this tension between theory
and practice in women's self-defense work. Professor Elizabeth Schneider, who
extensively practices and writes in this area, repeatedly cautions that the current
portrayal of battered women as helpless and impaired victims actually undercuts
attempts to depict them as rational and responsible agents. See Schneider, Describing,
supra note 52; Schneider, supra note 32. Professor Ann Coughlin is even more critical
of the battered woman defense and its current emphasis on psychological deviancy. In
arguing against its further extension, Coughlin asserts that the battered woman defense
assumes that women lack the same capacity for rational self-control as men and
subjects women to intrusive social intervention. See Coughlin, supra note 24, at 5, 7,
50-51. Other scholars voice similar concern over stereotyping battered women as
disturbed and dysfunctional. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 35, at 121-22; Chesler,
supra note 37, at 974-75; Developments, supra note 34, at 1592-93; Dowd, supra
note 52, at 577-78, 581; Jenkins & Davidson, supra note 52, at 168; Kristal, supra
note 52, at 152-53; Maguigan, supra note 52, at 152-53; Mahoney, supra note 34, at
37-42; Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 122; Walker, Self-Defense, supra note 46, at
137, 146, 151-52. The existing formulation of the battered woman defense impacts
the propriety of its extension to cases of duress. See infra part VI.
113 See Schneider, Describing, supra note 52, at 199, 207, 211-12. Indeed,
battered women unable to claim self-defense often base their defenses on an impaired
mental status such as legal insanity, diminished capacity, or heat of passion
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Accommodation of battered women within the "reasonable person"
benchmark requires even greater individualization of its abstract norm.
Besides objectively verifiable physical attributes like sex, age, or weight
that may generate a differing perspective of danger, courts must also infuse
the standard with the personality traits and psychological profiles that
presently personify the "battered woman."114 Courts are increasingly
provocation. See, e.g., United States v. Sebresos, No. 91-10193, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17757 (9th Cir. July 22, 1992) (finding battered woman syndrome relevant to
diminished capacity defense that negates specific intent); State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d
421 (La. Ct. App.) (attempting to establish insanity plea with evidence of battered
woman syndrome), review denied, 468 So. 2d 570 (La. 1985); State v. Felton, 329
N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1983) (holding that failure to investigate either insanity or "heat of
passion" manslaughter plea denied battered woman effective assistance of counsel);
State v. Hoyt, 128 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. 1964) (finding it appropriate to instruct jury on
heat of passion manslaughter in case of battered spouses). These mental status
defenses, however, pose particular difficulties for battered women that make them
unacceptable alternatives to self-defense.
For example, although the legal formulation of insanity varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, all states require that the defendant claiming insanity suffer from a
"mental disease or defect." Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985) with 18
U.S.C. § 20 (1984). While severe, long-term physical and psychological abuse may
well cause diagnosable mental illness and qualify for legal insanity, see WALKER,
TERRHFIG LOVE, supra note 46, at 178, the battered woman syndrome itself does not
constitute a mental disease or defect and battered women are not, by definition,
mentally ill. See United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1992)
(indicating that the battered woman syndrome is not "a gross identifiable mental
defect); Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 681 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (insanity does
not encompass "emotional insanity or temporary mania, not associated with a disease
of the mind"), aftd, 494 So. 2d 697 (Ala. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1987),
denial of post conviction relief aft'd, 642 So. 2d 494 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), writ
quashed as improvidently granted, 642 So. 2d 510 (Ala. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1316 (1995). But see Schopp, supra note 50, at 95-96 (concluding that the
"battered woman syndrome.., constitutes a psychological disorder and thus, a
mental illness"). Psychologists, instead, classify the syndrome as a sub-category of
post-traumatic stress disorder, a set of anxiety-related symptoms that follow "a
psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience."
AM. Psy. Assoc., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, §
309.89, at 247-51 (rev. 3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter "DSM-III-R"]; see also WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 46, at 48 & 48-49 nn.178-79; Walker, Self-Defense,
supra note 46, at 326-27. But see Dutton, supra note 33, at 1199 & 1225 n.200
(cautioning that some battered women fail to satisfy criteria for PTSD, while others
experience clinical reactions not defined by PTSD).
114 Courts and commentators still struggle to determine which, if any, of a
particular defendant's physical and mental attributes to ascribe to this theoretically
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willing to so subjectify the standard, whether explicitly through a separate
"reasonable battered woman" standard, or implicitly through further
elucidation of the battered woman's "situation." 115
IV. THE "BATTERED WOMAN DEFENSE" AND DURESS
A. The Battered Woman as Victim of Coercion
The battered offender would appear the ideal candidate for a criminal
excuse based upon duress or coercion. Psychologists frequently define the
neutral "reasonable person." See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is
the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and
Provocation, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981). While courts increasingly take an
actor's unusual physical characteristics into account, mental or psychological
peculiarities generally will not modify the hypothetical standard. Instead, juries
typically assess "reasonableness" from the perspective of one of average temperament
and disposition. See DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 102 (reasonable person "lacks
unusual physical handicaps" and "possess[es] the intelligence, educational
background, level of prudence, and temperament of an average person"); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE §1.02(2)(d) cmt. 4, at 242 (1985) ("heredity, intelligence or
temperament of the actor . . . not material in judging negligence, and could not be
without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity").
115 Feminist scholars like Phyllis Crocker and Elizabeth Schneider argue that a
male sex bias permeates the law of self-defense, including its notions bf
reasonableness. See Crocker, supra note 52, at 126; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra
note 52, at 647. But see Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1430,
1431 (1990) (suggesting that "the [self-defense] rules exist not so much to defilhe
manly behavior as to limit manly instinct-in order to preserve human life"). Some
commentators thus advocate a group based view of reasonableness, such as a
"reasonable woman." See Crocker, supra note 52, at 151-52; Mather, supra note 34,
at 588. Other commentators press for an entirely separate standard for battered women
in particular. See Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Cains, 67
OR. L. REv. 393, 419-22 (1988); Mahoney, supra note 34, at 89; see also State v.
Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985) ("[T]he objective test is how a reasonably
prudent battered wife would perceive [her abuser's] demeanor"); State v. Williams,
787 S.W.2d 308, 312-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (jury instruction regarding "reasonable
battered woman"); State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 7 (S.D. 1992) ("reasonable,
prudent battered woman"). Still others reject any specialized standard, whether for
battered women in particular or women generally. See Maguigan, supra note 52, at
443-48 (advocating "generally applicable standard which incorporates a subjective
reasonableness analysis"); Schneider, supra note 32, at 559-67 (seeking to challenge
concept of reasonableness by "bringing to it the wealth of different experiences of
both men and women").
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"battered woman; in terms of coerced conduct, physical domination, and
psychological compulsion. A battered woman, according to Dr. Walker, is
one "who has been physically, sexually, or seriously psychologically
abused by a man in an intimate relationship, without regard for her rights,
in order to coerce her into doing what he wants her to do at least two
times, often in a specific cycle."116 Mildred Pagelow similarly defines
battered women as
adult women who were intentionally physically abused in ways that caused
pain or injury, or who were forced into involuntary action or restrained by
force from voluntary action by adult men with whom they have or had
established relationships, usually involving sexual intimacy, whether or
not within a legally married state. 117
Indeed, scholars fearful of negatively stereotyping battered women 18
increasingly emphasize coercion as the essence of battering; characterizing
the battering relationship as an external "quest" for power and control by
the abuser, instead of an internal pathology of the woman." 9 Given the
mounting judicial acceptance of battered women's self-defense claims, 120 it
is not surprising that an increasing number of battered offenders seek to
parlay this vision of battering as coercion into the traditional criminal law
defense of duress.
116 WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 46, at 35 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 102; WALKER, supra note 25, at 202-03; WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra
note 46, at xv. An "intimate" relationship, according to Walker, is one "having a
romantic, affectionate, or sexual component." WALKER, supra note 25, at 203.
117 MILDRED D. PAGELOW, WOMAN BATTERING: VIcriMs AND THEIR EXPERIENCE
33 (1981) (emphasis added).
118 See supra note 112.
119 See Mahoney, supra note 34, at 5; see also Blackman, supra note 35, at 127
(abuser completely controls battered woman by dominating her thoughts, feelings, and
actions, and renders battered woman "unable to choose"); Dutton, supra note 33, at
1204 & n.59 (emphasizing importance of understanding "dynamic of power and
control within an abusive relationship"); Meier, supra note 103, at 1317-22 (noting
growing emphasis on understanding battering "not as violence, per se, but rather, as a
larger pattern of dominance and control"); Schneider, supra note 32, at 529, 539
(urging move away from feminist notion of battering as male domination toward a
broader definition of battering as "power and control in intimate relationships
generally"); cf Joyce McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary
Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992)
(viewing a battered woman as one coerced through the use or threatened use of force
to provide services against her will).
120 See supra note 77.
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While the use of the battered woman defense to support duress is a
fairly recent phenomenon, the notion of excusing women because of male
coercion has common law roots dating back to perhaps the eighth
century. 121 The common law doctrine of "marital coercion" granted
married women a complete defense to all but a few very serious crimes if
the wife acted at the "command" of her husband. 122 Moreover, the mere
commission of a crime in the husband's actual or constructive "presence"
created a presumption of coercion that the prosecution could rebut only by
demonstrating the woman's active and independent participation. 123 Unlike
common law duress, which generally required actual coercion or physical
overbearing, the doctrine of marital coercion required only a command or
request by a husband to his unwilling wife. 124
Virtually all states have legislatively or judicially abolished the special
excuse of marital coercion. 125 Notwithstanding such abolition, however,
some scholars view recent efforts to excuse battered women under the
121 ROLLINM. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1021 (3d ed. 1982)
stating that Blackstone characterized the marital coercion doctrine as one "thousand
years old at the time he wrote").
122 Id. at 1021-22.
123 See id. at 1023; ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(h), at 371.
124 While this Article uses the terms "duress" and "coercion" interchangeably,
the common law distinguished the two terms. "Coercion" referred to this narrower
doctrine of marital coercion available only to married women, while "duress" referred
to the broader criminal defense available to both male and female, married and
unmarried, offenders. For a discussion of the marital coercion doctrine as an excuse
distinct from duress, see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(0, at 440; PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 121, at 1062, 1018-27; ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(h), at
371-72; GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW THE GENERAL PART 762-68 (2d ed.
1961) [hereinafter "WILLIAMS, GENERAL"]; GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 635 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter "WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK"]; Rollin M.
Perkins, Impelled Perpetration Restated, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 403, 412 (1981).
125 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(0, at 440; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra
note 121, at 1026; ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(h), at 371-72; see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.09(3) (1985) ("It is not a defense that a woman acted on the
command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a
defense under this [duress] Section."). Even in those states that still retain the marital
coercion doctrine, the prosecution can easily rebut the presumption of coercion. See,
e.g., Matter of Gault, 546 P.2d 639 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (stating that the
presumption of subjection which arises from coverture is a slight one, rebuttable by
circumstances); see also LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(0, at 440 & n.55
(explaining that presumption is narrowly construed where maintained); PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 121, at 1026 (where presumption still exists, it is "slight" and so
easily rebuttable "as to be of very little practical importance").
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banner of duress as marital coercion reincarnated. In her recent article,
Excusing Women, Professor Ann Coughlin delves deeply into the
historical, legal, and social foundations of the marital coercion doctrine. 126
According to Coughlin, the battered woman defense resembles the marital
coercion doctrine in that both defenses require that the demanding
requirements of duress be "adjusted downward" in order to "accommodate
women's predisposition for obedience to men."127 The remainder of this
Article explores whether such a "downward adjustment," if required, is
either justified or desirable in light of the nature and underlying rationale
of duress itself.
B. Battered Woman Syndrome and Duress
As with traditional self-defense, classic duress can pose significant
obstacles that may prevent battered women from getting their claims of
duress to the jury. As with self-defense, the battered woman defense seeks
to surmount those obstacles.
1. The Law of Duress in a Nutshell
Whether battered women must stretch or modify the elements of duress
as they do for self-defense 128 depends largely on a jurisdiction's specific
formulation of that defense. 129 Most of the jurisdictions in this country
continue to closely adhere to the traditional common law formulation of
duress. 130 As traditionally defined, a prima facie case of duress consists of
126 Coughlin, supra note 24, at 26-48.
127 Id. at 1-32, 57.
128 While battered women can generally claim self-defense in traditional
"confrontation" cases, they face significant hurdles in less traditional, "non-
confrontation" cases. See supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text. Similarly, a
battered woman should have little difficulty obtaining an instruction on duress or
admitting expert testimony in cases that approximate the more traditional "gun to the
head" scenario. But see United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1994)
(viewing expert testimony as irrelevant to duress). As with self-defense, the less
traditional cases of duress, in which coercion is not readily apparent, pose the greatest
obstacles to battered offenders. See infra notes 133-209 and accompanying text. This
Article focuses on the extension of duress to encompass these arguably non-coercive
cases.
129 For a discussion of how a jurisdiction's definition of duress impacts the
viability of a battered offender's claim of duress, see infra notes 211-34 and
accompanying text.
130 The chart in the attached Appendix illustrates jurisdictional differences in the
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the following elements: (1) an immediate or imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury unless the defendant commits a criminal offense other
than homicide; (2) a well-grounded fear or belief that the threat will be
carried out; and (3) an honest and reasonable belief that committing the
crime is the only way to avoid the threatened harm.131 Each of these
treatment of duress. Most states have codified duress in their penal codes. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 13A-3-30 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.440 (1989) (Michie 1994);
Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-412 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-208 (Miechie 1993);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(6) (West 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-708 (West
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-14 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
431 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-906 (Michie 1992); HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-231
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-201(4) (Michie 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, Para.
5/7-11 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8 (West 1994); IowA CODE
ANN. § 704.10 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3209 (1988); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 501.090 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(6) (West
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 103-A (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.08 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.071 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2-212 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194.010(8) (Michie 1992); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL
LAW§ 40.00 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10 (1985); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 156 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.270 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 309 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-5-1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-11-504 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-2-302 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.060 (West 1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 939.46 (West 1982). A few jurisdictions continue to treat duress as a creature
of common law. See, e.g., Cawthon v. State, 382 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 388 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1980); State v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md.
1987); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 415 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1981); People v.
Hubbard, 320 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Knight v. State, 601 So. 2d 403
(Miss. 1992); State v. Fuller, 278 N.W.2d 756 (Neb. 1979), opinion supplemented,
281 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1979); State v. Castrillo, 819 P.2d 1324 (N.M. 1991); State v.
Carver, 385 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. 1989); State v. Harr, 610 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992); Frasier v. State, 410 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 1991); Sam v. Commonwealth, 411
S.E.2d 832 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Tanner, 301 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 1982);
Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255 (Wyo. 1991). Two states, Rhode Island and Vermont,
apparently have no common law or statutory version of duress.
131 In some jurisdictions, a defendant must additionally demonstrate that she was
not at fault for creating or placing herself in the coercive situation. See infra
APPENDIX. For a general discussion of the defense of duress, see JOHN S. BAKER, ET
AL., HALL'S CRIMINAL LAW 562-77 (5th ed. 1993); DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 259-
273; SANFORD H. KADISH & STEVEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS, 928-47 (5th ed. 1989); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 70, § 5.3 at 432-41; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 121, at 1054-74; ROBINSON,
supra note 89, § 177, at 347-72; WILLIAMS, GENERAL, supra note 124, at 751-69;
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elements of traditional duress presents a potential obstacle that may impede
battered women from asserting duress as a complete defense to a crime. 132
2. Obstacles Posed by Traditional Duress
a. Nature of Coercive Threat
Classic duress restricts the types of coercive threats 133 sufficient to
excuse an actor of criminal responsibility. Duress must arise from an
unlawful, human threat134 of personal injury135 that is likely to result in
WILLIAMs, TExTBooK, supra note 124 at 624-36; Michael D. Bayless,
Reconceptualizing Necessity and Duress, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1191 (1987); Craig L.
Carr, Duress and Criminal Responsibility, 10 LAW & PHIL. 161 (1991); Joshua
Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its
Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331 (1989); Herbert Fingarette, Victimization, A Legalist
Analysis of Coercion, Deception, Undue Influence, and Excusable Prison Escape, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 65 (1985); Walter H. Hitchler, Duress as a Defense In
Criminal Cases, 4 VA. L. REv. 519 (1917); Jeremy Horder, Autonomy, Provocation
and Duress, 1992 CRIM. L. REv. 706 (1992); Lawrence Newman & Lawrence
Wetzer, Duress, Free Will, and the Criminal Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 313 (1957);
Nicola M. Padfield, Duress, Necessity and the Law Commission, 1992 CRiM. L. REV.
778; G.L. Peiris, Duress, Volition, and Criminal Responsibility, 17 ANGLO-AMERICAN
L. REv. 182 (1988); Perkins, supra note 124; Peter Rosenthal, Duress and the
Criminal Law, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 199 (1990) (Canada); Martin Wasik, Duress and
Criminal Responsibility, 1977 CRIM. L. REv. 453 (1977).
132 A battered woman unable to establish the elements of "complete" duress
sufficient to acquit may usually still urge "incomplete" duress in mitigation of her
sentence. See United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Neelley v. State, 494 So.
2d 669, 681 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So. 2d 697 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 926 (1987), denial ofpost conviction relief aff'd, 642 So. 2d 494 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1993), writ quashed as improvidently granted, 642 So. 2d 510 (Ala. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995). For a discussion of the use of duress at sentencing,
see infra notes 271-89 and accompanying text.
133 Duress limits its excuse to threats, which rest on fear of painful consequences,
as distinguished from offers, which rest on a desire to improve one's circumstances.
According to Joshua Dressier, this distinction assumes that actions are more freely
motivated by an offer or temptation than by fear of a threat. See Dressler, supra note
131, at 1337.
134 Duress will not encompass the coercive effect of natural causes or forces. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 378-79 (1985). Although some commentators
describe duress as a "choice of evils" defense similar to necessity, this requirement of
a human threat distinguishes the two defenses. See infra notes 328-31 and
accompanying text. Moreover, duress does not encompass lawful human threats. See
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either death or serious bodily harm.' 36 Threats of lesser injuries, no matter
how minor the offense committed, will not excuse.137 Duress, as
traditionally formulated, thus does not permit any proportionality or
"sliding scale" analysis based on the severity of the threat compared to that
of the offense committed.' 38
A battered woman who commits an offense in order to avoid further
physical abuse from her batterer can likely establish that she acted out of
fear of an unlawful human threat to her person.' 39 Similar threats
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 378-79; ROBINSON, supra note 89 at § 177(e),
at 355-57; WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK, supra note 124, at 634.
135 Threats concerning property, reputation, or other economic loss, however
severe, will not suffice. DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 259; WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK,
supra note 124, at 634.
136 Common law duress further required that the mortal threat be aimed at the
personal safety of the accused or a close family member. Most jurisdictions today
relax this requirement to include threats aimed at the accused "or another." State v.
Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1977) (explaining that "recent decisions have
assumed that concern for the well-being of another, particularly a near relative, can
support a defense of duress if the other requirements are satisfied"). See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-3-30 (1994) ("himself or another"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14
(West 1994) ("person'or third person"). Some states, however, retain the common law
restriction requiring that the coercive threat be aimed at the defendant. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-26 (1992) ("person of defendant"). Others specify the relationship of the
threatened party. See KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3209 (Vernon 1994) ("him or
upon his spouse, parent, child, brother, or sister").
137 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 375 (1985); DRESSLER, supra note 68,
at 259; Toscano, 378 A.2d at 762.
138 Many commentators criticize this lack of proportionality and argue that
because some offenses are minor, no minimum level of threat should be required. See
WILLIAMS, GENERAL, supra note 124, at 762; Padfield, supra note 131, at 782;
Perkins, supra note 124, at 416; Rosenthal, supra note 131, at 225. Some states do
make a limited exception to the "death or serious bodily injury" requirement when the
coerced actor commits only a misdemeanor. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8
(West 1994) (for non-felonies, force or threat of force suffices for duress); KAN.
CRInz. CODE ANN. § 21-3209 (Vernon 1994) (force or threat of force permitted for
non-felony). Indeed, Texas would appear to permit a duress defense in non-felony
cases involving a mere threat to property. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05 (West
1994) ("In a prosecution for an offense that does not constitute a felony, it is an
affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct
because he was compelled to do so by force or threat of force."). The Model Penal
Code provides for a limited proportionality analysis. See infra notes 211-34 and
accompanying text.
139 At one time, unfortunately not so long ago, a battered woman may have had
difficulty establishing the "unlawfulness" of such physical abuse. See Bannister, supra
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concerning the woman's children or family, which may well be more
coercive to the woman than any danger to herself, will probably also
suffice. 140 Unless a batterer uses deadly force or threatens the battered
woman with death or mortal injury, however, the battered offender may be
denied duress as a matter of law. 141 The long and wasting psychological
injury characteristic of many battering relationships' 42 does not satisfy this
legal threshold and no balancing of the threatened harm against the offense
committed ever occurs.143
Classic duress also requires that the coercer, either expressly or
impliedly, order the commission of the offense committed by the
accused. 144 A generalized fear of retaliation, unconnected with any
note 34, at 317 (battering of wives by husbands previously the societal "norm");
Dowd, supra note 52, at 568-74 (acceptance of wife abuse in modem society only
recently beginning to change).
140 See supra note 136. But see United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 252 (3d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985 (1991) (trial court did not erroneously fail to
instruct jury that battered woman could establish duress as a result of threats against
her children because "[tihere was no evidence that the threats to her children had a
greater or different impact on [the battered woman] than the threats to her own life
and health").
141 See United States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 478-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(abuse of battered offender not severe enough to support duress defense). A majority
of jurisdictions in this country continue to limit duress to coercive threats involving
death or grievous bodily harm. See infra APPENDIX (Alabama, Arizona, California,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North. Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
142 Under most definitions of battering, a battering relationship consists of severe
psychological or emotional abuse, as well as physical assault. One domestic violence
expert, Charles Ewing, classifies this psychological injury as the defining
characteristic of a battered woman. Ewing describes the psychological damage to a
battered woman as "a gross and enduring impairment of one's psychological
functioning which significantly limits the meaning and value of one's physical
existence." See EWING, supra note 52, at 79; see also Jessica Greenwald et al.,
Psychological Self-Defense Jury Instructions: Influence on Verdicts for Battered
Women Defendants, 8 BEHAV. SC. & L. 171, 172 (1990).
143 But see Boland, supra note 24, at 626-27 (contending that "seemingly
minimal level of threats upon a woman who has been 'beaten down' over a long
period of time" justifies admission of expert testimony to aid jury in balancing threats
against coerced offense).
144 As explained by Glanville Williams "the offense must be one expressly or
impliedly ordered by the villain, the order being backed up by his threat." WILLIAMS,
TEXTBOOK, supra note 124, at 633; see also ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(e)(5), at
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specific, articulable demand to commit an offense, will not excuse. 145 A
battered woman may not be able to demonstrate that her batterer
specifically demanded that she commit a particular offense. For instance,
battered women are often charged with crimes of omission; for failing to
act in the face of a legal duty to do so.146 In such cases, the connection
between a batterer's violence and the woman's failure to act may prove
insufficient to support a claim of duress. A battered woman's "generalized
fear of persecution" by her batterer, absent any specific "threat of
immediate retaliation" if she fails to cooperate, generally will not
361-62; Fingarette, supra note 131, at 106.
Professor Paul Robinson finds the language of many duress statutes ambiguous in
that it "could also mean that the defendant must believe that he will be endangered if
he does not commit the act or make the omission, even if it is not the particular act
commanded." ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(e)(5), at 361 n.33. Robinson notes,
however, that many existing duress statutes implicitly require a directed threat. Id. at
362 n.33; see also United States v. Jordan, 722 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1983) (no right to
duress instruction absent evidence that alleged coercer demanded that defendant
commit the crime with which he was charged); State v. Coats, 835 S.W.2d 430, 435
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (duress instruction unwarranted absent evidence that alleged
muggers directed defendant to strike victim).
145 State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 761 (N.J. 1977); see also Dressier, supra
note 131, at 1384 (law must distinguish between those who act because of a specific,
articulable threat and those who commit crime without any such threat).
146 Authorities increasingly prosecute battered mothers for failing to protect their
children from abuse at the hands of a batterer. See, e.g., Joe Lambe, Dead Child's
Mother Enters Guilty Plea: Angela Melton Agrees to Testify at Former Boyfiiend's
Murder Trial, KAN. CrrY STAR, Dec. 3, 1994, at 1; Dan McGrath, Abused Mom Still
Must Protect Kids, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 18, 1994, at A2; Rita Price, Woman Says
Fear of Husband Kept Her Silent on Daughter's Rape, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 17,
1993, at IA; Woman Convicted in Scalding Death of Four-Year Old Son, UPI, Sept. 9,
1992; see also Schneider, supra note 32, at 551-54 (citing case law and legislation
holding battered mothers responsible for violence to battered children); Walker,
Self-Defense, supra note 46, at 322 (describing recent use of battered woman
syndrome testimony in cases of "murder by omission" where battered women fail to
protect their children).
Other battered women face criminal sanction because they fail to report their
abusive partner's illegal activities. See, e.g., United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah
County, 930 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 1991) (battered woman suffered criminal forfeiture
because of alleged consent to husband's drug activities); Sloan v. State, No. CA CR
88-35, 1988 WL 70743, (Ark. Ct. App. July 6, 1988) (battered woman convicted of
delivery and possession of controlled substance based upon failure to inform
authorities of husband's possession); State v. Lambert, 312 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1984)
(battered woman charged with welfare fraud for failure to tell welfare authorities of
husband's employment).
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"substitute... for the showing of duress courts have always required to
excuse otherwise criminal conduct."147
Even with crimes of commission, battered women may act under a
very real, but nevertheless "generalized fear of retaliation." In her studies
of battered women, for example, Dr. Walker finds that many battered
offenders commit their crimes in the shadow of their batterer's actual or
threatened violence.1 48 Unless a battered woman can connect her offense to
an articulable demand from her abuser, 149 however, her claim of duress
will likely fail. 150
b. Nature of Offense
Besides restricting the nature of the coercive threat, traditional duress
also limits the types of offenses that qualify for its excuse. Under the
147 Sixty Acres, 930 F.2d at 860-61. In Sixty Acres, the government sought
forfeiture of property used by a battered woman's husband to grow marijuana. The
woman defended the forfeiture action, arguing that she had never consented to her
husband's illegal activities. Id. at 859. Although the record amply demonstrated that
the woman and her family lived in extreme fear of the batterer, it failed to establish
that the man had "threatened immediate retaliation to his wife if she refused to
cooperate in the drug scheme which caused his arrest." Id. at 861. In rejecting the
abused woman's defense of duress, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
The evidence amply supports the district court's finding that Mr. Ellis'
presence induced fear, anxiety and fierce discomfort in the members of his
household. Mrs. Ellis' generalized fear of persecution from her husband,
however, does not allow her to escape the consequences (in this case, forfeiture)
of her consent to his illegal acts. We may not substitute, as the district court
appeared to do, a vaguely-defined theory of "battered wife syndrome" for the
showing of duress courts have always required to excuse otherwise criminal
conduct.
Id. at 860.
14 8 WALKER, supra note 25, at 142.
149 Toscano, 378 A.2d at 761.
150 See, e.g., United States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 478-79 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (abuse of battered woman not "connected directly enough with [her] crime to
support a duress defense"); Sloan v. State, No. CA CR 88-35, 1988 WL 70743, at *5
(Ark. Ct. App. July 6, 1988) (no evidence that battered woman acted under "present
and immediate danger with respect to possession of the marijuana") (emphasis added);
People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 763 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (duress instruction
unwarranted because woman did not act "at direction of another person" when she
hired another to kill abusive husband).
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common law, a defendant accused of murder could not avail herself of the
defense of duress, notwithstanding satisfaction of all the other requisites of
the defense. 151 Jurists and scholars have long debated the propriety of this
"inexcusable choice" restriction on duress. 152 While most contemporary
commentators oppose restricting duress based on the nature of the offense
committed, 153 the majority of jurisdictions in this country continue to
151 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 1, at 368 (1985); KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 131, at 940; Fingarette, supra note 131, at 69; Perkins, supra note 124, at
403-08.
152 See George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1278-79 (1974) (exploring common law's reluctance to accept
necessity or duress as defenses in homicide cases).
Blackstone regarded murder as a natural offense against God which society, as
creator of positive law, could never excuse. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*27 ("[Tlhough a man be violently assaulted, and hath no other possible means of
escaping death, but by killing an innocent person; this fear and force shall not acquit
him of murder; for he ought rather to die himself, than escape by the murder of an
innocent."). Scholars who view duress as a "lesser evils" defense argue that one can
never take an innocent life in order to avoid death or injury to oneself. See LAFAVE &
SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(a), at 433 (the rationale for duress is that, "for reasons of
social policy, it is better that the defendant, faced with the choice of evils, choose to
do the lesser evil . . . in order to avoid the greater evil threatened by the other
person."); see also WILLIAMS, GENERAL, supra note 124, at 756 (lesser evils rationale
of duress supports murder exception to duress). Still others believe the restriction
necessary to prevent duress from becoming a "charter for terrorists," Lynch v.
Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, 1 All. E.R. 913, 933 (1975)
(Lord Simon); Abbott v. The Queen, 3 All. E.R. 140, 146 (1976) (Lord Salmon), or a
"cloak" for "the coward." Regina v. Howe, 1 All. E.R. 771, 780 (1987) (Lord
Hailsham). See also Perkins, supra note 124, at 404 ("The criminal law is a moral
code and the recognition of an excuse under these circumstances would declare such
an intentional killing to be morally acceptable.").
In contrast, those opposed to limiting duress to non-homicide offenses find it
hypocritical to demand that an accused exercise a greater degree of courage than that
possessed by ordinary persons. Lynch, 1 All. E.R. at 918-19 (Lord Morris of
Borth-Y-Geft). These scholars view punishment of the coerced killer as ineffective and
thus improper because one faced with imminent death simply cannot be deterred from
acts of self-preservation. See WILLIAMS, GENERAL, supra note 124, at 737-38
(quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN, ch. 27 (1885)).
153 See WILLIAMS, GENERAL, supra note 124, at 762 (rejecting absolute ban on
duress in homicide cases and advocating, instead, a proportionality analysis that
balances "what the accused has done and what harm he was trying to avoid");
Fingarette, supra note 131, at 70 (finding murder exclusion to represent situation in
which "public policy rides roughshod over both legal analysis and psychological
reality"); Padfield, supra note 131, at 783-84 (proposing duress as defense to any
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exclude duress as a defense to homicide. 154
In many jurisdictions, then, a battered woman forced to kill a third
party under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm from her
batterer cannot assert duress as a matter of law, no matter how compelling
the circumstances or severe the abuse. 155 The homicide exception to duress
charge).
The Model Penal Code does not limit the types of offenses to which duress might
be asserted. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 376 (1985) ("It is obvious that
even homicide may sometimes be the product of coercion that is truly
irresistible .... "). For a discussion of the Model Penal Code formulation of duress
and its potential impact on battered offenders, see infra notes 211-234 and
accompanying text.
154 Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin all preclude duress as a
defense to a prosecution for murder or intentional killings. Arizona, Nebraska, North
Carolina, and South Carolina exclude duress from homicide prosecutions. California,
Idaho, Illinois, Montana, and Nevada exclude crimes punishable by death from their
duress provisions. Colorado limits duress to crimes other than Class I felonies. Florida
precludes duress as a defense to attempted murder charges. Kansas, Washington, and
Michigan prohibit duress from being asserted in manslaughter prosecutions.
Maryland, West Virginia and Wyoming limit duress to offenses other than those
involving the "taking of innocent life." Indiana and Iowa appear to impose the most
severe limitation based on the nature of the offense. Indiana prohibits the assertion of
duress in a prosecution for an offense "against persons" and Iowa prohibits its
assertion in any prosecution involving intentional or reckless physical injury. In total,
at least 29 states limit duress to crimes other than murder. See infra APPENDIX; see
also Cawthon v. State, 382 So. 2d 796, 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 388
So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1980); Wentworth v. State, 349 A.2d 421, 426 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1975); People v. Moseler, 508 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Fuller, 278 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Neb.), modified on other grounds, 281 N.W.2d 749
(Neb. 1979); State v. Baca, 845 P.2d 762, 767 (N.M. 1992); State v. Henderson, 307
S.E.2d 846, 849 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Robinson, 363 S.E.2d 104 (S.C.
1987); State v. Tanner, 301 S.E.2d 160, 163 (W. Va. 1982); Amin v. State, 811 P.2d
255, 260 (Wyo. 1991).
155 The case of Neelley dramatically illustrates this restriction and its impact on
battered offenders. In that case, Judith Neelley raised a "combination of duress...
the battered woman syndrome ... and coercive persuasion" in defense to a charge of
kidnapping and brutally murdering a 13-year old girl. Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d
669, 677 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So. 2d 697 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 926 (1987), denial ofpost conviction relief aft'd, 642 So. 2d 494 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1993), writ quashed as improvidently granted, 642 So. 2d 510 (Ala. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995). At trial, Neelley presented evidence that her
accomplice/husband had subjected her "to such violent and gross mental, emotional,
physical, and sexual abuse that she would have done anything, and did do everything
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may further prevent a battered woman from claiming duress as a defense to
the independent felony underlying a felony-murder charge. 156 Indeed, in
some jurisdictions, this restriction on duress may prevent a battered woman
from claiming duress in a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, a
crime involving mere recklessness. 157 If a battered woman cannot assert
duress in such circumstances, she may be relegated to using evidence of
compulsion and the battered woman syndrome to mitigate her crime158 or
her punishment 59 or to support an insanity or diminished capacity
he asked." Id. At a post-trial hearing, Dr. Lenore Walker testified that Neelley "was a
severely battered woman, that she was acting out her husband's wishes, and that her
criminal acts were committed as a way of coping with that abuse and protecting
herself." Neelley v. State, 642 So. 2d 494, 499 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), writ quashed
as improvidently granted, 642 So.2d 510, cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995).
Because Alabama law denied duress as a defense "in a prosecution for murder or any
killing of another under aggravated circumstances," however, such prior abuse was
ruled relevant only to mitigate punishment. Neelley, 494 So. 2d at 681-82.
156 Jurisdictions that prohibit the use of duress in homicide cases differ
concerning whether it can excuse one compelled to commit a felony during the course
of which a death occurs. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 131, at 941 n.12; see
also State v. Dunn, 758 P.2d 718, 725 (Kan. 1988) (battered woman permitted to
assert duress as a defense to the underlying felony in a felony murder prosecution),
habeas corpus granted sub nom. Dunn v. Roberts, 758 F. Supp 1442 (D. Kan. 1991),
aff'd, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992); State v. Bockorny, 863 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Or.
Ct. App. 1993) (court assumes, without deciding, that battered woman can assert
duress in defense of felonies underlying aggravated murder charge).
157 See, e.g., People v. Moseler, 508 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993),
appeal denied, 519 N.W.2d 899 (Mich. 1994) (denying duress defense to battered
woman involved in fatal traffic accident that occurred as she was being chased by her
abusive boyfriend).
158 Several jurisdictions that deny a duress defense in murder prosecutions
nevertheless permit coercion to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(3) (West 1987) (making it first degree manslaughter
where, through coercion, a defendant was forced to kill another); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
939.46 (West 1982) (in murder prosecutions, duress will reduce degree of crime to
manslaughter).
159 Even if duress cannot be asserted as a complete or even partial defense to
murder, most jurisdictions will allow evidence of compulsion to serve as a mitigating
factor in sentencing. See, e.g., Neelley, 642 So. 2d at 508 (evidence of battered
woman syndrome "obviously pertinent and significant on the sentencing decision to be
made by the judge"); Neelley, 494 So. 2d at 682 ("only legal theory upon which Mrs.
Neelley's alleged treatment by her husband was relevant was the one the jury properly
considered-mitigation of sentence"); People v. Smith, 608 N.E.2d 1259, 1271 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (in sentencing battered woman who pled guilty to murder of her infant
child, trial court considered fact that woman suffered from the battered woman
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defense. 160
c. Temporal Proximity of Threat: Imminent v. Immediate
Like self-defense, classic duress requires a certain temporal proximity
between a coercer's threat and his threatened harm. 161 As with
self-defense, jurisdictions differ in their construction of that temporal
prerequisite. And as with self-defense, this "element of immediacy" 162
§constitutes a serious roadblock to battered women seeking to assert
duress.
A majority of jurisdictions continue to require an "immediate" or
"imminent" threat of injury as a threshold element of duress. 163 This
syndrome and acted under influence of her co-defendant). See infra notes 271-89 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of the role of duress at sentencing.
160 Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992), illustrates the use of
coercion to support a claim of diminished capacity. In Dunn, a battered woman
convicted of aiding and abetting her batterer in felony-murder and aggravated
kidnapping failed at trial to establish a prima facie case of duress. State v. Dunn, 758
P.2d 718, 725-27 (Kan. 1988), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Dunn v. Roberts, 768
F. Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1991), aff'd, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992). On appeal of the
decision of the federal district court denying habeas relief, the Tenth Circuit
nevertheless held expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome "crucial"
to whether the woman possessed the specific intent necessary to aid and abet her
batterer. Dunn, 963 F.2d at 312-13. This psychiatric testimony, according to the
circuit court, provided an alternative reason for the woman's continued presence with
her abuser and thus supported her assertion that she lacked the requisite mens rea. Id.
at 313. See also McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725, 733 (R.I. 1992) (evidence of
battered woman syndrome rebuts element of premeditation in first-degree murder).
161 Sam v. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d 832, 839 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
162 United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1984).
163 DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 259; KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 131, at
936; LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(b), at 436. Of the thirty-five jurisdictions
that have codified duress, three (Arizona, Washington, and Louisiana) require an
"immediate" threat; one (Minnesota) requires an "instant" threat; and sixteen
(Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, North Dakota, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Missouri, Montana, New York, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,'and Wisconsin)
explicitly require an "imminent" threat. Courts in four other jurisdictions (California,
Colorado, New Hampshire, and Oregon) read an imminence or immediacy element
into their duress statutes. See infra APPENDIX. Most of the remaining jurisdictions that
have not codified duress retain the common law requirement that the threatened harm
be "present, imminent, and pending." See, e.g., Cawthon v. State, 382 So. 2d 796
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.); State v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987); Commonwealth
v. Robinson, 415 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1981); People v. Hubbard, 320 N.W.2d 294
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Castrillo, 819 P.2d 1324 (N.M. 1991); State v.
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requirement generally mandates that the threatened harm be "present,
imminent, and impending." 164 To be "present," a threat must operate "on
the mind of the actor at the time of the criminal act." 165 "Imminent" or
"impending" likewise demand that the threatened harm be "pretty close to
happening" and not too remote in time.166 Indeed, in the context of
duress, 167 many courts equate "imminent" with "immediate." 168 Thus,
traditional duress "typically involve[s] threatened injuries that will follow
nearly instantly if the coerced actor fails to obey." 169 Threats of future
death or serious bodily injury170 or "veiled threats of future unspecified
harm" 171 will not suffice. 172
Carver, 385 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. 1989); State v. Harr, 610 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992); State v. Robinson, 363 S.E.2d 104 (S.C. 1987); State v. Cram, 600 A.2d 733
(Vt. 1991); Pancoast v. Commonwealth, 340 S.E.2d 833 (Va. Ct. App. 1986); State v.
Tanner, 301 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 1982); Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255 (Wyo. 1991).
164 Dressier, supra note 131 at 1340; see also Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 694
(threat of injury must be "present, immediate, or impending").
165 Dressier, supra note 131, at 1340.
166 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(c), at 438-39; see also Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 562.071 cmt. (Vernon 1979) ("The threat of force must be 'imminent.' This
term is not defined, but it clearly indicates that the threat should not be remote in
time. However, neither is it necessarily limited to the last possible second."); Sam v.
Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d at 839 ("Imminent connotes less than immediate, yet still
impending and present.").
167 This contrasts with the typically broad construction of "imminence" in the
context of self-defense. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
168 See United States v. Jordan, 722 F.2d 353, 358-59 (7th Cir. 1983) (though
Illinois duress statute requires "imminent" harm, court upheld denial of compulsion
instruction in absence of evidence that defendant feared immediate, serious physical
injury or harm); Hill v. State, 219 S.E.2d 18,19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (notwithstanding
statutory "imminence" requirement, court held that fear must be of present and
immediate violence); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00 cmt. (McKinney 1987)
(interpreting "imminent" threat as "immediate physical force or immediate threat of
physical force"-one capable of "immediate exercise of realization"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-11-504 cmt. (West 1994) ("The standard sufficient to excuse criminal
conduct is that the compulsion must be immediate and imminently present .... ).
169 Dressler, supra note 131, at 1340. See also United States v. Gaviria, 804 F.
Supp. 476, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (coerced actor must "be presented with an
immediate and clear choice between commission of the crime charged or of serious
harm to [herself] or another without reasonable means to escape").
170 DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 259; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(b),
at 436.
171 United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1984).
172 See State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1981) (threats "directed at some
indefinite time in the future" insufficient); Sam v. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d 832,
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.This aspect of imminence often invalidates the duress defense of
battered women who commit crimes outside the presence of their
batterers.17 3 The coercing party generally must be present with the accused
during her commission of an offense for his threat to qualify as "imminent
and impending." 174 Any geographic distance between a batterer and an
accused at the time of the alleged threat thus may doom a battered
offender's claim of duress. 175
839 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (threats "that might occur at some uncertain time that is
distant and separate from the period of duress or coercion" not imminent).
173 See supra note 17.
174 Donald T. Lunde & Thomas E. Wilson, Brainwashing as a Defense to
Criminal Liability: Patty Hearst Revisited, 13 CRIM. L. BULL. 341, 354-55 (1977).
This traditional reading of "imminence" may adversely impact a battered offender's
defense. In United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 985 (1991), for example, a woman who claimed that her abusive husband had
coerced her into participating in a number of cocaine-related transactions received the
following jury instruction on duress:
You heard the evidence. You will have to determine whether or not, first of
all whether the threat was immediate. Keep in mind whether her husband was
even present on any of these transactions;... When you analyze the evidence,
these are a series of transactions which occurred over a period of almost a year,
six or seven transactions, and you have to consider whether or not under the
circumstances under which this lady got involved in these transactions [she] was
really acting under the fear that if she did not do this she would be subject to
serious bodily harm; that it was immediate; that there was no way to avoid it, it
was inescapable.
Certainly an abusive husband is no license to become involved in
transactions, half pound or half ounce or half kilo transactions of narcotics.
Id. at 253 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit upheld the instruction, as well as Mrs.
Santos' conviction. Id. at 254.
175 United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1992), illustrates this
obstacle. In Homick, a battered woman sought admission of expert testimony
concerning the battered woman syndrome to help establish that her ex-husband had
coerced her to falsify an affidavit regarding the ownership of a stolen ring. Although
the ex-husband was living with the woman at the time of the offense, he was out of
town at the time he made two allegedly coercive telephone calls to the woman. In
upholding the trial court's exclusion of the expert testimony, the Ninth Circuit stated:
We recognize that the unique nature of the battered woman syndrome
justifies. a somewhat different approach to the way we have historically applied
these principles. However, we do not think that the facts of this case fall within
the scope of any reasonable approach to the battered woman defense, no matter
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Moreover, even if willing to acknowledge the psychological
"presence" of an absent batterer's threat, 176 a court will likely find the
constant, but "generalized" fear by which batterers hold their partners
captive insufficient to satisfy the temporal strictures of imminence.' 77
Indeed, because duress generally requires a specific threat of nearly
instantaneous harm, that defense will not typically encompass "the effects
of subtle, ongoing forms of physical and psychological abuse" resulting
from severe, long-term domestic violence. 178
A "present and imminent" harm must also be "continuous." The
accused must apprehend imminent harm throughout the entire time she
commits a crime. 179 Thus, if an offense involves conduct over a span of
how we modify the traditional duress standards.
Id. at 905-06 (citations omitted).
176 See, e.g., State v. Torres, 657 P.2d 1194, 1197 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(batterer's absence from scene of crime not fatal to battered woman's claim of duress).
177 A perceived lack of immediacy also motivated the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 1991). See
supra note 147. In rejecting a battered woman's claim of coercion, the Eleventh
Circuit held:
In our view, circumstances justify a duress defense only when the coercive
party threatens immediate harm which the coerced party cannot reasonably
escape. The evidence at the hearing, however, showed only that Mrs. Ellis feared
her husband. This generalized fear provokes our sympathy, but it cannot provoke
the application of a legal standard whose essential elements are absent. Nothing in
the record before us suggests that Mr. Ellis threatened immediate retaliation to his
wife if she refused to cooperate in the drug scheme which caused his arrest.
Everything in the record before us suggests that Mrs. Ellis had ample opportunity
to flee or to contact law enforcement agents regarding her husband's activities.
We therefore must hold that, on these facts, Mrs. Ellis cannot utilize the defense
of duress to justify her consent to her husband's conduct.
Id. at 861. See also infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text for further discussion
of the inescapability requirement of duress.
17 8 United States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
179 See State v. Myers, 664 P.2d 834 (Kan. 1983) (no duress defense when
compulsion not always imminent, continuous, and uninterrupted); Commonwealth v.
Melzer, 437 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Mass. Ct. App.), review denied, 440 N.E.2d 1177
(Mass. 1982) (imminent threat must continue throughout the entire course of criminal
conduct); State v. Tanner, 301 S.E.2d 160, 163 (W. Va. 1982) (threat must be
"continuous"); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-504 (1991) ("The threatened harm
must be continuous throughout the time the act is being committed .... "); Lunde &
Wilson, supra note 174, at 354-55 ("Apprehension of immediate danger must
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time, the pressures creating the alleged duress must continuously operate
throughout the entire course of conduct.180 A defendant loses her defense
of duress "as soon as the claimed duress . . . [has] lost its coercive
force," 181 or as soon as she is "out of range" of the alleged compulsion. 182
This component of "imminence" clearly presents obstacles to battered
offenders who commit so-called "course of conduct" crimes that involve a
series of criminal acts committed over a period of time.183 In such cases, a
battered woman may find it "extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible,"
to demonstrate that her batterer's deadly threat persisted throughout the
entire course of criminal conduct. 184 Even cases that do not involve
"course of conduct" crimes may lack imminence if any appreciable period
of inactivity lies between the batterer's threat and the accused's crime. The
cyclical nature of many battering relationships, particularly the relatively
calm period of loving contrition, may thus prevent a battered woman from
demonstrating the imminenice of the alleged compulsion. 85
must continue during the whole time the crime is committed.").
180 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412-13 & n.9 (1980) (involving a
prison escape).
181 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(b), at 437.
182 WILLIAMS, GENERAL, supra note 124, at 758 ("As soon as defendant is out of
range he must go to the police, and must show reasonable firmness in braving [the
coercer's] threat. If, however, [the coercer] may come back at any moment, so that
this threat previously made is a continuing menace to [defendant], it is capable of
amounting to duress.").
183 See supra note 18.
184 United States v. Gregory, No. 88CR295, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10060, at *4
n.4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1988). In Gregory, a battered woman accused of participating
with her husband in a fraudulent tax scheme that occurred over the course of three
years asserted a "duress defense in terms of the battered woman syndrome." Id. at *3-
4. Without ruling on the propriety of that defense, the district court noted: "Obviously
this exceptional defense may fit a one-time event (say a duress-induced killing) far
more readily than a'course-of-conduct crime." Id. See also United States v. Johnson,
956 F.2d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 1992) (while jury found that battered woman acted under
duress in connection with three counts of drug distribution, it rejected view that
woman acted under complete duress for the six months that she was involved in the
drug dealing conspiracy); United States v. Sebresos, No. 91-10193, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17757, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1992) (while immediacy requirement judged
according to facts of case, this requirement of duress "will be harder to satisfy with a
course of conduct crime such as [battered woman's] embezzlement scheme").
185 The case of State v. Dunn, 758 P.2d 718 (Kan. 1988), habeas corpus granted
sub nom. Dunn v. Roberts, 768 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1991), aft'd, 963 F.2d 308
(10th Cir. 1992), illustrates this particular obstacle. In Dunn, a seventeen-year old
woman admittedly accompanied her boyfriend on a two-and-one-half week murderous
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d. Inescapability
Courts will often hold a batterer's threat insufficiently "imminent" if a
battered offender fails to take advantage of a perceived opportunity to
escape or report her abuser's crime to authorities.' 86 Indeed, the threshold
element of "imminence" naturally intertwines with the separate prerequisite
of "inescapability," for if a coercer's threat is not "imminent," the accused
could likely avoid the threat without undue danger. 187
"Inescapability" traditionally requires that a defendant reasonably
believe that committing the crime was the only way to avoid the threatened
danger. The accused cannot claim duress if she had any reasonable
opportunity to extricate herself from the coercive situation without
committing the crime, either by resisting the coercer or escaping. 188
The social, economic and psychological barriers that prevent battered
women from leaving an abusive relationship or from seeking outside
assistance thus may obstruct their successful assertion of duress. Even
courts that acknowledge the "extraordinary courage" that it takes to leave
"crime spree" through several states. Id. at 722. The woman claimed that she
unwillingly accompanied her boyfriend after he threatened her and her family with
physical violence. She sought to bolster her claim of compulsion with expert testimony
concerning the battered woman syndrome. Id. at 725. In upholding the denial of
expert witness fees, as well as an instruction on duress, the Kansas Supreme Court
noted that the boyfriend's threats occurred more than two weeks before the murders
and that his subsequent threats merely "consisted of intermittent reminders.., of the
prior intimidation." Id. at 726. Moreover, the boyfriend's threats were not
"continuous" because he admittedly treated the woman "nice at times" during his
mood swings. Id. The lack of an imminent and continuous threat thus precluded duress
as a matter of law. Id. at 727. See also State v. Vanzant, No. 64010, 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5220, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28, f993) (duress unavailable when jailed
boyfriend did not present immediate threat of bodily injury).
186 See United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857, 861 n.2
(11th Cir. 1991) ("[We insist that claimants under no inmediate threat of reprisal
either communicate their knowledge to police, or attempt to remove themselves from
the scene of illegal activity."); Dunn, 758 P.2d at 726 (intimidation not continuous
because defendant had ample opportunity to escape when boyfriend slept or when
couple went out in public); Vanzant, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5220, at *2
("Duress... requires an immediate threat.., which cannot be remedied by the
person who asserts the defense either by escaping or by utilizing self help .....
187 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(c), at 438-39.
188 DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 259-60; LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 70, §
5.3(c), at 438-39; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 121, at 1060; WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK,
supra note 124, at 631.
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an abusive relationship may reject duress if the woman could physically
leave her husband.18 9 Moreover, when criminal activity extends over any
appreciable period of time, as in course of conduct crimes, a battered
offender may be forced to establish herself a virtual prisoner of her abuser,
"with absolutely no opportunity to leave his presence long enough to seek
assistance from law enforcement authorities." 190 In short, if a battered
woman has any opportunity to seek the protection of the police, a women's
shelter, or other social or legal assistance, her apparent ability to avoid
committing an offense may effectively foreclose her from claiming
duress. 191
189 Judge Weinstein, for example, has acknowledged the difficulties battered
women face in satisfying the inescapability element of duress:
Had defendant not pled guilty she probably would not have been able to
successfully plead duress. She was not faced with a stark and immediate choice
between physical harm and commission of the particular crime for which she was
indicted. While it would have been an act of extraordinary courage and perhaps
recklessness, she could have left her husband. She knew that she was committing
a crime by participating in drug dealing and she chose to exercise whatever free
will she had to act criminally.
United States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (emphasis added).
In Gaviria, Judge Weinstein considered such "incomplete duress" relevant only to
sentencing. Id. at 480-81. See infra notes 271-89 and accompanying text.
190 United States v. Gregory, No. 88CR295, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10060, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1988). In Gregory, the battered offender's ability to "come and
go," maintain employment, communicate with friends, and obtain government
assistance prevented her from proving duress. Id. See also State v. Vanzant, No.
64010, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5220, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1993) (battered
offender "presented with opportunity for self-help or escape" when abusive boyfriend
imprisoned).
191 Inescapability further relates to the additional requirement, in some
jurisdictions, that a defendant be free of fault in creating the coercive situation. See
DREsSLER, supra note 68, at 259; ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 162(a), at 246-27, §
177(a), at 350. See alo MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (1985) (duress is "unavailable
if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he
would be subjected to duress"). A battered offender, for example, might be found to
have culpably caused the condition of her duress by remaining with an abusive
partner. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 758 P.2d 718, 727 (Kan. 1988) ("If [the battered
woman] was a victim, she was a victim of her own poor judgment."), habeas corpus
granted sub nom. Dunn v. Roberts, 768 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1991), aff'd, 963
F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Blackman, supra note 35, at 129 (attributing
criminal justice system's "ambivalence" toward battered women to "cultural values
about families," including the view of woman as "the responsible one, the one who
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e. Objective v. Subjective Standard: Battered Offender as Person of
"Reasonable" Firmness
Like self-defense, duress consists of both subjective and objective
components. 192 An accused must honestly believe that committing a crime
is the only way to avoid imminent serious injury. In addition, an accused
must demonstrate that a reasonable person under similar circumstances
would similarly have succumbed to the threat.' 93 Though jurisdictions
differ as to how they implement the latter objective backstop, virtually all
codifications of the defense assess the impact of a particular threat upon the
hypothetical "reasonable person" in the defendant's "situation."194 As in
other areas of criminal law, however, courts often differ in the extent to
which they will subjectify this benchmark.
A battered offender's "objective situation"1 95 generally includes the
could and should change, the person who could end her family's violence, if only she
would leave").
192 ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(d), at 355; Fingarette, supra note 131, at 93-
94 (both discussing interweaving of objective and subjective elements of duress).
193 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, explanatory note, at 367 (1985); ROBINSON,
supra note 89, § 177(c)(2), at 353. Duress, however, does not require that the alleged
coercer actually intend to kill or injure the defendant. It is enough that the defendant
reasonably perceives such a threat. Dressler, supra note 131, at 1336 n.26; cf. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 156 (West 1983) (requiring "actual compulsion by use of force
or fear").
194 Federal courts applying federal law require a "well-grounded" apprehension
of deadly imminent harm, as well as the lack of any "reasonable" legal alternative to
violating the law. See United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1984). Some states require that a
defendant "reasonably believe" that the threatened harm is imminent and can be
averted only by committing the criminal act (California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, and Washington). Others
inquire whether a "reasonable person" (Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky,
Maine, and South Dakota) or a "person of reasonable firmness" (Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Utah), in the defendant's "situation" would have been able to resist a particular threat.
See infra APPENDIX; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985). Still others
combine these various formulations, evaluating both the reasonableness of a
defendant's subjective belief and her choice to engage in criminal conduct. See infra
APPENDIX (Arizona, Arkansas, and Tennessee).
195 Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898. Almost all definitions of duress permit the fact-
finder to account for the "situation" or "circumstances" in which the defendant was
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previous experiences she has had with the alleged coercer, including any
history of abuse between them. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, "[flear
which would be irrational in one set of circumstances may be
well-grounded if the experience of the defendant with those applying the
threat is such that the defendant can reasonably anticipate being harmed on
failure to comply." 196 A court that narrowly construes the "immediacy"
requirement of duress, however, may well find such evidence of prior
abuse irrelevant to assessing the reasonableness of a battered offender's
conduct.1 97
Moreover, while courts are increasingly willing to subjectify a coercive
"situation" with external physical characteristics like size, strength, age, or
health, 198 "idiosyncrasies of an individual's temperament"'19 9 that render a
defendant unusually susceptible to coercion are often ruled irrelevant.200
allegedly coerced. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374 (1985); see also
infra APPENDIX (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, South Dakota, and Utah).
196 Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898 (prior abuse included within "objective situation"
confronting battered offender); see also Willis, 38 F.3d at 177 n.8 (a defendant's
"objective situation" includes both "immediate circumstances of the crime" and
"evidence concerning the defendant's past history with the person making the unlawful
threat"); Commonwealth v. Ely, 578 A.2d 540, 542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (duress
assessed under "totality of the circumstances (including past abuse and appellant's
mental capacity)").
197 See, e.g., State v. Bockorny, 863 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)
("consideration of the entire circumstances" does not mean "circumstances outside of
the immediate ones" addressed in duress statute); Kessler v. State, 850 S.W.2d 217,
222 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (batterer's prior threats made before battered woman
committed burglary failed to demonstrate that defendant "perceived a threat of
inminent death or serious bodily injury")
198 Such "stark, tangible factors.. . differentiate the actor from another." State
v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 764 (N.J. 1977); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt.
3, at 375 (1985).
199 Toscano, 378 A.2d at 766.
200 See United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
209 (1993); Toscano, 378 A.2d at 763-64, 766; see also ROBINSON, supra note 89, §
177(1), at 365 (duress inapplicable to purely internal psychological incapacity and will
not excuse actor who lacks the fortitude to make moral choice); WILLIAMS,
TEXTBOOK; supra note 124, at 633 (impossible to reconcile wholesale importation of
defendant's personal characteristics into objective standard of duress).
This traditional reluctance to import mental characteristics or psychological
incapacities into the "person of reasonable firmness" reflects the broader
"unwillingness" of the criminal law "to vary legal norms with the individual's capacity
to meet the standards they proscribe, absent a disability that is both gross and
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The battered woman defense, with its current internal, psychological focus,
obviously does not fare well under the objective standard of duress. 20 1
Many courts refuse to invest the hypothetical person of "reasonable
firmness" with the psychological and behavioral effects of long-term severe
battering. These" courts distinguish "objective evidence" of a defendant's
fear, such as the batterer's violent nature or prior incidents of. abuse, from
"subjective perceptions stemming from the battered woman syndrome." 2°2
As recently explained by the Fifth Circuit:
Evidence that the defendant is suffering from the battered woman's
syndrome is inherently subjective .... Such evidence is not addressed to
whether a person of reasonable firmness would have succumbed to the
level of coercion present in a given set of circumstances. Quite the
contrary, such evidence is usually consulted to explain why this particular
defendant succumbed when a reasonable person without a background of
being battered might not have. Specifically, battered woman's syndrome
evidence seeks to establish that, because of her psychological condition,
the defendant is unusually susceptible to the coercion. 203
The battered offender's "situation," then, ordinarily will not
encompass "the effects of subtle, ongoing forms of physical and
psychological abuse" that heighten her susceptibility to threats, distort her
verifiable, such as the mental disease or defect that may establish irresponsibility."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374 (1985). See infra notes 310-24 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the inherently objective nature of duress as a
defense to criminal liability.
201 See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
battered woman defense both in theory and in practice.
202 United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899-903. (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gaviria,
804 F. Supp. 476, 478-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (both distinguishing the external
objectively verifiable compulsion essential to "complete" duress, from the more
subjective and individualized "incomplete" duress relevant only to sentencing).
203 Willis, 38 F.3d at 175. In Willis, a battered woman raised duress as a defense
to a charge of carrying a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime.
The woman allegedly feared that her abusive boyfriend would beat her unless she
permitted him to place the gun in her purse. While the district court allowed the
woman to introduce evidence of the boyfriend's prior abuse, as well as some
psychiatric testimony concerning her mental state, it excluded expert testimony
concerning the battered woman syndrome itself. The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial
court's ruling, holding such subjectification of duress both "contrary to settled duress
law" and "unwise." Id. at 176-77. See infra parts VI and VII (exploring the
assumption that extending duress in defense of battered offenders would require an
imprudent modification of that defense).
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perception of imminence, or disable her from escaping. 2°4 Courts, instead,
view the battered offender as suffering from some "individual
psychological incapacity," 20 5 "special subjective vulnerability to fear," 2°6
or "abnormal stresses of life." 20 7 To many courts, then, such internal
incapacity is simply irrelevant, "for purposes of determining criminal
responsibility," 20 8 to the "stringent objective standard" of classic
duress. 209
V. CIRCUMVENTING THE OBSTACLES
Courts, legislatures, and commentators suggest various means to aid
battered offenders in circumventing the impediments posed by classic
204 Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. at 478-79. Notwithstanding that the defendant in
Gaviria represented the "classic example of the plight of a subservient, abused
woman," Judge Weinstein doubted that she could successfully plead complete duress.
Id. at 481. In his opinion, the judge acknowledged "the cycle of victimization and
dependence" produced by systematic domestic abuse. Id. at 479. He also recognized
that battered women can live in a "relationship of complete subservience" to their
batterer, whose -"control can result from a combination of physical and psychological
abuse, cultural norms, economic dependence and other factors." Id. Nevertheless,
Judge Weinstein found this relationship of subservience insufficient, in itself, to excuse
battered women who commit criminal acts under the command or control of their
abusers. Id. at 478-79. Instead, he viewed such "incomplete duress" as relevant only
in sentencing. Id. at 479.
205 United States v. Sebresos, No. 91-10193, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17757, at
*7 (9th Cir. July 22, 1992).
20 6 Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898; see also id. at 902.. The Ninth Circuit, in Johnson,
acknowledged that the "purely subjective vulnerability" produced by the battered
woman syndrome affects a battered woman's subjective evaluation of her
circumstances. Id. at 898-99. Because a battered woman generally does not suffer
from any "gross and verifiable" disability, however, her increased "susceptibility to
the threat of force," does not constitute "complete duress" sufficient to excuse. Id. at
899-903.
207 State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 51 (Wash. 1994).
208 United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). Although courts
generally view the battered woman defense as irrelevant to "complete duress"
sufficient to excuse, they will often consider such "incomplete duress" in connection
with sentencing, where "legal standards are more subjective and less itrict." United
States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). See also Willis, 38 F.3d at
175-76; United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1992). See infra notes
271-89 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the role duress plays (or
should play) in mitigation of punishment.
209 Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. at 478-79.
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duress. A number of states, for example, follow, at least partially, the lead
of the Model Penal Code and have reformulated duress by deleting some of
its traditional elements. In jurisdictions where classic duress still prevails,
courts may modify or liberally construe its elements so as to enable
battered offenders to get their claims of duress to a jury. Evidentiary
reforms aimed at facilitating the admissibility of the battered woman
defense in cases of self-defense are being extended, in a few states, to cases
of duress. Finally, even courts that regard the battered woman defense as
irrelevant'to complete duress might nevertheless utilize such evidence in
mitigation of punishment.210 This Part of the Article examines each of
these suggested reforms to determine the extent to which any or all of them
aid battered offenders in asserting duress.
A. Reformulating Duress: Model Penal Code § 2.09
The Model Penal Code reformulates the parameters of duress as
follows:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged
to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a
threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another,
that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been
unable to resist. 2 11
This delineation substantially expands the defense of duress by removing
many of its threshold elements and designating them instead as mere
210 A court unwilling to sub silentio eliminate or modify the traditional standards
of duress might also permit a battered offender to utilize evidence of prior abuse and
its psychological effects to support a mental status defense. The inability to claim
duress should not preclude battered offenders from asserting insanity or temporary
insanity, provided the jurisdiction recognizes such defenses. 'Again, however, a
battered offender will likely be unable to establish that she suffers from the "mental
disease or defect" generally required for legal insanity. See supra note 113. Further, if
a jurisdiction accepts the defense of diminished capacity, a battered offender could
argue that her abuser's coercion prevented her from forming the criminal intent
required for an offense. See United States v. Sebresos, No. 91-10193, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17757, at *9 (9th Cir. July 22, 1.992) ("Psychiatric evidence that goes beyond
a defendant's cognitive defects is admissible to negate specific intent."); State v.
Lambert, 312 S.E.2d 31, 34 (W. Va. 1984) (battered woman "entitled to present
evidence to support such theories as the battered spouse syndrome, which go to negate
criminal intent"); see also supra notes 113 and 160 for a discussion of mental status
defenses to a charge of homicide.
211 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985).
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factors for consideration by the fact-finder. 212 In so doing, the Model Penal
Code eliminates many-although not all-of the roadblocks that obstruct
battered women from successfully asserting duress. 213
1. Nature of Coercive Threat
The Model Penal Code broadly extends duress in cases of the use or
threatened use of "unlawful force against [a defendanit's] person or the
person of another. . .. "214 Unlike common law duress, then, duress under
the Model Penal Code encompasses threats of personal injury less serious
than death or serious bodily harm. Moreover, the Code does not appear to
require as close a connection between the threat and the crime committed
as that required under classic duress. 215 Thus, the Model Penal Code
arguably affords a battered woman a duress defense even if her abuser did
not threaten death or serious bodily injury and even if he did not explicitly
demand commission of the charged offense. Approximately fourteen states
follow the Model Penal Code and excuse when coercion involves less
serious unlawful threats. 216
212 For a discussion of the manner in which the Model Penal Code broadens
common law duress, see DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 270-72; Dressier, supra note
131, at 1343-44; Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral
Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 671, 679 (1988).
213 See United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1992) (battered
woman syndrome "has a particular relation to the defense of duress as it has been
expanded by the commentary to Model Penal Code").
214 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1995). The Model Penal Code adheres to the
common law requirement of an unlawful human threat of personal injuy. See supra
notes 133-39 and accompanying text. Professor Dressler argues that the Code does
not go as far as its reasoning suggests when it relegates threats to economic interests,
property, and reputation, to the "lesser-evils" defense of necessity. See Dressier,
supra note 131 at 1376; Dressier, supra note 212, at 708-15.
215 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 377 (1985) ("[Oln grounds of
policy it should not matter whether the crime committed by the victim of coercion is
one the author of coercion demands."). This Code commentary appears specifically
aimed at the situation in which a prison inmate escapes confinement to avoid
homosexual assaults. See id. For a discussion of the analogy between the prison
escapee and the battered woman, see infra notes 236-52 and accompanying text.
216 See infra APPENDIX (Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Utah).
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2. Nature of Offense
As previously indicated, traditional duress cannot be asserted by
battered women charged with murder. 217 The Model Penal Code removes
this limitation and allows duress to excuse any crime. 218 Twelve
jurisdictions appear to have similarly expanded the types of offenses to
which duress may be asserted as a defense. 219
3. Immediacy
The modification of duress that holds most promise for battered
offenders is the Code's deletion of "imminence" as a threshold element of
the defense. As previously demonstrated, battered offenders cannot
establish even a prima facie case of classic duress unless they are faced
with a direct and immediate choice between serious physical harm and
commission of the charged offense.220 The Code rejects this absolute
requirement of temporal proximity in favor of making "imminence" but
one of many factors for consideration by the fact-finder in assessing
whether a defendant's will had been reasonably overborne. 221
Equally significant is the Code's recognition that "long and wasting
pressure may break down resistance more effectively than the threat of
immediate destruction. "222 The Code thus extends duress to the claims of
"brainwashed" victims:
[S]uppose that by the continued use of unlawful force, persons effectively
break down the personality of the actor, rendering [them] submissive to
whatever suggestions they make. They then, using neither force nor threat
of force on that occasion, suggest that [s]he perform a criminal act; and
the actor does what they suggest. The "brainwashed" actor would not be
barred from claiming the defense of duress, since [s]he may assert that
217 See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
218 The Code rejects the view of some commentators that duress is a sub-species
of the lesser-evils necessity defense. Instead, the drafters of the Code viewed it
"obvious that even homicide may sometimes be the product of coercion that is truly
irresistible .... ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 376 (1985). See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 372-73 (1985) (distinguishing duress from necessity).
219 See infra APPENDIX (Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah).
220 United States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 479, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). See
supra notes 161-85 and accompanying text.
221 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 375-76 (1985).
222 Id. at 376.
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[s]he was "coerced" to perform the act by the use of unlawful force on
[her] person. [S]he might also argue that [s]he is responding to earlier
threats to use unlawful force that have rendered [her] submissive to those
who made the threats because [s]he still subconsciously fears they will be
carried out. Of course, it may be very difficult to persuade a jury that an
act willingly performed at the time was truly the product of unlawful force
and would have been performed by persons of reasonable firmness
subjected to similar conditions, but, as framed, the [duress] section is
broad enough to permit such an argument. 223
"Brainwashing" refers to a psychological conditioning process
designed to instill in its victims a feeling of complete helplessness in which
"eventually, only subtle threats would be required to maintain control over
the victim."224 Given the striking similarity between brainwashing and the
battered woman syndrome, 225 the Code's deletion of "imminence" as a
threshold requirement may permit many battered offenders who commit
their crimes under their abuser's threatening shadow to claim duress. 226 Of
223 Id. at 376-77.
224 United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1984). Courts and
commentators may differ in their definition of brainwashing or, as called by some,
"coercive persuasion." See infra note 388.
225 It is not surprising that a significant number of courts and commentators
analogize the plight of a battered offender to that of a hostage, POW, or brainwashing
victim. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1992)
(comparing psychological effects of the battered woman syndrome to effects on
hostages and POWs who exist under "threatening shadow of . . . complete
domination "); Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 677, 682 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)
(battered woman's defense a "combination of duress, the battered woman syndrome,
and coercive persuasion"), af'd, 494 So. 2d 697 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
926 (1987), denial of post conviction relief aff'd, 642 So. 2d 494 (Ala. Crim. App.
1993), writ quashed as improvidently granted, 642 So. 2d 510 (Ala. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995); State v. Torres, 657 P.2d 1194, 1196 (N.M. 1983)
(batterer "subjected defendant to his will and beliefs" "[t]hrough a pattern of
discipline, beating, and teaching"); see also Appel, supra note 24, at 975-76 (using
hostage analogy to support extension of the battered woman syndrome to cases of
duress). This analogy has long been made in the self-defense context. See supra notes
103-06 and accompanying text. Of course, many courts are not persuaded by such
comparisons. See Neelley, 494 So. 2d at 682 (stating that the brainwashing defense is
not accepted in any jurisdiction); State v. Dunn, 758 P.2d 718, 727 (Kan. 1988),
habeas corpus granted sub nom. Dunn v. Roberts, 758 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1991),
af'd, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992) (as a matter of law, hostage or captivity
syndrome not applicable to battered woman who is not subject to brainwashing or total
breakdown of her personality).
226 But 'f Commonwealth v. Ely, 578 A.2d 540, 542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
all the modifications to duress wrought by the Code, however, its
elimination of "imminence" has been the least influential. 227 Unless
judicially modified, then, the element of immediacy retained by a majority
of jurisdictions will continue to prevent battered victims of "brainwashing"
from asserting duress. 228
4. Objective Reasonableness
Unlike its reform of self-defense, the Model Penal Code retains an
objective standard of reasonableness for duress.2 29 Even under the Code, a
defendant "must have been coerced in circumstances under which a person
of reasonable firmness in his situation would likewise have been unable to
resist."230
Whether a battered offender can satisfy this objective standard may
again largely hinge on a court's willingness to import the psychological
and behavioral characteristics of battered women into the accused's
situation." 23 1 While the Code does not ordinarily consider such "matters of
temperament" part of a defendant's "situation," 23 2 it does invest ultimate
(noting that because Pennsylvania has eliminated imminence from law of duress,
battered woman syndrome is not as crucial in duress context as it is in self-defense).
227 Only nine states similarly omit any temporal requirement from their definition
of duress. See infra APPENDIX (Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota).
228 The Code commentary recognizes this fact. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09
cmt. 3, at 376-77 n.40 (acknowledging that the "argument for brainwashing could not
easily be made under the provision of many statutes"). For a discussion of the
"slippery slope" concerns raised by any extension of duress that encompasses
"brainwashing," see infra notes 384-402 and accompanying text.
229 Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) (self-defense "justifiable when
the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary") with MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.09(1) (1985) (duress available only if "person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist").
230 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, explanatory note, at 367 (1985) (emphasis
added).
231 See supra notes 107-15, 192-209 and accompanying text.
232 The traditional unwillingness of our criminal justice system to completely
subjectify duress prompted the drafters of the Model Penal Code to reject a standard
of duress based solely on the individual fortitude of the particular actor. Instead, the
Code relegates psychological infirmities other than insanity to consideration at
sentencing. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374 (1985); cf. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4, at 242 (1985) (courts cannot subjectify negligence standard with
defendant's internal mental characteristics "without depriving the criterion of all its
objectivity").
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discretion in the trial court to further individualize that standard with an
actor's "purely internal psychic incapacity." 23 3
Moreover, and as noted by Professor Dressier, the ultimate issue under
the Code is whether an actor has exercised the degree of moral firmness
that can be expected of persons in the actor's circumstances," not whether
she has satisfied any prima facie elements of duress. 23 4 The Model Penal
Code would thus treat the "reasonableness" of a battered offender's
conduct as a matter for the jury to assess in light of all the facts and
circumstances, rather than a question of law for the court. Because the
Code more deeply involves the jury in the assessment of coercion and
apparently permits greater individualization of duress' objective standard,
battered offenders will likely fare better under the Code than under more
traditional formulations of duress.
B. Modifying Traditional Elements of Duress
As previously indicated, the majority of jurisdictions in- this country
preserve some, if not all, of the traditional elements of duress. Even in
such traditional jurisdictions, however, courts may, as in cases of
self-defense, liberally construe or modify those elements in order to justify
submission of the defense to the jury. Instead of explicitly reformulating
the defense, in other words, courts can implicitly accomplish the same end
England, in contrast, appears more willing to subjectify duress. A recent Law
Commission proposal to codify duress would excuse defendants who honestly, but
unreasonably, believed that committing a crime was necessary to avoid serious injury.
Padfield, supra note 131, at 782. This accords with English treatment of other
mistakes of fact. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, 2 All. E.R. 347
(1974). Even the English Law Commission, however, would not completely subjectify
duress; the alleged threat must still be "one which in all the circumstances (including
any of [the defendant's] personal characteristics that affect its gravity) he cannot
reasonably be expected to resist." Padfield, supra note 131, at 779, 783 (emphasis
added).
233 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 376 n.40 (1985) (in some cases,
duress standard "leaves open" the use of an actor's- "purely internal psychic
incapacity"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4, at 242 (1985) (leaving definition of
"actor's situation" ultimately to the court).
234 Dressler, supra note 131, at 1345. Thus, the Code treats both "imminence"
and "inescapability" as evidentiary factors for the jury, rather than as threshold
elements of duress. The Code does, however, deny duress to an actor who recklessly
places herself in a coercive situation. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (1985). See supra
note 131.
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by treating "imminence" and "inescapability" as fact issues,23 5 or by
further subjectifying "reasonableness:"
1. Modification of Imminence and Inescapability
Battered offenders do not need to strike out in uncharted territory to
argue for an expansion of traditional duress or its constituent elements.
Courts have already modified the elements of imminence and inescapability
in a distinct class of cases involving prison inmates who assert duress as a
defense to a charge of prison escape. Battered offenders might analogize
their plight to that of the prison escapee and argue for a similar
modification or expansion of duress. 23 6
Like many cases involving battered offenders, the typical prison escape
case will not satisfy many of the strictures of classic duress, often because
of similar obstacles. 23 7 The prison escapee typically argues that he needed
to violate the law (i.e., flee prison) in order to avoid another inmate's
threat of homosexual assault.238 The coercing party does not compel the
prisoner to escape. Instead, he intends to coerce a different act. More
importantly, the coercive threat typically concerns a harm that will occur at
some indefinite time in the future.239 The threatened harm is thus neither
"immediate," nor "inescapable," as the threatened inmate presumably has
time to seek aid from prison authorities.
235 See ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(e)(2), at 359 (some courts construe
imminence liberally and treat it as a question of fact under all the facts and
circumstances).
236 Although they are not incarcerated by iron bars, battered women are often
viewed as similarly imprisoned by the battering relationship. See, e.g., State v.
Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 17 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (battered woman
"incarcerated by abuse, by fear, and by her conviction that her husband [is] invincible
and inescapable"); see also supra notes 103 and 225 (discussion of captivity analogy
for battered women).
237 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 377 (1985); DRESSLER, supra note
68, at 266-72; GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 834-35 (1978);
Dressier, supra note 212, at 679 n.52; Fingarette, supra note 131, at 106-09.
The prison escapee might also assert the separate defense of necessity, arguing
that he chose the lesser of two evils by escaping. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt.
3, at 377 (1985); DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 266-69; see also Martin R. Gardner,
The Defense of Necessity and the Right of Escape from Prison-A Step Toward
Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L: REv. 110 (1975).
238 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 377 (1985); FLETCHER, supra note
237, at 834.
239 Dressler, supra note 212, at 679 n.52.
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Notwithstanding these impediments, many courts permit inmates to
submit their duress defense to the jury. Some expand the nature of the
coercive threat, relaxing the required identity between crime committed
and that demanded, and permitting threats of sexual assault, in addition to
threats of death or serious bodily harm, to qualify for duress. 24° Other
courts refuse to literally construe "imminence" to require gun-to-the-head
immediacy. 241 Where an inmate's fear is based upon a pattern of prior
threats and abuse, the mere passage of time between threat and escape will
not preclude duress as a matter of law. Instead, the question of what
constitutes "present, immediate, and impending" compulsion is treated as
one of fact for the jury.242 'Inescapability," in the prison escape context,
also often similarly hinges on the factual context, "including the [inmate's]
opportunity and ability to avoid the feared harm." 243 In this regard, the
probable ineffectiveness of official protection may demonstrate that the
inmate lacked any reasonable opportunity to avoid the harm without
escaping. 244
Battered offenders may draw some obvious helpful analogies to this use
240 See People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd,
232 N.W.2d 187 (Mich. 1975) (inmate asserted "more than generalized fear of
homosexual attack"). But see State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986) (threatened
harm must be at least that which would cause substantial bodily injury);
Commonwealth v. Stanley, 446 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1982) (alleged overcrowding and
inadequate medical care insufficient to support duress).
241 See People v. Unger, 338 N.E.2d 442 (111. App. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 362 N.E.2d
319 (111. 1977).
242 See, e.g., Esquibel v. State, 576 P.2d 1129, 1132-33 (N.M. 1978), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Wilson, 867 P.2d 1175 (N.M. 1994) (passage of two to
three days between threat and escape still presented jury question concerning
"imminence").
243 Harmon, 220 N.W.2d at 214.
244 A number of courts will permit an inmate to establish inescapability by
demonstrating either the lack of time or opportunity for complaint or "a history of
futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory." People v.
Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Amin v. State, 811 P.2d
255, 260 (Wyo. 1991).
Of course, not all courts are so willing to expand the elements of duress in the
prison escape scenario. See, e.g., State v. Wolf, 689 P.2d 188 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(public policy requires courts to apply more stringent standard of duress in prison
escape case); People v. Davis, 306 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (duress not
available when no imminent threat to life and person who allegedly threatened inmate
did not demand that inmate escape); State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981) (for
threat to be "imminent," it must be communicated to inmate that he would be
subjected to physical force presently).
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of duress by prison escapees. 245 They might, for example, request that
courts similarly relax the requirement that the coercive demand be for the
commission of the offense and, instead, require only that their batterer's
unlawful threat cause their criminal conduct. The cycle of domestic
violence and pattern of prior abuse might likewise justify submitting the
question of imminence to the jury in all but the clearest cases. Finally, as
in the prison escape scenario, a history of futile complaints to authorities
concerning an abusive partner's prior assaults, or the ineffectiveness or
inaccessibility of other forms of social assistance to battered women,246
arguably raise a triable fact issue concerning whether a battered offender
had any reasonable avenue of escape.
The analogy to prison escape cases, however, may ultimately prove
unhelpful to battered offenders. Even a court willing to stretch the
traditional limitations on duress may impose additional restrictions similar
to those often required in the prison escape scenario. In many jurisdictions,
for example, an inmate must demonstrate that he used no force or violence
in escaping and that he immediately attempted to surrender upon reaching a
position of safety.247 These additional prerequisites flow from the
245 In State v. Torres, 657 P.2d 1194 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), for example, a New
Mexico appellate court analyzed a battered offender's claim of duress by drawing
upon that court's similar treatment of inmates charged with escape. In that case, the
jury convicted the battered offender of purchasing a computer with a check drawn on
a fictitious account. The State had argued that because the woman's abusive husband
had not accompanied her into the store with his threats, the accused had failed to
demonstrate the requisite "imminence." Id. at 1196-97. The trial court supported the
State's argument with a supplemental instruction emphasizing the need for immediacy.
Id. at 1196. In reversing the woman's conviction, the appellate court stated: "We can
fathom no reason why threats need to be less immediate in prison escape cases than in
other situations where duress might be a defense." Id. at 1197 (citing Esquibel, 576
P.2d 1129). The court thus held the jury entitled to consider whether the seven-year
history of abuse, along with the threat of further beatings, rendered the threatened
harm both present and immediate. Id.
246 For a description of the limited legal and social options available to a battered
woman in an abusive relationship, see Appel, supra note 24, at 970-74; Blake, supra
note 24, at 74-75.
247 See Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115; Iowa v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863, 866
(Iowa 1978); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 446 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1982); State v. Tuttle,
730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986); State v. Niemczyk, 644 P.2d 759 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982);
Amin, 811 P.2d at 260. Courts differ on whether these additional restrictions on duress
constitute prima facie elements of duress 'in the prison context, id.,. or merely factors
for the jury to assess in determining coercion. See People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319
(111. 1977); People v. Mendoza, 310 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); State
v. Baker, 598 S.W.2d 540, 545-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Esquibel v. State, 576 P.2d
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traditional unwillingness of courts to entertain inmate complaints, 248 as
well as strong public interests in preserving prison discipline, preventing
prison escapes, and protecting the safety of the prisoner, prison officials,
and the public.249 Arguably, they represent restrictions limited to the
prison escapee and will not be applicable to the more sympathetic battered
offender. If relevant, however, these additional conditions on duress may
pose significant hurdles to battered offenders accused of violent offenses or
of course-of-conduct crimes that continue over an extended period of time.
Moreover, many view the unavailability, inaccessibility, or
ineffectiveness of official assistance as irrelevant to individual criminal
responsibility-both in general, 25 0 and of battered women in particular. 25 1
1129, 1132-33 (N.M. 1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Wilson, 867 P.2d
1175 (N.M. 1994). In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that in order to obtain a jury instruction on duress or necessity as a defense
to the continuing federal crime of prison escape, the escapee must offer evidence of "a
bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or
necessity had lost its coercive force." Id. at 413.
248 See, e. g., State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971).
249 See David Dolinko, Comment, Intolerable Conditions as Defense to Prison
Escapes, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1126, 1167-81 (1979) ("guidelines represent an
attempt to safeguard the strong public interest in preventing prison escapes while
taking into account 'the individual dilemma' confronting a seriously treatened
inmate"); Note, The Necessity Defense to Prison Escape after United States v. Bailey,
65 VA. L. REV. 359, 372 (1979) (additional requirements "reflect the judgment that
the costs of prison escapes are justified only when escape is the single means for
avoiding intolerable prison conditions"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, at 12
n.5 (1985) ("[A] court could consider whether recognition of the [necessity] defense
when a prisoner has escaped to avoid assault would have the effect of substantially
encouraging unjustified escapes.")
250 See Dressier, supra note 212, at 685-86; Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime,
75 CAL. L. REv. 257, 285 (1987) (both finding concept. of "shared guilt" not
inconsistent with that of individual responsibility). A recent proposal to codify duress
in England explicitly rules it "immaterial that the person doing the act believes, or that
it is the case, that any official protection available in the circumstances will or may be
ineffective." Padfield, supra note 131, at 779 (quoting Law Commission's proposed
codification of duress).
Authorities differ widely concerning this issue. Some, like Glanville Williams,
argue against considering the ineffectiveness of official assistance in claims of duress.
According to Williams, if a defendant could have fled or resisted a wrongdoer as a
matter of undisputed fact, "there is no evidence of duress for the consideration of the
jury." WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK, supra note 124, at 631. While severe, such a rule aims
at encouraging persons under duress to choose lawful alternatives to committing a
crime. Id. at 631-32.
Others, in contrast, view the absence of social assistance as directly relevant to
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Such a restrictive reading of inescapability would preclude battered
offenders presented with an opportunity for self-help or escape from
utilizing duress as a matter of law. 252
2. Subjectifying Reasonableness
No matter how willing a court may be to modify the traditional
elements of imminence and inescapability for a battered offender, 25 3 her
defense of duress will likely fail, as a matter of law, unless a court is
similarly willing to subjectify "reasonableness" by considering the
behavioral and psychological attributes of "battered women." Indeed, this
appears a primary role of the battered woman syndrome in cases of duress.
Clearly, expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome
relates to the subjective component of a battered offender's claim of duress.
As in cases of self-defense, the battered woman defense arguably dispels
the common "myths and misconceptions" surrounding domestic abuse and,
in so doing, bolsters the credibility of the defendant's claim that she acted
whether a defendant had any reasonable opportunity to escape. See, e.g., United
States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1984) (jury might find
defendant had no reasonable opportunity to escape drug traffickers given defendant's
belief that Bogota police were paid informants of coercers); State v. Toscano, 378
A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1977) (duress should recognize "predicament of individual who
reasonably believes that appeals for assistance from law enforcement officials will be
unavailing"); see also ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(e)(2), at 358 (contending that if
legal or other protection is unavailable or not accessible, exercise of free will might be
impaired); Padfield, supra note 131, at 780-81 (arguing that without such information,
jury could not "accurately assess the alternative courses available to the defendant"
and would "assume that official protection is available when the practicality of the
situation indicated that it wasn't").
251 Compare Schulhofer supra note 53, at 128 (author would recognize battered
woman's inability to obtain help in self-defense context) with C.]. Rosen, supra note
52, at 54 (author troubled with allowing battered women to establish necessity of
deadly force, absent imminent attack, because criminal justice system has failed
them).
252 See State v. Vanzant, No. 64010, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5220, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1993) (holding that duress "may not be utilized" by battered
offender presented with opportunity for self-help or escape when batterer imprisoned).
But see Blake, supra note 24, at 75 ("Jurors need to be informed of the limited options
available to battered women in order to evaluate the defendant's perceived and actual
opportunity for escape.").
253 See United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that "unique nature of battered woman syndrome" may justify
modification of traditional duress standards).
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under duress. 25 4 Such testimony thus explains why a battered woman
would remain in an abusive relationship and continue to commit crimes and
why she failed to report either the abuse or those crimes to authorities.
Absent evidence of the objective reasonableness of her belief, however,
a battered offender cannot establish a prima facie case of traditional duress.
Not surprisingly, then, courts and commentators that advocate the use of
duress by battered offenders all emphasize the need to admit expert
testimony to establish the reasonableness of the woman's decision to
commit a particular crime.25 5 Such expert testimony renders reasonable
what would otherwise appear unreasonable by explaining "how a battered
woman might think, react, or behave." 25 6 Without such testimony, these
authorities posit, "the abused woman may appear and act relatively
normal" 25 7 to a jury unfamiliar with the ways in which severe abuse can
alter her state of mind and distort her perception of danger and
immediacy. 25 8 These courts and commentators additionally find the
254 See People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 340-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(expert testimony bolsters credibility of battered offender's claim of duress), vacated
on other grounds, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (Cal. 1994); McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d
725, 732 (R.I. 1992) (testimony concerning battered woman syndrome explains why
battered woman incapable of freeing herself); see also Blake, supra note 24, at 69
(testimony concerning battered woman syndrome "equally relevant to support the
credibility of a battered woman and assess the defense of duress"); Boland, supra note
24, at 625-27 (expert testimony related to battered offender's credibility and state of
mind); Gousie, supra note 24, at 480 (expert testimony necessary to dispel myths and
help jury decide whether defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent).
255 See Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339 (expert testimony used to explain
behavior patterns that might otherwise appear unreasonable); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d
43, 54 (Wash. 1994) (en bane) (Utter, ., dissenting) (expert testimony explains
whether defendant acted under reasonable apprehension of harm given effects of past
abuse); see also Blake, supra note 24, at 80-82 (advocating use of battered woman
syndrome testimony to establish battered offender's reasonable belief of imminent
danger); Boland, supra note 24, at 627 (finding evidence of past abuse "informative
on the totality of the circumstances in which the defendant finds herself when faced
with such a choice"); Magner, supra note 24, at 447 (explaining that expert testimony
concerns "what would be expected of women generally.., who should find
themselves in a (comparable) domestic situation").
256 Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
257 McMaugh, 612 A.2d at 733.
258 Riker, 869 P.2d at 54 (Utter, J., dissenting) (expert testimony explains how
severe abuse distorts perception of harm and its immediacy in ways not readily
understandable); Boland, supra note 24, at 625-26 (defendant's altered perception of
danger and imminence is as relevant to duress as it is to self-defense); Magner, supra
note 24, at 446 (battered woman syndrome establishes how battered woman's reactions
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battered woman defense relevant to reasonableness in that it demonstrates
how prior abuse can render a battered offender more susceptible to future
threats of violence25 9 and incapable of handling "situations in the way
ordinary people would." 260
As previously indicated, however, courts generally measure duress
against the standards of a person of reasonable moral fortitude. Ordinarily,
an actor's "situation" does not encompass individual psychological
characteristics that heighten an actor's susceptibility to threats, distort her
perception of imminence, or disable her from escaping.261 Yet, the battered
woman defense directly aims at establishing such psychological traits and
mental characteristics. Thus, in order to find such testimony relevant to
reasonableness, courts must partially infuse the objective standard of duress
with the psychological make-up of battered women. While not completely
subjective (i.e., based on the individual perceptions and fortitude of a
particular defendant), this modified standard implicitly assesses duress
from the perspective of the reasonable battered offender.262
C. Evidentiary Reform and the Battered Woman Defense
Some who advocate the use of duress in defense of battered offenders
urge the "feminist community" to "lobby for statutory additions and
amendments to make expert testimony on [the battered woman syndrome]
and responses differ from those which might be expected).
259 See Riker, 869 P.2d at 50 (defense expert testimony sought to establish that
defendant's "history of abuse built a cumulative patina of fear which resulted in her
inability to resist or escape... alleged coercion"); Boland, supra note 24, at 626-27
(testimony establishes that battered woman's "ability to resist was precipitously low to
begin with").
260 Magner, supra note 24, at 446. See also Riker, 869 P.2d at 56 (Utter, I.,
dissenting) (battered woman assesses "danger differently than would an ordinary
person").
261 See United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1992) (battered
woman's "special subjective vulnerability" and lack of "psychological freedom to end
her victimization without assistance' does not establish inescapability required for
complete duress); see also supra notes 192-209 and accompanying text.
262 See Boland, supra note 24, at 632 (arguing that threat "as it is perceived by
the defendant" must be fully explained to jury); Magner, supra note 24, at 447
(assessing reasonableness from perspective of women "who should find themselves in
a (comparable) domestic situation"). For a discussion of whether such a
subjectification of duress comports with the rationale of duress as an excuse, see infra
notes 310-334 and accompanying text.
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admissible" in support of duress. 263 Several states have recently attempted
to codify the admissibility of the battered woman defense. 264 Only a few of
these statutes, however, are currently broad enough to encompass cases
where a battered offender asserts duress. 265 Instead, most of these
legislative reforms restrict their applicability to cases involving
self-defense, 266 homicide, 267 or "the use of force against another."268 Such
263 Blake, supra note 24, at 92.
2 6 4 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (Deering Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-21 (Supp. 1993); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN.
CTS. & IUD. PROC. § 10-916 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23E
(West 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (Vernon Supp. 1994); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.7 (West 1992);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 6-1-203 (1993).
265 The Massachusetts evidence code explicitly mandates the admissibility of
expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome "[i]n the trial of criminal
cases charging the use of force against another where the issue of. . . duress or
coersion [sic]... is asserted." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23E (West 1994).
Though the California statute concerning the battered woman syndrome does not
explicitly mention duress, California courts have construed it broadly to apply to "any
criminal case." People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 338 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), vacated on other grounds, 833 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994). See generally Scott
Gregory Baker, Deaf Justice?: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned Prior to the
Enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 99 (1994).
The language of the Oklahoma statute is similarly broad enough to encompass cases of
duress. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.7 (West 1992) ("[i]n an action in a court
of this state").
266 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (Supp. 1993) (use of force in defense of self or
others); LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 404 (West 1994) ("when the accused pleads
self-defense"); MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JuD. PRoc. § 10-916 cmt. (Supp. 1993)
(when "offered in support of the state of mind element of perfect or imperfect
self-defense"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (Vernon Supp. 1994) ("admissible upon
the issue of whether the actor lawfully acted in self-defense or defense of another");
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson 1993) (if accused "raises the affirmative
defense of self-defense"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (West Supp. 1994) ("if a
defendant raises as a defense a justification"); WYO. STAT. § 6-1-203 (1993) ("and the
person raises the affirmative defense of self-defense").
267 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (Supp. 1993) ("[i]n a prosecution for murder or
manslaughter"); MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (Supp. 1993)
(available to defendant charged with commission or attempted commission of "[flirst
degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, maiming, or... [a]ssault with
intent tb murder or maim"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.36 (West 1994)
("[i]n a prosecution for murder or manslaughter").
268 See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson 1993); WYo. STAT.
§6-1-203 (1993). Even the Massachusetts statute which expressly includes duress
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statutes often further limit the purposes for which expert testimony may be
admitted. 269 Thus, while these legislative efforts ostensibly aim at
protecting battered women by facilitating the admission of expert testimony
concerning the battered woman syndrome, they might actually argue
against admission of such testimony in cases of duress. 270
D. Duress and Sentencing
A court unwilling to dispense with the imminence or inescapability
requirements of traditional duress, or to import the special subjective
vulnerabilities of battered women into its objective benchmark, may
nevertheless find, duress relevant to a battered offender's
blameworthiness. 271 While these courts do not consider the subjective,
limits its ambit to cases "charging the use of force against another." MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23E (West 1994).
269 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (Supp. 1993) ("in order to establish the defendant's
reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary");
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (Supp. 1993) ("for the purpose of
explaining the defendant's motive or state of mind"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.06 (Anderson 1993) ("to establish the requisite belief of an imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36 (West 1994)
("to establish the defendant's reasonable belief that use of force or deadly force was
immediately necessary"); WYO. STAT. § 6-1-203 (1993) ("to establish the necessary
requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm").
Professor Holly Maguigan criticizes such statutory limits on the scope of expert
testimony as potentially excluding evidence "on state of mind, on myths and
misconceptions, and on the question why the defendant did not leave the abusive
relationship." Maguigan, supra note 52, at 455. Maguigan believes it unwise to
legislatively define the permissible content of expert testimony by codifying some type
of diagnostic checklist for the syndrome. Id. at 455-56 & n.281. Instead, Maguigan
contends that expert testimony concerning the syndrome "should be admissible in all
cases, civil and criminal, in which an explanation of the state of mind of a party or
witness is otherwise relevant and admissible." Id. at 456-57.
270 In State v. Baker, No. 13-91-46, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3745 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 16, 1992), for example, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that legislative
recognition of the battered woman syndrome in cases of self-defense did not establish
a general rule of admissibility in cases of duress. See also Blake, supra note 24, at 91
(describing many recent legislative responses as "laudable but ultimately inadequate,
and possibly detrimental"); Developments, supra note 34, at 1593 (indicating that
"current legislation in some states may place new limits on a battered woman's legal
options by imposing new restrictions on the use and purpose of syndrome testimony").
271 See United States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting
that battered offender's "status as a victim of systematic physical and emotional abuse
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"incomplete" duress experienced by many battered offenders sufficient to
excuse, 272 they may consider it relevant in sentencing. 273
"[L]egal standards are more subjective and less strict" in sentencing
than in adjudging criminal liability.2 74 In sentencing, courts are not
confined to the classical definition of duress and routinely relax or entirely
jettison its traditional elements. 275 Thus, a defendant subjected to threats
substantially lessens her blameworthiness, notwithstanding her legal guilt").
272 Sir James Stephen argued that duress should never constitute a defense to
criminal liability, but instead, should function only in mitigation of punishment. 2 SIR
JAMES FiTzAmEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 107-08
(1883) ("[Colmpulsion by threats ought in no case whatever to be admitted as an
excuse for crime, though it may and ought to operate in mitigation of punishment in
most but not all cases.). ISeveral contemporary scholars continue to view duress as
relevant only to mitigation of punishment. See Bayless, supra note 131, at 1214
(finding duress analogous to provocation in that it should mitigate only); Peiris, supra
note 131, at 208 (arguing that conception of duress as "mitigatory, rather than
exculpatory" is "cogently defensible"); Wasik, supra note 131, at 457-58 (contending
that while motive irrelevant in assessing guilt, it becomes proper consideration at
sentencing).
Today, however, most authorities agree that the criminal law should not hold a
person caught in a coercive dilemma to a standard of heroism to which her judges
themselves would not be prepared to submit. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2,
at 374-75 (1985) ("hypocritical" not to excuse); WILLIAMS, GENERAL, supra note
124, at 755 (purely mitigatory view of duress "over-severe"). A successful defense of
duress (i.e., "complete duress") will thus completely exculpate an accused of all
criminal liability. In contrast, "incomplete duress" will only mitigate punishment.
273 Even in "guideline" jurisdictions where sentencing is less discretionary and
more determinate, "incomplete" duress or coercion will often function in mitigation of
punishment. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, expressly permit a
downward departure from the applicable sentencing range if a defendant "committed
the offense because of serious coercion, . . . or duress, under circumstances not
amounting to a complete defense." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis
added). For a helpful overview of the framework and operation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, see John M. Walker, Jr., Loosening the Administrative
Handcuffs: Discretion and Responsibility Under the Guidelines, 59 BROOK. L. REv.
551 (1993). State sentencing regimes often contain similar "coercion" provisions. See
State v. Pascal, 736 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (discussing
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act).
274 Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. at 479.
275 In permitting a downward departure in a battered offender's sentence based
upon incomplete duress, the Ninth Circuit, in Johnson, noted "that the injury
threatened need not be imminent and may include injury to property, and there need
not be proof of inability to escape." United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 898 (9th
Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 1989)
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less serious than death or serious bodily injury, or that concern future
harm, rather than imminent harm, might argue that such "incomplete
duress," while insufficient to excuse, nevertheless justifies a lesser
punishment than that accorded one not similarly coerced. 276
Moreover, "purely subjective" factors otherwise irrelevant to guilt may
be taken into account in sentencing, where a court can "properly consider
the individual before the court and her particular vulnerability." 277 Thus, a
battered offender's subjective perception of danger,278 her individual
evaluation of the opportunity to escape,279 her "psychological makeup," 280
and her particular susceptibility to "patterns of dependence, domination
and victimization," 28 1 while arguably irrelevant to her culpability, 28 2 may
be utilized in affixing her sentence. 283
(acknowledging broader standard of coercion as sentencing factor than that required to
prove a complete defense). Courts similarly often relax or eliminate the elements of
self-defense in sentencing battered women convicted of killing their batterers. See,
e.g., United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 1992); Pascal, 736 P.2d
at 1072.
276 See, e.g., Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898 (both defendants who failed to persuade
jury of duress and defendant properly denied instruction on duress entitled to assert
coercion in sentencing); United States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 479-81
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (defendant who could not satisfy the objective standard of duress
entitled to downward departure of sentence); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 47 (Wash.
1992) (en banc) (battered offender who failed to convince the jury of duress sentenced
at lowest end of standard range).
277 Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898-99. See also United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170,
176 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2585 (1995) (distinguishing between
criminal liability and criminal sentencing where court not limited to objective duress
formulation); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374 (1985) ("The most that it is
feasible to do with lesser [subjective] disabilities is to accord them proper weight in
sentencing.").
278 Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898.
279 Id. at 898, 903.
280 Id. at 900.
281 Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. at 479; see also United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888,
891 (2d Cir.) (testimony that defendant unusually vulnerable relevant to sentencing),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 209 (1993); United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d at 899, 903
(9th Cir. 1992) (trial court free to consider subjective vulnerability of battered women
in determining "incomplete duress"); Riker, 869 P.2d at 51 n.5 (cumulative fear that
made battered offender unable to escape or resist coercion more appropriately
considered at sentencing).
282 See supra notes 192-209 and accompanying text.
283 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines so subjectify duress: "The extent of the
decrease [for serious coercion or duress] ordinarily should depend on the
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Relegation of duress to sentencing, however, will not completely
circumvent the obstacles experienced by many battered offenders. The
current sentencing regime in many jurisdictions dramatically circumscribes
judicial discretion in sentencing.28 4 In addition, the "serious coercion"
sufficient to merit a reduction in sentence may be limited to physical
coercion and thus fail to account for the "endemic sociological and
psychological realities" of male dominance, female victimization, and
emotional abuse that characterizes the battered woman defense.285
Even when permitted to depart from applicable guidelines because of
duress or coercion, courts may find themselves further hamstrung by
legislative mandatory minimum sentences. 286 Thus, courts that admittedly
reasonableness of the defendant's actions and on the extent to which the conduct
would have been less harmful under the circumstances as the defendant believed them
to be." U.S.S.G. § 5.K2.12., policy stint. (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). See also
Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898 (guidelines allow court to consider the "perception of the
particular defendant").
284 Under the ostensibly gender neutral Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for
instance, federal courts cannot ordinarily consider an accused's sex or family
responsibilities in determining whether to depart from the applicable sentencing range.
See generally Raeder, supra note 37.
285 In Gaviria, Judge Weinstein noted that a "subservient" defendant "might not
be able to show the sort of 'serious coercion... or duress' of which the Guidelines
speak, yet still might establish a pattern of dependence that would be relevant to
blameworthiness and her sentence." United States v. Gaviria, 805 F. Supp. 476, 479
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). See also Raeder, supra note 37, at 973 (contending that "[o]nly if
judges can move beyond coercion to dominance in considering departures will
culpability questions be dealt with in a way that recognizes the gendered nature of
some female crime"); Nagel & Johnson, supra note 38, at 211 (noting inability of
Sentencing Commission to articulate express adjustment for crimes caused by "some
form of dominance or manipulation, falling short of physical abuse or serious physical
coercion"); Henry Wallace & Shanda Wedlock, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Gender Issues: Parental Responsibilities, Pregnancy and Domestic Violence, 2 SAN
DiEo JUSTICE J. 395, 423 (1994) (arguing for modification of Guidelines to permit
departure "in cases where only emotional abuse was previously present").
286 The Guidelines explicitly defer to conflicting statutorily prescribed sentences.
See U.S.S.G. § 5.G1.1(a) (Supp. 1995) ("Where a statutorily required minimum
sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily
required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence,"). See generally William
W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing Apples and
Oranges, 66 S. CAL. L. Rav. 405 (1992). A district court may depart from the
mandatory minimum sentence of the Guidelines only in cases in which the accused
provides substantial assistance in the prosecution of another and upon Government
motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); see also United States v. Valente, 961 F.2d 133, 135
(9th Cir. 1992) (no discretion to depart downward from mandatory minimum sentence
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view battered offenders as less deserving of punishment, and less in need
of deterrence or incapacitation, 287 might be precluded from translating
those sentiments into practice. 288
Finally, many courts fail to exercise their authorized discretion in
sentencing battered offenders. Although permitted to consider the battered
woman syndrome and the coercion exerted upon battered offenders, many
courts appear no more able than jurors to shirk the "myths" and
"misconceptions" surrounding domestic violence, even in connection with
sentencing. 289
based on defendant's "aberrant behavior"); Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. at 480 (court lacks
power to reduce sentence "where Congress' own pronouncements speak definitively
on the length of a defendant's sentence").
287 See, e.g., Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 478-79 (asserting that incarceration of
battered women is incompatible with the purposes of punishment). See also Appel,
supra note 24, at 978 (maintaining that punishment of battered offender "serves no
moral purpose"); Moyer, supra note 37, at 206 (noting that there is a "consensus...
among most researchers that most women in prison are not dangerous and that
criminal justice system should be seeking alternative policies and programs for
handling these less-serious women offenders"); Raeder, supra note 37, at 930 (citing
lower recidivism rates for women and fact that averrage incarcerated female is not a
dangerous offender).
288 In Gaviria, Judge Weinstein regretted that he had "no power to consider the
injustice of minimum terms in individual cases," and thus sentenced the "subservient,
abused" defendant in that case to the statutory minimum of five years imprisonment.
Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. at 480-81. As previously noted, many attribute the dramatic
increase in the 'female prison population to such mandatory minimum sentences for
drug offenses. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
289 In Neelley, for example, the trial court had sentenced the defendant to death,
notwithstanding testimony that she was a "severely battered woman," and
notwithstanding the jury's recommendation of life without parole. See Neelley v.
State, 642 So. 2d 494, 508. (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), writ quashed as improvidently
granted, 642 So. 2d 510 (Ala. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995). In
concluding that the husband's influence did not constitute extreme duress or substantial
domination, the trial court stated:
The defendant is an intelligent person capable of making independent
choices. The evidence is substantial that she made a willing choice to follow her
husband's influence rather than to depart from it. There were numerous
opportunities for the defendant to break with her husband and seek help had she
felt the need or beer so inclined.
Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 693 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So. 2d 697
(Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1987), denial of post conviction relief aff'd,
642 So. 2d 494 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), writ quashed as imporvidently granted, 642
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VI. DURESS, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE BATTERED OFFENDER
Absent legislative reform, then, battered offenders must either convince
a court to implicitly modify duress by subjectifying its traditional elements
or consign duress for use in connection with their sentencing. Advocates of
battered offenders, who obviously prefer the former alternative, 290 often
urge extending the vehicle for such implicit modification -r-the battered
woman defense-beyond self-defense to cases of alleged coercion. 291 The
apparent overlap in the prima facie elements of imminence, necessity, and
reasonableness, they contend, make self-defense and duress "patently
similar in all relevant aspects" and the battered woman defense thus "easily
transferable" to the context of duress.2 92 As shown below, however, the
different natures of self-defense and duress, as well as the additional moral
So. 2d 510 (Ala. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995). See also People v.
Smith, 608 N.E.2d 1259, 1271 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (in sentencing battered mother to
60 years imprisonment, trial court weighed the brutal and heinous nature of the crime
over the fact that the defendant was under the influence of her husband and suffered
from the battered woman syndrome).
290 As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Johnson, "if the defense were 'complete,'
there would have been no crime requiring a sentence." United States v. Johnson, 956
F.2d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1992).
291 Appel, supra note 24, at 980; Blake, supra note 24, at 77-84; Gousie, supra
note 24, at 454-55.
292 Blake, supra note 24, at 69; see also Appel, supra note 24, at 980 (contending
that battered woman syndrome "equally applicable in duress defenses" as in
self-defense because it "fulfills the same elements... in both defenses"); Boland,
supra note 24, at 625-26 (finding "no reason why the defendant's perception, altered
through a cycle of battering, of the imminence of the threat should be any less
informative in a case of coerced conduct than where the defendant acted in
self-defense").
At least one court has found this overlap in elements similarly convincing:
With the two defenses thus juxtaposed, it is clear that a rule permitting expert
testimony about [battered woman syndrome] in a self-defense case must
necessarily permit it in a case where duress is claimed as a defense. In both cases,
the evidence is relevant to the woman's credibility and to support her testimony
that she entertained a good-faith objectively reasonable and honest belief that her
act was necessary to prevent an imminent threat of greater harm.
People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), vacated on other
grounds, 833 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994). See also State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 54 (Wash.
1994) (en bane) (Utter, I., dissenting) (persuaded by similarity in two defenses).
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claims at issue in duress, preclude such ready correspondence.
A. Self-Defense and Duress: Overlap of Elements
Though jurisdictional differences in the formulations of duress and
self-defense make any comparison of the two defenses quite difficult, both
arguably do contain parallel elements. Both duress and self-defense, for
example, require a certain temporal proximity of harm.293 Likewise, both
defenses require that a defendant's conduct be "necessary." 294 It is the
overlap in the subjective elements of the two defenses, however, that
presents the strongest argument for extending the battered woman defense
to non-traditional cases of duress.
Evidence of past abuse, including expert testimony concerning the
battered woman syndrome, explains how a battering relationship affects a
battered woman's subjective perception of imminence and necessity. Such
testimony aids in establishing a battered woman's mental state and in
bolstering her credibility, whether at issue in self-defense or duress.295
Thus, if duress were an entirely subjective defense, the battered woman
defense would clearly justify submission of that defense to the jury.
The successful assertion of both self-defense and duress, however,
293 Jurisdictions, however, are likely to more strictly construe this temporal
prerequisite and require "immediacy," as opposed to broader "imminence," in the
context of duress. See, e.g., Riker, 869 P.2d at 51 ("Unlike self-defense, which only
requires an apprehension of 'imminent' danger, our duress statute requires an
apprehension of 'immediate' harm."); see also supra notes 161-72 and accompanying
text.
294 In self-defense, this means that deadly force must be necessary to avert an
aggressor's imminent attack. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. In duress,
necessity mandates that a defendant have no reasonable opportunity to escape an
imminent deadly threat without violating the law. See supra notes 186-191 and
accompanying text. While courts rigidly enforce the inescapability requirement in
duress, the majority of jurisdictions in this country fail to take necessity to its logical
conclusion in self-defense. Most jurisdictions, for example, do not require a defendant
to retreat in the face of an imminent unlawful attack, even if she is aware of a
completely safe avenue of escape, before using deadly force in self-defense. See supra
note 91.
295 See Blake, supra note 24, at 69 ("the use of [battered woman syndrome]
testimony is equally relevant to support the credibility of a battered woman asserting
the defense of duress as for a battered woman claiming self-defense"); Boland, supra
note 24, at 626-27 (need to admit "evidence of past abuse" to assess battered woman's
credibility and subjective apprehension of danger "virtually identical" in cases of
duress and self-defense).
[Vol. 56:665
THE USE OF DURESS IN DEFENSE
generally requires that a battered woman also demonstrate the "objective
reasonableness" of her subjective belief.296 Whether she can satisfy that
objective standard, in turn, depends on the court's willingness to
individualize and contextualize it with the behavioral and psychological
characteristics of the "paradigmatic" battered woman. The question then
becomes whether the underlying rationale of duress itself will permit such
modification. This issue, in turn, requires an examination of the inherent
nature of duress as a defense to criminal liability; an investigation of why
we excuse coerced actors in the first place. Given its underlying rationale,
as discussed below, duress cannot appropriately be modified to the extent
necessary to accommodate the battered woman defense in many
non-traditional cases of coercion.
B. The Rationale of Duress
Duress as a defense to criminal culpability dates back to the ancient
Hebrews and has occupied a place in the common law for well over two-
hundred years. 297 Despite its pedigree, the underlying rationale,
classification, and scope of duress has generated extensive debate both in
this country and abroad. 298
1. Duress as Negating Element of Offense
The mentalistic idiom utilized by courts and commentators when
discussing duress accounts for much of the confusion over its rationale.299
Commentators who advocate the use of duress in defense of battered
offenders, for example, frequently describe the coerced offense as an
"involuntary" act of one whose "free will" has been "overborne" and who
thus no longer acts according to her own choices and desires. 3°° Such
portrayals, however, misleadingly suggest that coercion negates either the
296 This would not be the case in jurisdictions that adhere to the Model Penal
Code's entirely subjective formulation of self-defense. See supra note 72. But see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1985) (retaining objective standard for duress).
297 See Rosenthal, supra note 131, at 200-01.
298 Commonwealth courts and scholars appear particularly preoccupied with the
duress defense. See id. at 182; see also Horder, supra note 131; Magner, supra note
24; Padfield, supra note 131; Peiris, supra note 131; Wasik, supra note 131.
299 Fingarette, supra note 131, at 71.
300 See, e.g., Gousie, supra note 24, at 476-77, 481 (describing battered offender
as one whose conduct is "not done voluntarily," who acts "without free will," and
whose behavior results from "intimidation," rather than her own desires and choices).
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actus reus or the mens rea elements of an offense. 301
The "involuntary" actor exercises no choice over her actions. She
completely lacks the ability to control her behavior or to avoid committing
the offense. 3°2 A coerced actor, in contrast, does retain some choice over
her conduct. Though the opportunity to exercise such choice may be
significantly impaired, she remains able to control her actions and resist the
coercion.30 3 Thus, a coerced act is "involuntary" only in the metaphorical
sense of the word3 4 and will not negate the actus reus of a crime. 30 5
Nor does coercion necessarily negate the mens rea of an offense. 3°6 In
the typical case of duress, the actor intentionally chooses to commit her
crime. Her options might be painfully limited, but the coerced actor retains
her free will. While she may not desire to commit the crime, she does
intend to disobey the law as a means of escaping the threatened harm. 307
301 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(a), at 433; WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK,
supra note 124, at 624-25; Wasik, supra note 131, at 453-55.
302 Criminal liability generally requires the commission of a "voluntary" act. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1985) (criminal liability must be "based on conduct
which includes a voluntary act"). Few actions, however, are sufficiently "involuntary"
to negate the actus reus of an offense. See, e.g., id., § 2.01(2) (involuntary conduct
includes "a reflex or convulsion," "a bodily movement during unconsciousness or
sleep," "conduct during hypnosis," or any similar bodily movement "that otherwise is
not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual").
303 As recognized long ago by Aristotle: "[A]n individual may resist the threat
and suffer the evil rather than do what he thinks to be wrong; he will then be praised,
and his resistance will show that it was not inevitable that a person should submit to
the threat." ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book 3, ch. 1, quoted in WILLLAMS,
TEXTBOOK, supra note 124 at 625.
304 See Kadish, supra note 250, at 266 (discussing metaphorical voluntarism
underlying duress).
305 See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 121, at 1054-55; ROBINSON, supra note
89, § 177(b), at 351; Bayless, supra note 131, at 1193-94; Carr, supra note 131, at
174-79; Fingarette, supra note 131, at 71-75; Wasik, supra note 131, at 454.
306 As previously discussed, the existence of duress can negate mens rea,
particularly the specific intent portion of an offense. See supra note 160; see also
Rosenthal, supra note 131, at 202-08 (reminding that courts should not foreclose
possibility that duress might negate mens rea).
307 Professor Joshua Dressler, upon whose many works on duress this Article
extensively draws, explains:
[Tihe coerced actor chooses to violate the law. He chooses to commit the criminal
offense rather than to accept the threatened consequences. He would not have
chosen to commit the crime but for the threat, but it is still his choice, albeit a
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Thus, it is incorrect to view battered offenders under duress as lacking
free will or acting involuntarily. Likewise, the duress exerted upon
battered offenders generally will not deprive them of criminal intent.308
Instead, although their choices may be "excruciatingly difficult" and their
actions "unwilling," battered offenders possess free will, know they are
committing a crime, and act voluntarily. 309
2. Duress as Normative Defense
A person who acts under duress accurately perceives the nature and
consequences of her conduct, as well as appreciates its wrongfulness. 310
The coerced actor is a normal person, unafflicted by any internal incapacity
and able to alternatively choose a lawful course of action.311 The law
nevertheless excuses the coerced actor because external, abnormal
circumstances for which she is not responsible (i.e., the coercive threat)
unfairly restrict her opportunity to act lawfully. 312 Unlike defenses such as
hard and excruciatingly difficult choice. His act may be unwilling, but it. is not
unwilled.
Dressier, supra note 131, at 1359-60. See also WILLIAMS, GENERAL, supra note 124,
at 751 (accused's motive for committing crime does not negate her will or fact that she
has a choice); Fingarette, supra note 131, at 111 (coercion "is not merely working
one's will upon another, but wrongfully working one's will through the will of the
other"); Wasik, supra note 131, at 455 ("[T]hat the accused does not really desire the
consequences for their own sake, but does desire them as a means of escape from
imminent peril" is irrelevant to whether she possesses mens rea).
308 But see State v. Lambert, 312 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 1984) (defendants
"[are] entitled to present evidence.., such.., as battered spouse syndrome, which
go[es] to negate criminal intent ").
309 See United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 1992) (improper to
equate "voluntary" with "absence of duress"); United States v. Sebresos, No.
91-10193, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17757, at *6 (9th Cir. July 22, 1992) (battered
woman cannot claim that acts were involuntary); United States v. Gaviria, 804 F.
Supp. 476, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (battered woman knew she was committing crime
and "chose to exercise whatever free will she had to act criminally").
310 Dressier, supra note 131, at 1359-60; Dressler, supra note 212, at 702; Paul
H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 199,
222-24 (1982).
311 ROBINsoN, supra note 89, § 177(e)(3), at 354; Dressier, supra note 212, at
684.
312 See Joshua Dressier, Professor Delgado's "Brainwashing" Defense: Courting
a Determinist Legal System, 63 MINN. L. Rav. 335, 345-46, 351-52 (1979); Dressier,
supra note 212, at 702-12; Dressier, supra note 131, at 1365-66; Kadish, supra note
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insanity or involuntary intoxication that excuse an actor based on
individual inadequacies, duress excuses a coerced actor because she
"show[s] [her]self [to be] no different than the rest of us." 3 1 3
Duress thus differs from other excuses314 in that' it possesses a
normative component. In order to merit excuse via the defense of duress,
an actor must demonstrate the level of fortitude that society can
legitimately expect of one under similar coercive circumstances. As
Professor Dressler explains, the "excusing process [under duress] involves
a normative judgment about the degree to which people may fairly be
expected to apply their capacities in the defendant's immediate
circumstances. "315 Duress excuses the coerced actor "only'if he attained or
reflected society's legitimate expectations of moral strength." 316
250, at 259; Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1091,
1132 (1985).
Some commentators view duress in terms of a relative incapacity or impairment
of control. See Robinson, supra note 310, at 221-22, 225-26. The Model Penal Code
similarly focuses on the "incapacity" of the coerced actor. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.09 (1985) (whether "a person of reasonable firmness in [the actor's] situation would
have been unable to resist") (emphasis added).
In contrast, Professor Dressler believes that while coercion can incapacitate, the
defense of duress focuses, instead, on lack of fair opportunity, rather than on any
incapacity, to choose. See Dressler, supra note 131, at 1352 n.134, 1365-66;
Dressler, supra note 212, at 707-10. This latter view of duress as based on a lack of
opportunity appears more accurate, given the objective, normative component of the
defense. Indeed, the Model Penal Code acknowledges that the "incapacity" that counts
in duress is not the subjective incapacity of the actor, but the "incapacity of men in
general to resist coercive pressure." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374
(1985); see also ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(c)(1), at 353.
313 Kadish, supra note 250, at 262. Professor Kadish classifies duress as a
"reasonable volitional deficiency" defense, as compared to insanity, which he
categorizes as a defense of "non-responsibility." While the coerced actor is
indistinguishable from the "common run of human kind," the insane -actor is very
different from the rest of us." Id. at 262, 266. Professor Dressier expresses similar
sentiments by describing duress as a "there but for the grace of God or good fortune"
defense. Dressier, supra note 212, at 683. Unlike the insane actor, Dressler finds, the
coerced actoi is "whole" and "free of sickness." Dressier, supra note 131, at 1359-
60. See also Fingarette, supra note 131, at 94 (duress focuses on the reasonableness of
the victim's response to a wrongful threat not on whether "some psychological power
of victim's mind was destroyed or crippled").
314 Scholars differ as to whether duress constitutes a justification or an excuse.
See infra notes 325-38 and accompanying text.
315 Dressier, supra note 212, at 702.
316 Dressler, supra note 131, at 1334. See also id. at 1385 (actor lacks fair
[Vol. 56:665
THE USE OF DURESS IN DEFENSE
Given this normative aspect, duress will not excuse based solely upon
an actor's subjective incapacity to resist a coercive threat. 317 Nor will any
minimal restriction on an actor's opportunity to choose lawful conduct
suffice. 318 Instead, what entitles the coerced actor to an excuse is the
reasonableness of her response to the external abnormal circumstances to
which she is subjected. 319 The coercive threat must be sufficiently grave
and severe as to similarly coerce a non-heroic, but reasonably firm, person
into criminal conduct. 320
The battered woman defense, as currently formulated, runs contrary to
this normative aspect of duress. Although feminist scholars emphasize the
need to view a battered woman's actions as reasonable, the battered woman
opportunity "if a person of reasonable moral strength cannot fairly be expected to
resist the threat"); DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 262 (duress excuses "as long as an
actor's ordinary and expectable conduct demonstrates no more than human frailty");
ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(c)(2), at 353 (normative standard of duress assures
that actor's level of resistance meets the community's standards for
blamelessness .... "); Dressier, supra note 212 at 710 (duress represents normative,
rather than empirically verifiable judgment about personal responsibility).
317 ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(c)(3), at 354-55. Such subjective coercion is
nevertheless an essential component of the defense. See supra note 192.
318 Dressier, supra note 131, at 1365-66.
319 These abnormal circumstances are what distinguish the otherwise "normal"
coerced actor from other members of the general community. See ROBINSON, supra
note 89, § 177(c)-(e), at 353-55; Dressler, supra note 212, at 683; Kadish, supra note
250, at 273; see also FLETCHER, supra note 237, at 808 (duress "focuses excusing on
the incident and the circumstances that induced violation"); Horder, supra note 131, at
707 ("exceptional circumstances" may induce even the "normal person" to commit
crime; the "excusatory element lies in the uniqueness of the pressure to act").
320 As Professor Dressler explains:
By recognizing duress as an excuse, we concede that we as humans are
sufficiently fallible that in extreme circumstances we will nearly
inevitably... succumb to our weaknesses. We will choose (it is a choice) to take
the wrong route. When the choices are this bad we conclude that the actor was not
provided a fair opportunity to behave properly. In these circumstances, unless we
are hypocritical, we cannot blame the wrongdoer for his actions. Acquittal here is
not a function of mercy but of justice.
Dressler, supra note 212, at 711-12. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at
374-75 (1985) (the law is "ineffective . . . [and] hypocritical, if it imposes on the
actor who has the misfortune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a standard that the
judges are not prepared to affirm that they should and could comply with if their turn
to face the problem should arise"); Kadish, supra note 250, at 273-74 (coerced actor
has "no effective choice given limits of human fortitude").
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defense typically focuses on how the individual perceptions and
psychological capacities of battered women, in fact, differ from those of
the person. of "reasonable firmness." 321 The more that defense resembles a
plea of diminished capacity or insanity, the less the battered offender
resembles the morally responsible agent for whom the defense of duress
was constructed. 322  In short, the behavioral and psychological
characteristics that currently comprise the battered woman defense and that
render battered offenders more susceptible to threats and less capable of
resistance 23 cannot be imported into the objective standard without gutting
duress of its normative function.324
3. Duress as Justification or Excuse
The normative component of duress makes that defense difficult to
categorize as either a justification or an excuse. A justification centers on
the external, objective circumstances that surround an otherwise criminal
act and seeks to determine whether, on balance, the act has either benefited
(or at least not harmed) society.325 In contrast, an excuse generally focuses
on an actor's individual characteristics and subjective mental state and
seeks to determine whether she can justly be held accountable. 326 As
distinguished by Professor Paul Robinson:
Justified conduct is correct behavior which is encouraged or at least
tolerated. In determining whether conduct is justified, the focus is on the
act, not the actor. An excuse represents a legal conclusion that the conduct
is wrong, undesirable, but that criminal liability is inappropriate because
some characteristic of the actor vitiates society's desire to punish him.
321 See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
322 See Boland, supra note 24, at 629-30 (battered offender's claim of duress
closely resembles a claim of mental impairment or insanity); see also note 313 and
accompanying text.
323 See id. at 625-27 (evidence of past abuse admissible in cases of duress to
show how battering alters battered woman's perception of imminence and
"precipitously lower[s] her abilify to resist her abuser").
324 See Fletcher, supra note 152, at 1293 n.72, 1300 (acknowledging law's
traditional reluctance to consider defendant's "peculiarities" and "psychiatric
condition" in assessing defenses like duress); Kadish, supra note 250, at 277
(contending that complete individualization would circumvent the rationale of excusing
under defenses like duress).
325 See Moore, supra note 312, at 1096; C.J. Rosen, supra note 52, at 18-22.
326 See Dressier, supra note 212, at 75-76; Fletcher, supra note 152, at 1304;
Kadish, supra note 250, at 258.
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Excuses do not destroy blame, . . rather, they shift it from the actor to the
excusing conditions. The focus in excuses is on the actor. Acts are
justified; actors are excused.327
Scholars debate the classification of duress under this dichotomy.
Some, like Professors LaFave and Scott, classify duress as a sub-species of
the "lesser evils" justification of necessity.328 A few jurisdictions likewise
deem duress a justification 329 or expressly condition the defense with a
requirement that the harm avoided "clearly outweigh the harm sought to be
prevented." 330 Most jurisdictions, however, follow the suggestion of the
Model Penal Code and classify duress as an excuse, separate from the
justification of necessity, that does not depend on any weighing of
competing harms. 331
That scholars disagree as to its appropriate classification illustrates that
duress fails to neatly fit within either category of defense. 332 The coerced
327 Robinson, supra note 310, at 229. Other scholars similarly demarcate
justifications from excuses. See Dressler, supra note 212, at 675-76; Fletcher, supra
note 152, at 1304; Kadish, supra note 250, at 258; Moore, supra note 312, at 1095-
99.
328 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(a), at 433 ("The rationale of the
defense of duress is that, for reasons of social policy, it is better that the defendant,
faced with a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil . . . in order to avoid the
greater evil threatened by the other person.").
329 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18 (West 1986); Feliciano v. State, 332
A.2d 148, 148 (Del. 1975).
330 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-504 (1994); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:3 (1986) ("competing harms" statute).
331 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 373 (1985) (question in duress is
whether the actor should be excused even when her "choice involves an equal or
greater evil than that threatened"). Most scholars would likewise classify duress as an
excuse. See FLETCHER, supra note 237, at 830 (duress not justification); ROBINSON,
supra note 89, § 177(a), at 348-51 (classifying duress as excuse); WILLIAMS,
TEXTBOOK, supra note 124, at 626-27 (duress does not depend on the advancement of
good or the lessening of evil); Dressler, supra note 131, at 1349-53 (most states view
duress as more than comparison or weighing of harms); Kadish, supra note 250, at
261-62 (duress available even when not justified by lesser evils).
332 See Carr, supra note 131, at 179 (proposing third defense classification for
duress); Dressler, supra note 212, at 709 (noting that duress sometimes blurs into
justification of necessity); Kadish, supra note 250, at 261 (admitting that classification
of duress is "not free of doubt"). The prison escape scenario previously discussed
illustrates this lack of fit. Courts in those cases often struggle to determine whether the
justification of necessity or the excuse of duress better applies. See supra notes 236-52
and accompanying text.
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act cannot be justified because one can hardly say that the coerced actor did
the right thing or, on balance, caused society no harm.333 At the same
time, however, duress differs from .a typical excuse that focuses on some
personal disability or peculiar incapacity of the actor. Normally, such a
disability excuses by distinguishing the actor from the normal morally
responsible agent.334 A coercive threat, however, does not deprive the
coerced actor of her responsible moral agency. 335 Indeed, the normative
component of duress assures that the coerced actor demonstrated the degree
of fortitude expected of a member of the morally responsible community.
In other words, even though the legally coerced actor failed to do the right
thing, her act is nevertheless tolerated because she "attained . . society's
legitimate expectations of moral strength." 336
Thus, just as actus reus and mens rea appear to collapse in duress, so
does the line between justification and excuse. Its general classification as
an excuse would, on first blush, make duress more prone to legitimate
individualization 337 than self-defense, which is generally regarded as a
justification.338 The peculiar normative character of duress, however,
333 See Carr, supra note 131, at 179 (duress not justification because there exists
"no morally right thing for the person to do in the face of a serious moral dilemma).
Moreover, justification of the coerced act would arguably preclude prosecution of the
coercive agent or similarly prevent an innocent third party from resisting the criminal
act. See FLETCHER, supra note 237, at 830 (duress not justification because otherwise
victim not entitled to resist and accomplice cannot be convicted); see also infra notes
352-68 and accompanying text (discussing differing moral equities at issue in duress).
3 34 See Coughlin, supra note 24, at 13-14.
335 See Carr, supra note 131, at 179 (duress not properly an excuse because it
fails to "override responsible moral agency"); Dressler, supra note 131, at 1359
(coerced actor "a morally responsible agent").
336 Dressier, supra note 131, at 1334.
337 Theoretically, justifications present an entirely "objective" question that
centers on the surrounding circumstances and resulting consequences of an accused's
conduct, rather than on her subjective perceptions or knowledge. An act committed
under justifying circumstances is not wrongful and others can rely upon a justification
as a guide to future conduct. See Fletcher, supra note 152, at 1304; Moore, supra
note 312, at 1095-96. In contrast, an excuse presents an inherently subjective question
which aims at achieving "individual justice to a particular actor." Moore, supra note
312, at 1096. See also Dressier, supra note 212, at 675-76 (excused actor wrongs
society, but does not deserve to be punished); Fletcher, supra note 152, at 1304
(excuses ascertain "whether particular individual can be held responsible"). Thus; "by
focusing on the actor, excuses necessarily concern themselves with the subjective
mental state of a particular actor." Moore, supra note 312, at 1096.
338 Even the traditional classification of self-defense as a justification is not secure
in the context of battered women. Many scholars would excuse, but not justify, a
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counteracts this facile conclusion. Indeed, this difficulty in classifying
duress illustrates its uniqueness as a criminal defense.
4. Duress as "Exceptional" Defense
Courts and commentators frequently describe traditional duress as a rare
and exceptional defense, the limits of which are both narrowly drawn and
extraordinarily demanding. 339 The stringent limitations imposed on duress
flow, in part, from the fact that it excuses persons who have rationally and
intentionally chosen to commit an unlawful act-persons who would
ordinarily be held blameworthy. 340
Those traditional restrictions also exist due to the difficulty of
distinguishing the coerced actor from the "common run of humankind." 341
Coercion, the subjective mental state necessary to duress, cannot be
empirically verified by any objectively verifiable disability like a mental
disease or defect. 342 Indeed, every member of society undoubtedly and
daily experiences some form of coercion wrought by life's internal and
battered woman's killing of an abuser in non-confrontational situations that lack
imminent harm. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 312, at 1149 n.19 (contending that cases
of reasonable mistake should be treated as excuses, not justifications); Schopp, supra
note 50, at 109-110 (finding subjective inquiries regarding battered women as
"relevant to culpability and excuse rather than to standards for justification").
339 See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1080 (1978) (duress "even rarer" defense than insanity); United
States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (only "extraordinary" case
will satisfy "demanding" test of the "narrowly defined" defense of duress); United
States v. Gregory, No. 88CR295, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10060, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 2, 1988) (courts "narrowly circumscribe" "exceptional" defense with "stringent"
limitations); State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 766 (N.J. 1977) (duress a "peculiar"
defense); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 50-51 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) ("stringent
requirements" for duress accord with law's "traditional skepticism" regarding the
"limited" defense); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 3, at 379 (1985) (noting the
"exceptional nature" of duress); Bayless, supra note 131, at 1216 (courts "restrictively
interpret" duress); Coughlin, supra note 24, at 2, 30, 57 (discussing "demanding"
standard of duress); Dressler, supra note 131, at 1384 (duress "very limited and
slightly disquieting" defense).
340 See Dressier, supra note 131, at 1359-60 (only duress excuses one who
rationally and intentionally places his own interest above that of the community);
Horder, supra note 131, at 708 (duress is exception to rule that motives are normally
irrelevant in determining culpability).
341 Kadish, supra note 250, at 262.
3 42 In this regard, duress thus differs from the excuse of insanity. See supra notes
310-24 and accompanying text.
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external pressures. 343 In order to distinguish the coerced -actor worthy of
excuse from the timid or easily coerced actor for whom choice is
subjectively difficult, duress requires that an actor be able to point to an
imminent, sufficiently grave and 6bjectively determinable cause of her
coercion-the external threat.344
The decision as to where to draw the line among this omnipresent
system of pressures is ultimately one of public policy. 345 Classic duress
thus provides reasonably clear and identifiable restrictions on the defense
designed to ensure that its excuse does not cut too broadly and exculpate
persons whose choices, albeit difficult, were nonetheless fair. Traditional
duress requires that the external cause of an actor's coercion be extreme
and sufficiently grave in order to limit the defense to the most serious types
of pressures to commit .crime.346 The requirements of immediacy and
inescapability further limit the excuse to situations in which the
government has no time or opportunity to intervene and the defendant is in
the best and only position to prevent the threatened harm.347
Finally, the normative component of duress excuses only those actors
who demonstrate the level of fortitude that society can fairly expect of its
morally responsible members. The very rationale of duress thus requires
that an accused be judged against some objective standard, regardless of
her own capacities or constitutional weaknesses. 348 That is, whatever the
343 As noted by Sir James Stephen, the criminal law itself is a system of
compulsions designed to coerce persons into compliance with the law. STEPHEN, supra
note 272, at 466-68 (1883).
344 See ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(c), at 352-55; WILLIAMS, GENERAL,
supra note 124, at 758; Bayless, supra note 131, at 1210, 1196 n.22.
345 See WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK, supra note 124, at 625-26. (what counts as duress
is "question of policy" that rests "upon an assessment of what the criminal law is
capable of effecting and what it is right that it should try to do").
346 See Bayless, supra note 131, at 1216 (duress limited to extreme
circumstances); Dressier, supra note 312, at 354-55"(sufficiently grave threat more
quantifiable and tangible for jury making moral judgment); Schulhofer, supra note 53,
at 112-13 (duress requires extreme and overbearing compulsion).
347 See Dressier, supra note 312, at 354-55 (stating that the "requirement of
'imminency' ensures that the danger is real"); Horder, supra note 131, at 709-11
(coerced defendant uniquely placed to usurp state's exclusive right to prevent harm).
348 Even the Model Penal Code, which advocates a completely subjective
standard for self-defense, as well as a substantial relaxation of the traditional elements
of duress, acknowledges the importance of retaining an objective standard for duress-
a standard that should not vary according to the individual's capacity to meet this legal
norm. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374 (1985) (duress does not depend
"upon the fortitude of any given actor").
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merits of completely individualizing other excuses, the defense of duress
depends on maintaining some objective standard external to the character
and capacities of the individual actor.3 49
This stringent, objective standard of duress, then, clearly does not
favor any further expansion of the traditional limitations on duress.350 Nor
does it support the extension of the inherently "subjective" battered woman
defense, beyond self-defense, to cases of duress. As recently stated by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
To consider battered woman's syndrome evidence in applying that
[objective] test would be to turn the objective inquiry that duress has
always required into a subjective one. The question would no longer be
whether a person of ordinary firmness could have resisted. Instead, the
question would change to whether this individual woman, in light of the
psychological condition from which she suffers, could have resisted. In
addition to being contrary to settled duress law, we conclude that such a
change would be unwise. 351
C. Differing Equities: Batterer v. Innocent Third Party
One of the primary distinctions between a battered woman's claim of
self-defense and that of duress concerns the nature of her response to the
perceived deadly threat. In self-defense, the woman avoids the imminent
danger by responding in kind against its source-her batterer. In duress,
however, the woman avoids her abuser's threat by misconduct directed
against an innocent third party.352
This difference in the two defenses clearly makes some courts reluctant to
stretch or subjectify the traditional elements of duress to encompass battered
349 Compare Fletcher, supra note 152 (advocating system of excuses based on the
individual character and culpability of an accused by asking what she could fairly be
expected to do under the circumstances) with Kadish, supra note 250, at 274-77
(defending the maintenance of an objective reasonableness standard).
350 In holding expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome
irrelevant to a battered offender's claim of duress, the Washington Supreme Court
expressed similar sentiments: "The more stringent requirements for the duress defense
are a result of the more socially harmful outcome allowed by this defense, and reflect
society's conclusion that, as a matter of public policy, the defense should be
limited ... . State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 51 (Wash. 1994) (en bane).
351 United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1994).
352 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, § 5.3(a), at 43 n.6; Bayless, supra note
131, at 1191 n.1.
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offenders. 353 Other commentators, however, argue that the retributive desire to
punish a wrongdoer for the crime committed against an innocent can be
satisfied by prosecution of the author of the coercion-the batterer.354
That a battered offender saves herself from her batterer's deadly threat by
committing a crime against another, rather than by killing her abuser, should
not alone preclude a duress defense. Indeed, duress is formulated to excuse
"wrongs" committed against a neutral innocent. At the same time, however, a
case of duress does inject different moral claims into the excusing calculus than
those involved in the "justified" killing of a threatening abuser.
The criminal law acquits the battered woman who kills her abuser in the
heat of an ongoing confrontation because she possessed the right to protect
herself against her abuser's unlawful and deadly aggression. A moral forfeiture
theory would go further and justify her conduct by virtue of the fact that the
batterer deserved killing. He had, at least temporarily, forfeited his right to
life.3 55 Indeed, much of the debate over extending self-defense to battered
women who kill in non-confrontational circumstances may well flow from
353 See, e.g., Neelley v. State, 642 So. 2d 494, 508-1000 (Ala. Crim. App.
1993), writ quashed as improvidently granted, 642 So. 2d 510 (Ala 1994), cert. denied
115 S. Ct. 1316 (1995) ("major distinguishing fact" between case of duress and that of
self-defense is that defendant did not "choose to kill her batterer. She chose, instead,
to kill an innocent third party, a choice which falls outside any acceptable notion of
self-protection."); State v. Dunn, 758 P.2d 718, 725 (Kan. 1988), habeas corpus
granted sub nom. Dunn v. Roberts, 758 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1991), aft'd, 963
F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992) (unlike use of the battered woman syndrome in connection
with self-defense, defendant attempted to use battered woman syndrome to justify
crimes committed against innocent third parties); Riker, 869 P.2d at 51 ("Whereas
someone who acts in self-defense acts against the very person pressuring him or her,
an actor who successfully raises a duress defense is freed from criminal liability for
harm caused to an innocent third party.").
354 See Boland, supra note 24, at 633 (asserting that a "large measure of fault
should lay against the batterer"). See generally Richard Delgado, Ascription of
Criminal States of Mind: Toward A Defense T7heory for the Coercively Persuaded
Brainwashed Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13, 30 (1978) (in advocating
brainwashing defense, author finds "retributive instinct" fulfilled by punishment of the
captor, "to whom the criminal action may more appropriately be ascribed");
Rosenthal, supra note 131, at 209 (punishment should be directed against coercer,
"not against the morally innocent").
355 For a discussion of the moral forfeiture principle and its applicability to the
battered woman defense, see DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 181-182, 205. See also
Morse, supra note 103, at 610 ("Many people may inchoately believe that perpetrators
of such deeds deserve to die ... and thus attempt to discover means to justify killing
them.").
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judicial fear of fostering such a "blame the victim" mentality.3 56 Regardless of
the legitimacy of such a rationale, its very existence illustrates that the moral
equities appear balanced in favor of the battered woman in the self-defense
scenario.357
A situation of duress adds the claims of an innocent third party to the
moral equation. In such cases, the utilitarian goals of deterrence and social
protection may override the retributive aim of individual justice to the battered
offender. 358 Thus, a court may legitimately conclude that the extraordinary
nature of duress as a defense-involving the intentional and knowing infliction
of unlawful harm on a non-threatening party-justifies stringent adherence to
its traditional limitations, which themselves are the product of public policy. 359
Instrumentalist goals might support even a slightly successful increase in
356 See DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 205 (finding moral forfeiture principle
"troubling" in that it suggests that an abuser's constant "immoral and dangerous
conduct renders his life nearly permanently forfeited"); Morse, supra note 103, at 610
(stating that the criminal law "rejects the legitimacy of inflamed vengeance");
Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 117 (noting "court's traditional preoccupation with
confining the boundaries of any defense suggestive of the inevitably powerful 'blame
the victim' strategy").
357 Professor David McCord explains the battered woman's right to kill her
aggressor/batterer as a vindication of the "innocents preferred" principle-one of the
core moral principles that "define the essence of self-defense law." McCord & Lyons,
supra note 73, at 130-31. According to Professor McCord, this "innocents preferred"
principle accommodates the "killing is bad" principle and the "self-preservation"
imperative-other core principles that often conflict in the self-defense scenario. Id.
358 See Kadish, supra note 250, at 271 ("Another reason why justice for the
individual is not an absolute is that it can conflict with the moral claims of other
individuals."); Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 114 & n.30 (asserting. that "though
inconsistent with just deserts theory of punishment," the demanding nature of criminal
law is "justified by social protection function").
It is not uncommon for the criminal law to discriminate between cases involving
injury to an accomplice in an unlawful scheme and those involving injury to an
innocent third party. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-11-3 (West Supp. 1994)
(imposing felony murder liability when "the actor acting either alone or with one or
more other persons is engaged in the commission of [an enumerated felony] . . . and
in the course of such crime . any person causes the death of a person other than
one of the participants. ... ")(emphasis added); State v. Petersen, 526 P.2d 1008,
1009 (Or. 1974) (drag racing case holding that Oregon's involuntary manslaughter
statute "should not be interpreted to extend to those cases in which the victim is a
knowing and voluntary participant in the course of reckless conduct").
359 See supra notes 339-51 and accompanying text. But see Fletcher, supra note
152, at 1308-09 (arguing that compassion, rather than public policy, should motivate
excuses).
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deterrence value to protect those innocents caught between the batterer and the
battered. These third-party claims might also implicate the non-utilitarian focus
on the blameworthiness or "moral fault" of the battered offender. 360 In short,
the "innocents preferred" principle, in the context of duress, might yield a
different result than that produced in the context of self-defense. 361
Utilitarian and retributive benefits undoubtedly do flow from
punishment of the person who coerces another into unlawful conduct. 362
The excuse of duress may, in some cases, merely vent blame backward
onto the batterer who, with the requisite intent, coerces a battered offender
into criminal conduct. 363 In cases involving an undirected threat, however,
in which a battered offender commits her offense out of some
"generalized" fear rather than any specific command from her abuser,
prosecution of the batterer may not be available. Excusing the battered
offender in those circumstances may leave the "basic [retributive] interests
of the law" unsatisfied. 364
360 See Kadish, supra note 250, at 264 ("To blame a person is to express a moral
criticism .... Excuses... represent no sentimental compromise with the demands of
a moral code; they are, on the contrary, of the essence of a moral code.").
361 See McCord & Lyons, supra note 73, at 130-31; see also supra note 357 and
accompanying text.
362 The requirement that a coercive threat emanate from a human, rather than
natural threat, seeks to ensure that someone is prosecuted for an unjustified wrong.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 379 (1985) (if natural threats permitted and
actor excused "no one is subject to the law's application"). The criminal law thus
provides a number of avenues for prosecuting "the agent of unlawful force." See id.,
§ 2.09 cmt. 1, at 370 n.22. For example, one who attempts to induce another to
commit a criminal offense can generally be independently prosecuted under a criminal
coercion statute. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (1985); see also PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 121, at 1069 (discussing similar impelled perpetration statutes). If
duress excuses the actual perpetrator of the offense, the coercer may still be convicted
as a principal who committed the crime through an innocent instrumentality. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a) (1985). Finally, the author of the coercion can be
convicted as an accomplice to the primary party of the crime if he possesses the
requisite mens rea. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(c), (3) (1985).
363 See Dressler, supra note 212, at 711 ("Duress excuses by shifting blame
backwards."); cf. Robinson, supra note 310, at 226 (excuses shift blame from actor to
external or internal disability)
364 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 379 (1985) ("basic interests of the
law may be satisfied by prosecution of the agent of unlawful force"). This raises yet
another difference between self-defense and duress in the context of battered women.
In self-defense, the wrongdoer who provoked the incident is punished (i.e., killed),
thus fulfilling society's interests in retribution and deterrence. In contrast, if no one
can be held responsible for a battered offender's crime (i.e., the batterer cannot be
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That the batterer may escape punishment does not, of course,
necessitate punishment of the battered. Harms often befall innocents for
which no one can be held criminally responsible. By the same token,
however, that a "large measure of fault should lay against the batterer" 365
should not, by itself, exonerate the battered offender who actually and
intentionally perpetrates the criminal act. Instead, the blameworthiness of
the battered offender must be independently assessed. As Professor
Dressler points out, the existence of a legal excuse does not hinge on
"whether someone else can be deservedly punished for the crime."366
Instead, the central issue in any excuse, including duress, concerns
"whether this particular defendant deserves punishment." 367 When a
battered offender commits a crime in the absence of any imminent threat,
"there may be enough guilt to go around." 368
VII. DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT AND THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
In order to excuse battered women under the aegis of duress, a court or
legislature must be willing to either eliminate many of its traditional
elements (as proposed in the Model Penal Code), or implicitly modify them
by incorporating the individual capacities, characteristics, and propensities
of battered women into its objective and normative standard. A court, in
other words, must be willing to "adjust downward" the demanding
standard of duress before accommodating battered offenders in
non-traditional cases of duress. 369 While such an adjustment might very
well be desirable, it cannot be made without similar modification of the
theory of personal accountability and free choice that currently underlies
our criminal justice system and its parsimonious theory of excuses. Nor
can such an adjustment, if made, be legitimately confined to the defense of
battered women.
prosecuted for his undirected threat), these societal interests go unfulfilled.
365 Boland, supra note 24, at 633.
366 Dressier, supra note 131, at 1376; see also Dressier, supra note 312, at 344
("criminal law has no aversion to convicting more than one person for a single
crime").
367 Dressier, supra note 131, at 1376.
368 Dressier, supra note 212, at 712 (cautioning against shifting all blame to
coercer in cases lacking an imminent threat).
369 See Coughlin, supra note 24, at 57 ("The demanding 'duress' standard, which
the criminal law insists that responsible actors must satisfy, is adjusted downward to
accommodate women's pre-dispositions for obedience to men."). But see Appel, supra
note 24, at 979 (contending that battered woman syndrome does not change or extend
the "current law of duress").
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A. Adjusting Duress Downward
The battered woman defense, like other proposed extensions of
duress,370 seeks to explain a battered woman's behavior, to aid in
understanding how a battered offender came to do what she is accused of
doing. Its acceptance and success lie in broad contextualization and an
individualized assessment of the personal capacities and good character of
the battered actor. It speaks, as some have said, in a feminine voice based
on empathy, caring, and compassion.371
As many commentators have noted, however, our current system of
blaming-of personal responsibility and just deserts-does not speak in a
feminine voice of empathy or supportive compassion. Instead, the criminal
law is "judgmental" and "demanding." 372 It aims, not at understanding
criminal conduct, but at defining it in terms of general, minimal, (and, it is
hoped, reasonable) norms. 373 These standards, forged by public policy as
well as by individual justice,374 guide lawful conduct and, given this
normative function, rarely vary according to the individual capacities or
good character of the actor. 375
370 Examples of two such defenses include brainwashing, see Peter Alldridge,
Brainwashing as a Criminal Defense, 1984 CRIM. L. REv. 726; Delgado, supra note
354, and defenses based on disadvantaged background, see David L. Bazelon, The
Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385 (1976); Richard Delgado,
"Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAw & INEQUALITY 9 (1985).
371 See Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 124 (finding that "different voice" feminism
"collides with the core assumptions of criminal law"); Dressier, supra note 212, at
681-82 n.67 (IT]hose who broadly contextualize-people who speak with a feminine
moral voice-tend to excuse more people.); see also Schneider, Equal Rights, supra
note 52, at 639-40 (advocating individualization of excusing conditions for battered
women).
372 Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 124.
373 As Professor Schulhofer points out: "Criminal law . . . is judgmental and
demanding. Its usual posture is not supportive and empathetic. Its aim is not to
understand each person in her individuality, but rather to articulate general norms,
and to judge and to condemn even when compliance was understandably difficult." Id.
See also Kadish, supra note 250, at 270 (asserting that "criminal law ... must serve
as a clear, explicit guide to lawful conduct").
374 See Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 124; cf. Fletcher, supra note 152, at 1309
("[Yet so long as we think of law as a pursuit of policies, we are inclined to think the
probable consequences of our decision ought to mediate our sense of justice to the
individual accused.").
375 See Fletcher, supra note 152, at 1300 (individualizing excuses runs contrary
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The current theory of personal responsibility thus assumes that all
humans are morally responsible agents who possess free will and,
accordingly, are personally accountable for their intentional conduct-even
conduct that is somehow "caused."376 Exceptions to this principle, like the
excuse of duress, are sparingly granted and severely restricted. 377
Likewise, personal responsibility, under the present regime, rejects any
notion of excuse based solely upon compassion or character.3 78 Motives
are generally irrelevant to culpability, for we can assess blame even if we
can understand and empathize with an actor.3 79 As Professor Schulhofer
has pointed out, the criminal law "can understand, empathize and care
without concluding that we must excuse."380 Indeed, sometimes the more
we can empathize, the more we blame in order to prevent us from acting
likewise. Again, duress represents a very limited exception to this usual
discounting of motive; an exception which itself depends upon an external
standard of personal responsibility. 381
Thus, the existing paradigm of personal guilt rejects the type of
individualization of excusing conditions that the extension of the battered
woman defense to duress would require. Classic duress, likewise, will not
easily accommodate the internal susceptibilities and psychological
incapacities, i.e., the unique lack of fortitude, that are now part and parcel
of the battered woman syndrome.382 While the expansion of duress to
to common law tradition based on "rules that suppress the differences among persons
and situations"); Kadish, supra note 250, at 278 (only with insanity does law permit
individualized inquiries into the capacities of the defendant).
376 The current blaming system rejects any causal theory of excuses that would
exonerate all criminal conduct that can be traced to internal or external causes for
which the accused is not responsible. See Dressier, supra note 212, at 686-87 (causal
theory would result "in a universal excuse"); Moore, supra note 312, at 1092 (causal
theory leads to "absurd conclusion that no one is responsible for anything").
377 Dressier, supra note 312, at 357-58 (society limits excuses to most severe
situations).
378 See Dressler, supra note 131, at 1360-63 (compassion alone will not excuse,
nor will good character free actor of responsibility for wrongdoing); Dressler, supra
note 212, at 674, 683 (while compassion is good, it does not, alone, excuse many
wrongdoers who merit both compassion and blame); Kadish, supra note 250, at 289
("compassion and mitigation are not incompatible with blame").
379 See Moore, supra note 312, at 1147 ("To stand back and to refuse to judge
because one understands the causes of criminal behavior is to elevate one's self over
the unhappy deviant.").
380 Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 126.
381 See Kadish, supra note 250, at 289 ("We need some standard of responsibility
external to the make-up of the person to maintain our practices of blame.").
382 As Professor Coughlin has recognized: "The [battered woman] defense itself
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encompass battered offenders may well represent a more just system of
blaming, 383 that modification cannot be wrought without generalizing
duress by adjusting downward its stringent requirements.
Moreover, a more generalized coercion defense will likely draw the
"slippery slope" objection that its expanded ambit cannot be restricted to
the defense of battered women. Instead, once its demanding requirements
are relaxed, duress must similarly excuse a broader class of offenders who
are arguably subject to equally coercive pressures.
B. The "Slippery Slope"
A variety of pressures, both human and natural, hereditary and
environmental, arguably "compel" persons into crime. As shown
previously, the traditionally restrictive parameters of duress exist, at least
in part, to distinguish the legally coerced actor from the general population
of other criminal offenders subject to similarly coercive pressures. 384 To
prevent its excuse from cutting too broadly and exonerating persons whose
choices, while personally difficult, were nonetheless fair, classic duress
severely restricts the types of pressures that qualify for its excuse. 385 Thus,
as traditionally formulated, duress will not excuse victims of non-human
coercive circumstances like broken homes or disadvantaged
backgrounds. 386 Nor will it excuse victims of alleged brainwashing who
defines the woman as a collection of mental symptoms, motivation deficits, and
behavioral abnormalities; indeed, the fundamental premise of the defense is that
women lack the psychological capacity to choose lawful means to extricate themselves
from abusive mates." Coughlin, supra note 24, at 7.
383 Indeed, some would argue that women, not only battered women, cannot be
viewed as morally responsible agents until the existing paradigm of responsibility
embraces their voice through individualization and contextualization, caring and
compassion, empathy and understanding. See Coughlin, supra note 24, at 92 (stating
that the task is to revise current theory of responsibility to accommodate women);
Schneider, supra note 32, at 566-67 (challenging the "concept of reasonableness" to
encompass "the wealth of different experiences of both men and women").
384 See supra notes 339-51 and accompanying text (discussing exceptional nature
of duress).
385 See Bayless, supra note 131, at 1210 (traditional limitations on duress provide
objective criteria to distinguish "between a person unable to choose rationally and a
person who must make a great effort to do so").
386 According to Professor Dressler, such "situational duress" would excuse an
actor "for committing a crime if, through no fault of her own, she is placed in a
situation so harsh that a person of ordinary moral firmness in her situation would have
committed the crime." DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 270. Only a few commentators
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commit crimes under the threatening shadow of prolonged physical and
psychological abuse, rather than under any impending threat of immediate
harm.38 7
As previously discussed, the defense of many battered offenders,
whose plight is frequently analogized to that of brainwashed victims,
depends on an explicit or implicit expansion of duress to encompass the
long-term and psychologically wasting abuse that renders them submissive
to their abusers. The inclusion of such long-term psychological pressures
within the ambit of duress, however, blurs the relatively clear perimeters
drawn by classic duress.388 Moreover, such inclusion further increases the
difficulty of distinguishing those deprived of a fair opportunity for lawful
advocate this "duress of circumstances." See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 370; Delgado,
supra note 370. The criminal law academy generally derides these new excuses as
emasculating the notions of free will and choice that support the current theory of
criminal responsibility. See FLETCHER, supra note 237, at 801-02 (recognizing that
excuse based on prolonged social deprivation "leads us into the cul-de-sac of
environmental determinism" and the abandonment of "the entire institution of blame
and punishment"); Dressier, supra note 131, at 380-84 (assessing and rejecting theory
of duress based upon social and economic deprivation); Kadish, supra note 250, at
283-85 (contending that excuses based on social deprivation fail to establish the
breakdown of rationality and judgment that is incompatible with moral agency);
Moore, supra note 312, at 1146 ("[O]ne is responsible for actions that result from
one's choices, even though those choices are caused by factors themselves
unchosen."); Stephen Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: Reply to Judge
Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1268 (1976) (criticizing Bazelon's proposal
because it denies that actors from disadvantaged backgrounds are "autonomous and
capable of that most human capacity, the power to choose").
387 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 376-77 (1985). In contrast, while the
Model Penal Code rejects duress of circumstances, it substantially expands duress to
potentially excuse victims of brainwashing. See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying
text (examining ramifications of Code's deletion of "imminence" as a threshold
requirement of duress).
388 For a discussion of the line-blurring problems that arguably inhere in the
creation of a separate "brainwashing" defense, see Alldridge, supra note 370, at 731-
32, 737 (rejecting view of brainwashing as extension of duress and advocating entirely
new excuse); Delgado, supra note 354, at 7 n.29 (arguing that "[e]xtension of existing
doctrine to include the 'hard case' of a coercively persuaded defendant may blur the
lines separating legal concepts to the point where no one can predict their
boundaries"); Dressier, supra note 312, at 358-60 (finding brainwashing defense to
lack bright line clarity of classic duress, while excluding other potentially equal and
morally similar claims based on reduced choice); Lunde & Wilson, supra note 174, at
342 (arguing that the brainwashing defense increases the difficulty of determining
when coerced behavior ends and truly voluntary behavior begins).
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conduct froin those whose personal vulnerability merely makes compliance
more onerous.
389
This potential bleeding of duress makes courts reluctant to expand its
borders in defense of battered offenders. The recent opinion of the
Washington Supreme Court in State v. Riker390 illustrates this hesitancy. In
Riker, a battered woman claimed that a police informant coerced her
delivery and possession of cocaine. Although the defendant had no intimate
or long-term relationship with her alleged coercer, she claimed that her
status as a battered woman distorted her perception of danger and rendered
her more submissive to the informant's threats. In affirming the trial
court's exclusion of expert testimony concerning the battered woman
syndrome, the Washington Court stated:
Without requiring a foundation which would distinguish Debbie
Riker's fear from that of every other citizen who has a troubled past there
is a danger that the evidentiary doors will be thrown open to every
conceivable emotional trauma. Ultimately, the jury's finding of duress
would rest upon sympathy for the defendant, rather than an evaluation of
her present danger. These considerations are more appropriately a part of
sentencing. 39 1
Battered offenders thus need to sufficiently distinguish their situation
from other submissive offenders, subject to equally coercive long-term
pressures, who likewise commit their crimes under the power and control
of another. 392 The severe, long-term physical and psychological abuse
experienced in battering relationships, as well as the behavioral and
psychological symptoms engendered by that abuse, may provide the
389 As Professor Paul Robinson explains:
When . . . an individual is excused because of the fact of long-term
conditions, rather than a single threat of force, his situation is not as readily
distinguishable from that of many others who face ongoing personal problems and
economic pressures. An excuse based on such less dramatic and more long-term
pressures would tend to undermine a norm of obedience to the law and could
create the impression of legal norms that improperly vary depending upon the
individual's personal capacities.
ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(e)(7), at 365-66
390 869 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1994) (en bane).
391 Id. at 51 n.5.
392 See ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(e)(7), at 365 ("There should be strong
reasons compelling disparate treatment of actors who are equally unable to control
their conduct.").
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necessary basis for discrimination. 393 Indeed, that battered women suffer
from an established psychological "syndrome" may well separate battered
offenders from other submissive defendants who cannot (yet) take
advantage of such a psycho-social label. 39 4 Again, however, while this
psychological abnormality may aid battered offenders in staving off
slippery slope objections, it directly contravenes the normative aspect of
duress, which refuses to recognize individual incapacities not shared by
"men in general."395
Moreover, as feminist scholars like Elizabeth Schneider now
acknowledge, power and control mark many relationships, particularly
intimate ones. 396 According to Professor Schneider, while many women
have relationships with controlling men,397 the use of violence to control
partners in relationships is not unique to heterosexual relationships or to
those involving sexual intimacy. 398 Indeed, lesbian and gay battering, and
elder and child abuse, all necessitate a broader view of battering that
transcends "woman battering." 399 Schneider notes the "paradox" this
393 In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that while the Model Penal Code
expansion of duress to include brainwashing "may go too far if not linked to gross and
identifiable classes of circumstances," battered women, for purposes of sentencing,
were "in circumstances forming such a class." United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d
894, 900 (9th Cir. 1992).
394 Battered women do not generally suffer from any objectively verifiable
"mental disease or defect." See supra note 113. For a discussion of syndrome
evidence in criminal cases, see generally Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No
Need for a "Better Mousetrap," 32 S. TEx. L. REv. 37 (1990); David McCord,
Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of
Non-Traditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv. 19 (1987).
395 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374 (1985). See supra notes 310-24
and accompanying text.
396 Indeed, Professor Schneider finds power and control a characteristic of
virtually all relationships. See Schneider, supra note 32, at 538; see also Dutton,
supra note 33, at 1211 (finding "gender analysis of power" insufficient "to understand
the dynamics of violence and abuse in all intimate relationships").
397 Schneider, supra note 32, at 531.
398 Id. at 538.
399 This expanded vision of battering has already prompted calls to expand
self-defense, via psychological theories similar to the battered woman syndrome, to a
much larger category of cases involving "power and control in intimate relationships
generally." Schneider, supra note 32, at 538-44. Dr. Walker views the psychological
theory underlying the battered woman syndrome as helpful in "understand[ing]
victims' states of mind in a variety of situations." Walker, Self-Defense, supra note
46, at 334. At least one court has acknowledged that "victims of physical, sexual, and
psychological abuse may be men." Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa.
1995]
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re-definition creates for battered women seeking "special legal
recognition":
[A]lthough this revised definition of battering more fully describes the
range of experiences of women who are beaten, it complicates the
argument that women who have been physically battered are a distinct
group with unique problems. In other words, by collapsing the distinction
between physical abuse and other forms of abuse within intimate
relationships, battered women become like everyone else. Since all
relationships involve issues of power and control, practical difficulties
thus arise in differentiating battered women's experiences from women's
experiences within heterosexual relationships, or, as we have expanded
our understanding, within relationships generally. 4
This bhirring of lines between woman-battering and other forms of
battering-between battering and other manifestations of power and
control-may make a court, fearful of plummeting down the proverbial
slippery slope, hesitant to modify duress in the case of battered
offenders. 40 1 Indeed, as society's vision of battering expands, so must the
1989). Gay men and lesbians accused of murdering abusive partners often draw on
battered women's self-defense theories. See generally Denise Bricker, Fatal Defense:
An Analysis of Battered Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians
Who Kill Abusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. Rnv. 1379 (1993); David S. Dupps,
Battered Lesbians: Are They Entitled to a Battered Woman Defense?, 29 1. FAM. L.
879 (1990/1991); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REv. 567 (1990). Finally,
although it has failed to generate either the support or success achieved by the battered
woman syndrome, the psychologically similar "battered child syndrome" supports the
claim of self-defense in an increasing number of parricide cases. See, e.g., People v.
Gindorf, 512 N.E.2d 770 (111. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 517 N.E.2d 1090 (111. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1011 (1988); State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 506 (Wash. 1993)
(en bane). See generally Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational Killings and
the Appropriate Use of Battered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective
Self-Defense and the Merits of Partial Excuse, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 185 (1994);
John Nelson Scobey, Self-Defense Parricide: Expert Psychiatric Testimony on the
Battered Child Syndrome, HAMNE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 181 (1992); Susan C. Smith,
Abused Children Who Kill Abusive Parents: Moving Toward an Appropriate Legal
Response, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 141 (1992).
400 Schneider, supra note 32, at 538-39. Schneider believes that this paradox can
be resolved only by further individualizing excuses for both men and-women. Id. at
566-67. See also Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 52, at 639-40 ("The law can
equalize the positions of male and female defendants by recognizing their
differences.").
401 See Dressier, supra note 312, at 357-58 (society does not consider degrees of
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range of potential defendants eligible for a parallel expansion of duress.
In sum, the expansion of duress to excuse battered offenders places
them in somewhat of a dilemma. Excusing battered offenders under the
banner of duress hinges on distinguishing the coercive circumstances
surrounding a battered woman's crime from those surrounding other
offenders not entitled to excuse.4° 2 While the psychological incapacity that
currently epitomizes the battered woman defense might sufficiently
distinguish battered offenders, such subjective lack of fortitude contravenes
the inherently objective and normative nature of duress. At the same time,
the more a battered offender bases her claim of duress on the external
societal pressures to which she is- subject (i.e., battering), the less
"abnormal" her situation arguably becomes and the less entitled she is to
special legal treatment via expansion of duress.
C. Grappling with the "Slope"
Admittedly, slippery slope objections are generally unpersuasive. If an
accused does not merit blame, she should not merit conviction, regardless
of any ripple effect on precedent generated by her acquittal. At the same
time, however, those who advocate excusing battered offenders under the
banner of duress often implicitly restrict this expanded excuse to battered
women who, it is argued, face unique circumstances that justify special
legal attention. The foregoing analysis simply recognizes that duress likely
cannot be generalized exclusively in favor of battered women and without
modification of the excuse itself.
In writing this Article, I, like the courts addressing this issue, have
struggled to determine whether such an extension or modification of duress
is necessary or desirable. I am still uncertain of my tentative conclusions
and expect to be wrestling with this issue for some time to come.
The battered woman defense is clearly relevant to the subjective
threats due to "belief that extension to other cases might make excuses limitless");
Horder, supra note 131, at 708 (duress must be narrowly construed to prevent
indeterminacy and unpredictability); Kadish, supra note 250, at 274 (generalized
coercion defense would "open nearly every prosecution to claim that even reasonable
and lawful persons would have done the same").
402 See supra notes 341-44 and accompanying text. To preserve its deterrent
value, the criminal law conditions its excuses on the ability to distinguish the excused
actor from others who are arguably in the same situation and subject to similar
pressures. See ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(e)(7), at 365 ("'gross and verifiable'
disability... permits exculpation of the blameless without dissipation of the deterrent
effect of the criminal law prohibition"); Bayless, supra note 131, at 1216 (broad
expansion of duress will weaken general deterrence).
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component of a battered woman's coercion defense. It undeniably aids the
woman in bolstering (and in many cases, in salvaging) her credibility
before the fact-finder. 40 3 It supports the honesty of her fear, as well as her
belief that committing a crime was the only way to avert harm, even in the
absence of an objectively imminent and explicit threat. 404 Again, however,
duress does not consist solely of these subjective factors. Every jurisdiction
in this country requires the battered offender to additionally establish that
her honest fear and belief were objectively reasonable.40 5
In many atypical cases of duress, the battered woman cannot establish
this objective element unless a court is willing to subjectify the
reasonableness standard with the special psychological vulnerability and
paralysis that currently comprise the battered woman syndrome. 40 6 That
duress is generally classified as an excuse, rather than a justification,
arguably makes such individualization more theoretically sound for duress
than for self-defense.40 7 Ultimately, however, the unique nature of duress
as a normative excuse dependent upon some standard of conduct external to
an actor's individual psyche should preclude this degree of subjectification.
Of course, one could argue that normative judgments like those made
in assessing duress are especially suited for resolution by the jury.408 That
is, because duress requires a judgment about what a person of reasonable
firmness would do under similar circumstances, the question of coercion,
in all but extreme cases, arguably should go to the jury as representatives
of the relevant standard-setting community. 40 9 Fear of fostering the "abuse
excuse" can perhaps be allayed by saddling the defendant with the ultimate
403 See supra notes 99-100, 192-93 and accompanying text.
404 One commentator has suggested, however, that the current formulation of the
battered woman defense might actually undermine a battered woman's credibility.
While acknowledging that expert testimony concerning a well-supported syndrome
might be "relevant. to the defendant's credibility under certain limited conditions,"
Professor Schopp believes that such testimony "may actively undermine her credibilty
with the jury by portraying her relevant beliefs as the product of a pathological
syndrome rather than as reasonable inferences from her experience." Schopp, supra
note 50, at 90-91.
405 See infra APPENDIX.
406 See supra notes 192-209 and accompanying text.
407 See supra notes 193-209, 229-22 and accompanying text.
408 See Dressler, supra note 131, at 1374 (characterizing duress as presenting
"morality play... especially suitable for resolution by the jury").
409 See ROBINSON, supra note 89, § 177(e)(7), at 365-66 ("One might argue that
regardless of the cause of the coercion, the defendant should have the opportunity to
persuade the jury that, for reasons not attributable to him, he could not control his
conduct sufficiently to be held accountable for it.").
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burden of persuasion on her coercion defense. 410 Arguably, these are
"procedural" solutions that do not purport to change the substantive
requirements of classic duress; they simply relax procedural hurdles that
preclude the battered offender from presenting her case to the jury. That
jury must still determine whether the battered offender has succeeded in
proving the traditional elements of her defense.411 Such arguments,
however, beg the central question regarding the relevance of the battered
woman defense to the excuse of duress.
Potentially, the battered woman defense speaks to abnormal, external
circumstances that severely restrict the battered offender's opportunity to
4 10 Jurisdictions differ on whether the prosecution or defense bears the burden of
persuasion concerning duress. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 4, at 384 & nn.
66-67 (1985); ROBINsON, supra note 89, § 177(a), at 350-51 & n.5. There is no
federal constitutional bar to placing on the defendant the burden of persuasion to
prove the affirmative defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence. See
United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1991). At least one court
receptive to the battered woman defense in the context of duress has explicitly placed
the burden of persuasion on the battered woman. In McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725
(R.I. 1992), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held:
Today we acknowledge that this court does recognize that battered woman's
syndrome is a mental or an emotional condition that can affect women and that it
does have certain legal consequences. Nevertheless we intend that a defendant's
assertion of the condition be exposed to the most exacting scrutiny to determine its
legitimacy in each factual circumstance in which it is presented. When the issue of
battered woman's syndrome is raised as a defense in a criminal trial, we hold that
the state will not be required to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather a
defendant will be required to prove the existence of the condition as an affirmative
defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The defendant must bear the
burden to prove the existence of facts that would constitute the
battered-woman's-syndrome defense.
Id. at 733-34 (citations omitted). See also State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 766 (N.J.
1977) (holding that the "admittedly open-ended nature of [the duress] standard, with
the possibility for abuse and uneven treatment, justifies placing the onus on the
defendant to convince the jury").
411 Professor Holly Maguigan has proposed a similar reform in the context of
self-defense. Instead of reformulating self-defense, Professor Maguigan would reform
the procedural rules that govern whether a battered woman can get her defense to the
jury. Maguigan, supra note 52, at 387. She proposes a rule that requires a self-defense
instruction whenever the defendant produces any evidence from any source on any
(not all) of the- elements of self-defense. It would then be up to the jury to determine
whether all of those elements had been satisfied. Id. at 441-42.
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freely choose lawful over unlawful conduct. So formulated, the defense
would dovetail with the conception of duress as a "lack of fair
opportunity" excuse.412 The battered woman defense, however, currently
does not focus on such external circumstances. It centers instead on the
internal psychological incapacities of battered women and their special
subjective vulnerability to their abusers. 413 It is this very formulation of the
defense, designed to subjectify (and hence establish) "imminence,"
"inescapability," and "reasonableness," that runs contrary to the
normative, objective, and exceptional nature of duress.
Ultimately, such subjective, "incomplete" duress seems most
appropriately accounted for through the use of sentencing discretion in
mitigation of a battered offender's punishment. 414 Judges should possess
the discretion to exercise compassion in light of an accused's individual
character and susceptibilities and mete out punishment in proportion to the
battered offender's reduced blameworthiness. Unfortunately, sentencing
constraints like guidelines and mandatory minimum penalties currently
shackle this essential judicial discretion.415 Moreover, in the current "get
tough on crime" political climate, sentencing reform appears remote and
unlikely. It is tempting to compensate for this sentencing inadequacy by
throwing up one's hands in frustration and urging that if the battered
woman defense cannot be fully accounted for at sentencing, a court has no
alternative but to permit the jury to consider it in assessing guilt.416 While
emotionally appealing, this argument remains theoretically disquieting. I
question the wisdom of attempting to correct a faulty sentencing scheme
with an injudicious expansion of the substantive excuse itself 4 17 -an
412 See generally Dressier, supra note 131.
413 See supra notes 107-14, 201-09 and accompanying text.
414 See Dressier, supra note 212, at 700-01 (finding broad contextualization
appropriate at sentencing); Kadish, supra note 250, at 289 (favoring mitigation "based
on special elements in background of individual"); Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 112
(noting that the judgmental feature of criminal law " is considerably muted" at the
more individualistic sentencing stage).
415 But see Nagel & Johnson, supra note 38, at 219-221 (contending that female
drug offenders continue to benefit from special sentencing discretion under federal
guidelines scheme).
416 See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 212, at 701 n. 136 (noting that mandatory
minimums increase pressure "to load substantive penal code with full and partial
excuses"); see also Aron, supra note 2, at 17 (describing "Alice-in-Wonderland
journey of ihe bAttered woman through the federal criminal justice system").
417 Others have expressed similar concerns. See Dressler, supra note 212, at 684
(rejecting use of excuses "to circumvent poorly devised system of punishment").
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expansion that requires a fundamental modification in excusing 418 and that
applies to a much broader class of psychologically "coerced" offenders. 419
VIII. CONCLUSION
The differing natures of self-defense and duress, as well as the
innocents preferred principle at issue in duress, preclude any facile analogy
between the two defenses based upon a mere overlap in their prima faie
elements. Duress, as a defense to criminal liability, is indeed both
exceptional and demanding. Its normative aspect ensures that the legally
coerced actor satisfies society's legitimate expectations of conduct
becoming a "person of reasonable firmness." Its traditionally stringent
requirements restrict its excuse to the most serious types of pressures to
commit crime and to situations where the defendant is in the best and only
position to avert the threatened harm.
Some battered offenders will undoubtedly be able to satisfy even the
most rigorous strictures of classic duress. In cases where an abuser is
present and threatening a woman with imminent and severe physical harm
unless she engages in illegal activity, courts should not hesitate to submit
the issue of duress to the fact-finder. Nor should courts prevent the
battered offender from establishing that defense with both lay and expert
testimony concerning domestic abuse.
Less traditional cases of alleged coercion, however,-where the abuser
is neither present nor immediately threatening the woman, or where she
engages in a series of criminal acts over an extended period of time-fall
outside the parameters of classic duress. In order to excuse battered
offenders in these atypical cases, the restrictive requirements of duress
must be eliminated or, at the very least, substantially relaxed.
"Imminence" must be debrided of its inherent temporal meaning.
"Inescapability" must encompass the perceived unavailability and
inaccessibility of social assistance. Most importantly, its objective
backstop-the person of reasonable fortitude-must be subjectified to
include the special subjective vulnerability and psychological incapacity
that currently comprise the battered woman defense.
Such a downward adjustment in the demanding nature of duress cannot
418 The merits of overhauling the principles of personal accountability and free
choice that currently underlie our criminal justice system go well beyond the scope of
this Article.
419 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 209 (1993); see also Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 124 (caring and helpful
conception of criminal law not confined to situation of battered woman).
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be made without a similar modification of our current system of blaming.
Nor can such an adjustment, if made, legitimately be confined to the
defense of battered women. Absent such modifications, the coercion
undoubtedly experienced by battered offenders must be accounted for in a
flexible system of sentencing, where caring, compassion, and individual
character should play a significant role. The sentencing scheme in many
jurisdictions currently constrains the discretion essential to such a system
and must be reformed to permit the "downward adjustment" in punishment
commensurate with a battered offender's reduced blameworthiness.
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